The forgotten story of the birth and life of the definition of ‘military objectives’ is relevant to the ongoing discussion about the need to adapt the law to asymmetric warfare. This definition, authored by a West German law professor and former member of the Nazi party, was driven by a Western effort to privilege regular armies while curbing the actions of guerrilla fighters and exposing their civilian supporters to harm. The Non-Aligned Movement turned the tide by burdening regular armies while exempting irregular combatants from the consequences of disregarding the law. It was only through judicial intervention—grounded in an imagined history of the linear progress of humanity—that civilians on both sides of asymmetric conflicts would ultimately become entitled to receive adequate protection.

The English Court of Appeal and German Bundesgerichtshof recently decided that Article 31(2) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation applies to asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. This article contends that while this conclusion is sound, separating the ‘clause’ into two ‘agreements’ to reach it is not. This disaggregation prevents a solution to the anomaly that Article 31(2) creates for asymmetric clauses, where a lender sues under its option and the borrower subsequently sues in the anchor court. This article proposes a solution, based on a uniform characterisation of the clause as a whole, which protects the lender's option and mitigates the risk of parallel proceedings.

This article assesses the arguments and challenges that are likely to arise should investors file an investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) claim over measures taken in response to a waiver of obligations relating to intellectual property rights (IPRs) under the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). After providing an overview of the proposed waiver of IPRs for COVID-19 vaccinations and treatments, it examines the jurisprudence relating to IP and investor–State arbitration and the grounds upon which investors would rely to make a case in ISDS and possible State defences. The analysis, which focuses on fair and equitable treatment and expropriation, concludes that it will be difficult for investors to succeed in claiming that measures taken in response to a TRIPS waiver of IPRs breach any substantive protection provision contained in an international investment agreement. States should, however, seek additional security by revisiting existing treaties and adding additional layers of safeguards to ensure legitimate and non-discriminatory measures taken in response to a TRIPS waiver do not lead to investor claims.

The constant exchange of investment assets poses a risk of ‘commoditisation’ of investment treaty claims. Nevertheless, both traditional and modern investment treaties contain sufficient safeguards against attempts by host State ‘insiders’ and third State ‘intruders’ to create artificial access to arbitration. First, the definition of ‘investment’ can filter genuine investments from bare acquisition of assets (ratione materiae). Second, the textual linkage between ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ strongly implies that ‘active contribution’ in the investment is required from assignees to qualify for protection (ratione personae). Third, the doctrine of abuse of rights prevents treaty shopping and internationalisation of domestic disputes (ratione temporis).

This article challenges the widely held view that WTO Members are not permitted to impose trade restrictions on other WTO Members in the form of countermeasures for breaches of international law. It cautions that this generally held view has wider implications for international law and multilateralism because countermeasures are a significant means of enforcing and preserving the normative integrity of international obligations outside the WTO, including erga omnes and erga omnes partes obligations. Arguments supporting their ‘displacement’ must be based on clear evidence, which this article shows to be lacking. This article also attempts to allay the (understandable but perhaps exaggerated) concern that such countermeasures might undermine the predictability of the WTO system. Trade countermeasures for breaches of extra-WTO obligations are subject to stringent conditions under customary international law and to judicial scrutiny by means of WTO adjudication, both of which minimise the space for abuse and the risk of unpredictability.

The article tests the claim of feminist scholars that concerns about gender have been marginalised in refugee law, by exploring the interpretation given to the concept of a ‘Particular Social Group’ set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is argued that recent practice at the supranational level in the European Union has contributed to the deterioration of refugee protection standards for women seeking asylum from gender-based violence. However, the article demonstrates that a human rights-based approach to the interpretation of ‘Particular Social Group’, which is supported by extensive examples of good practice in individual Member States, has the potential to redress this.

General Comment 36 of the Human Rights Committee, adopted in 2018, asserts that ‘States parties engaged in acts of aggression as defined in international law, resulting in deprivation of life, violate ipso facto article 6 of the Covenant.’ One question about this claim is whether it reduces incentives for compliance with international humanitarian law for States and their agents—incentives provided through the principles of belligerent equality and combatant immunity. It is argued that it does not do so—such a worry about incentives is not a reason to reject the claim in General Comment 36. In the process, it can also be shown that, if accepted, this claim is interesting in another way: it entails, in effect, a duty on States to prosecute acts of aggression insofar as they entail killing, as they often will. This itself is doctrinally innovative. As to who is to be prosecuted, it is the political and military leadership of the State. It is their decision to wage war unlawfully that renders the killings arbitrary.

The recent Representative Actions Directive 2020/1828/EC is a welcome advance in developing collective redress in Europe. However, this article contends that whilst the Directive is a positive development, shortfalls in its design restrict its potentially transformative impact for consumers. Critical examination is made of the Directive's rules on scope, standing, remedies, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), cross-border claims, funding, awareness and the provision of information. The article further considers whether the Directive will serve to improve co-ordination in civil procedure in this area which has traditionally been very diverse at a Member State level.

In September 2021, the French Cour de Cassation reversed the annulment that the Paris Cour d'appel earlier had granted in regard to an arbitral award in Alexander Brothers v Alstom on grounds of corruption. This brought French courts in line with their English counterparts, at least in that one case, the latter having accepted the Alexander Brothers award as enforceable. Noteworthy beyond the welcome consistency that the recent French judgment imparts in one case, that and other recent judgments cast light on several issues in international arbitration, including the arbitrability of allegations of fraud or corruption, the relevance of evidence of corruption ‘downstream’ from a contract, and the legal effects (if any) on third parties of internal compliance regimes that enterprises adopt in response to national regulatory and enforcement actions in respect of corruption.