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VICTIM–PERPETRATOR RECONCILIATION AGREEMENTS:WHAT CAN MUSLIM-MAJORITY JURISDICTIONS AND THE PRC LEARN FROM EACH OTHER?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 October 2017

Daniel Pascoe  and
Michelle Miao
Daniel Pascoe
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, School of Law, City University of Hong Kong, [email protected]
Michelle Miao
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, [email protected]
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Abstract

As States that use the death penalty liberally in a world that increasingly favours abolition, the Muslim-majority jurisdictions that are strict exponents of Islamic law and the People's Republic of China share a crucial commonality: their frequent use of victim–perpetrator reconciliation agreements to remove convicted murderers from the threat of execution. In both cases, rather than a prisoner's last chance at escaping execution being recourse to executive clemency, victim–perpetrator reconciliation agreements fulfil largely the same purpose, together with providing means of compensating victims for economic loss, and enabling the State concerned to reduce execution numbers without formally limiting the death penalty's scope in law. Utilizing the functionalist approach of comparative law methodology, this article compares the 13 death penalty retentionist nations that have incorporated Islamic law principles into their positive criminal law with the People's Republic of China, as to the functions underpinning victim–perpetrator reconciliation agreements in death penalty cases.

Keywords

capital punishmentChinaclemencycomparative lawdeath penaltyIslamic lawpardonPRC lawreconciliation agreements
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , October 2017 , pp. 963 - 989
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2017 

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References

1 These are: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Sudan, Nigeria (12 Northern States), Somalia, Libya, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. See n 39.

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7 See Section VI.

8 See Section VII.

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28 Peters (n 21) 50–2; Lange (n 10). See n 22.

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31 Baderin (n 22) 143 n 34; Bassiouni (n 20) 209.

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33 al-Alfi (n 17) 230; El-Awa (n 10) 85, 89. The fact that diya is primarily a compensatory, rather than punitive, remedy explains why different sums were traditionally payable for men and women and slaves and non-slaves, as a measure of lost economic output in the early Islamic era ( Black, AE et al. , Modern Perspectives on Islamic Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 221 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

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36 Includes Federal Republic of Somalia, Puntland State of Somalia and the Republic of Somaliland: see ‘Death Penalty Database’ (S Babcock et al., Cornell University Law School) <http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/search.cfm>. During the remainder of this article, ‘Somalia’ refers to the internationally recognized Federal Republic of Somalia.

37 Constitution of Saudi Arabia 1992, art 48; Iran Islamic Penal Code 2013, art 12; Yemen Law 12/1994, art 5; United Arab Emirates Penal Code 1987, art 26; Babcock et al. (n 36) (Kuwait; Somalia); Bahrain Penal Code 1976, art 109; Constitution of Jordan 1952, art 105(ii)–106; Sudan Penal Code 2003, section 251; Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia 2012, art 2(3), 4(1), 40(4); Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland 2001, art 90(5); Constitution of Puntland State of Somalia 2010, art 79(11), 133(1); Afghanistan Penal Code 1976, art 1; Pakistan Penal Code 1860, art 53, 310; ‘Harmonised Sharia Penal Code Law’ (Centre for Islamic Legal Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, March 2002) art 93, 199 (outlining the criminal laws of 12 Northern Nigerian States); Libya Law 7/2000, art 1.

38 Babcock et al. (n 36); Hood and Hoyle (n 6) 503. Diya is also applied for qisas crimes in Mauritania, Qatar, the Maldives and Oman, however these States have not conducted an execution for over 10 years (Hood and Hoyle (n 6) 507–8). See Babcock et al. (n 36) (Oman); Mauritania Penal Code 1983, art 1; Qatar Penal Code 2004, art 1; Maldives Regulation R-33/2014.

39 In several countries, including some where diya is a part of the positive criminal law (Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia) and some where it is not (Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine (Gaza Strip)), informal, extra-legal settlements are nonetheless arranged between parties to a crime, which precludes the crime's reporting to State authorities or its prosecution (N Malone, ‘How Does Blood Money Work?’ (Slate Blog Post, 2009); Gottesman (n 14) 457; E Goat, ‘Trading Justice for Money: Prisoners on Pakistan's Death Row Can Pay Off Their Victims’ Families in Exchange for Freedom’ The Independent (10 January 2015); S Wacays, ‘Somaliland: From Crisis to Stability’ (unpublished Master's Thesis in Human Geography, Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, May 2008) 74; Babcock et al. (n 36); Rogers, D, Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, and Security (Routledge 2016) 68 Google Scholar; interview with Afghan NGO Staff (Oslo, 23 June 2016); interview with Saudi Arabian NGO Staff (Oslo, 23 June 2016); Penal Reform International, Sharia law and the Death Penalty: Would Abolition of the Death Penalty Be Unfaithful to the Message of Islam? (Penal Reform International 2015) 13). For the purposes of this article, we consider such informal reconciliation agreements inappropriate objects of comparison with Chinese VRAs, as State institutions do not play as active a role in bringing the former reconciliation agreements about, in contrast with the judicial oversight within regular diya negotiations. For further research on informal dispute resolution arrangements in the Muslim world, see YB Hounet, ‘“Reconciliation is the Foundation!”: Courts of Justice and Unofficial Reconciliation Practices in Algeria and Sudan’ (2015) 60(3–4) Diogenes 1; JH Wilson, ‘Blood Money in Sudan and Beyond: Restorative Justice or Face-Saving Measure’ (unpublished Doctor of Liberal Studies thesis, Georgetown University 2014); Dupret, B and Burgat, F (eds), Le cheikh et le procureur: Systèmes coutumiers, centralisme etatique et pratiques juridiques au Yémen et en Egypte (CEDEJ 2005)Google Scholar; Irani, GE, ‘Arab-Islamic Rituals of Conflict Resolution and Long-Term Peace in the Middle East’ (2000) 7 Palestine-Israel Journal Google Scholar <http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=994>; and Irani, GE, ‘Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts’ (1999) 3(2) Middle East Review of International Affairs 1 Google Scholar.

40 Ismail, SZ, ‘The Modern Interpretation of the Diyat Formula for the Quantum of Damages: The Case of Homicide and Personal Injuries’ (2012) 26 Arab Law Quarterly 361, 377 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hascall, SC, ‘Restorative Justice in Islam: Should Qisas Be Considered a Form of Restorative Justice?’ (2011) 4 Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern & Islamic Law 35, 61 Google Scholar.

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42 El-Awa (n 10) 76, 85, 89; Penal Reform International (n 39); interview with Saudi Arabian NGO Staff (n 39); interview with Iranian NGO Staff (Oslo, 23 June 2016).

43 El-Awa (n 10) 84; Duncan (n 32) 239; Hubbard (n 32); Gottesman (n 14) 442.

44 al-Alfi (n 17) 227; Bassiouni (n 20) 209.

45 Lange (n 10) 170. Of the jurisdictions under study, Pakistani courts can impose a replacement sentence of death itself, life imprisonment, or a term of imprisonment of up to 14 years, and a minimum term of 10 years in cases of honour killing (Pakistan Penal Code 1860, art 311). However, none of these sentences are used with any regularity, with many perpetrators walking free after the settlement ( Cheema, MH, ‘Beyond Beliefs: Deconstructing the Dominant Narratives of the Islamization of Pakistan's Law’ (2012) 60 AmJCompL 875, 899–900 Google Scholar). Libyan law imposes a more consistent mandatory sentence of life imprisonment if diya is accepted (Libya Law 7/2000, art 1). In Yemen the alternative punishment is up to 15 years (Yemen Law 12/1994, art 55). In Sudan, the maximum punishment is 10 years’ imprisonment plus a fine (Sudan Penal Code 2003, Section 251). In Iran, the Islamic Penal Code 2013, art 612 allows for 3–10 years imprisonment. In most Northern Nigerian States, the tazir penalty is fixed at one year's imprisonment and 100 lashes, whereas in Kano and Katsina States, up to 10 years’ imprisonment is permissible (Weimann (n 35) 97–8). In Kaduna State no further punishment appears possible if diya is accepted (‘Harmonised Sharia Penal Code Law’ (n 37) 85 n 270). In Saudi Arabia, the usual punishment awarded has variously been reported as five years of imprisonment or less (Duncan (n 32) 239; Ismail (n 40) 377) or between eight months and two years’ imprisonment (interview with Saudi Arabian NGO Staff (n 39)). Nonetheless, Sharia judges possess absolute sentencing discretion to impose harsher punishments as tazir, including corporal and capital punishment (Peters (n 21) 66–7). The same situation presumably follows in the UAE, Somalia, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya and Afghanistan, with no alternative tazir penalty proscribed in the relevant legislation or constitutional provisions.

46 Babcock et al. (n 36).

47 Zhao, B, ‘The Use of the Death Penalty in Contemporary China: For Reference’ (2011) 6 China Legal Science 5, 5–22 Google Scholar.

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49 Fu (n 12) at 290 asserts that the SPC ‘has always allowed cash for leniency and clemency in limited circumstances’, and cites an SPC memo from 1999 on the subject (emphasis added).

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53 Miao, M, ‘Two Years between Life and Death: A Critical Analysis of the Suspended Death Penalty in China’ (2016) 45 IJLCJ 26, 38 Google Scholar.

54 Trevaskes (n 12) 38.

55 Zhao, B and Peng, X, ‘On Civil Compensation and Limiting the Application of the Death Penalty’ (2010) 5 China Legal Science 52 Google Scholar.

56 Trevaskes (n 12) 38.

57 Shen, J, ‘Killing a Chicken to Scare the Monkey: The Unequal Administration of Death in China’ (2014) 23 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 869, 898 Google Scholar.

58 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 278. For further detail on criminal reconciliation in minor cases in China, see J Jiang, Criminal Reconciliation in Contemporary China: An Empirical and Analytical Enquiry (Edward Elgar 2016).

59 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 277–99; Fu (n 12) 291.

60 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 278.

61 Fu (n 12) 291.

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69 Garland describes sovereignty as the ‘claimed capacity to rule a territory in the face of competition and resistance from external and internal enemies’ ( Garland, D, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State’ (1996) 36 BritJCriminol 445, 448 Google Scholar). Today, as in the past, clemency provides key benefits for the decision-maker who exercises it, entirely independent of the prisoner's interests and those of the broader constituency. Frequent use might cast the decision-maker (usually the head of State) in a benevolent light, increasing the ruler's hold over the ‘life and death’ of his citizens ( Kobil, DT, ‘The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King’ (1991) 69 TexLRev 569, 571, 582 Google Scholar; Sarat (n 62) 16; Shapiro, M, ‘Appeal’ (1980) 14 Law and Society Review 629, 635–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Coyne and Entzeroth (n 66) 839). Relatedly, clemency might help an autocratic government increase its international legitimacy, or clemency may conform with the ruler's conception of religious piety (D Pascoe, ‘Clemency in Southeast Asian Death Penalty Cases’ (2014) 1 Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society Policy Papers). Clemency may even act as a form of corruption, being granted for the financial or direct political benefit of the decision-maker (Sebba (n 62) 231; Rapaport, E, ‘Staying Alive: Executive Clemency, Equal Protection and the Politics of Gender in Women's Capital Cases’ (2001) 4 BuffCrimLR 967, 982 Google Scholar; Heise, M, ‘Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and its Structure’ (2003) 89 VaLRev 239, 289, 298 Google Scholar; Crouch, JP, The Presidential Pardon Power (University Press of Kansas 2009) 4 Google Scholar).

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74 Amnesty International (n 51); Sebba, L, ‘The Pardoning Power: A World Survey’ (1977) 68 JCrimL&Criminology 83 Google Scholar.

75 Hood and Hoyle (n 6) 313; Shen (n 57) 899.

76 Shen (n 57) 899; Su, C, ‘The Present and Future: The Death Penalty in China's Penal Code’ (2011) 36 OklaCityULRev 427, 445 Google Scholar.

77 Babcock et al. (n 36) (Libya, Saudi Arabia, UAE); Sudan Criminal Act 1991, section 38(2); Iran Islamic Penal Code 2013, art 261; Yemen Law 12/1994, art 48. This no-clemency categorization may well also extend to Somalia, whose Constitution (while strongly Islamic) is silent on this issue (see Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia 2012, art 90(p)). Notably, the constitutions of neighbouring semi-autonomous provinces Puntland and Somaliland bar executive clemency in qisas cases (Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland 2001, art 90(5); Constitution of Puntland State of Somalia 2010, art 79(11)).

78 Miao (n 53) 34.

79 ‘China: Juveniles Biggest Winners in 2015 Special Pardon’ (Dui Hua Foundation, NGO article, 2016).

80 Z Zhou, ‘The Death Penalty in China: Reforms and Its Future’ (Waseda University Institute for Advanced Studies, 2011) 35; Shen (n 57) 899; Su (n 76) 445. The PRC signed the ICCPR in 1998, yet has not yet ratified it.

81 ‘Pardon Us: Asian Clemency Laps China’ (Dui Hua Foundation, NGO press release, 2012).

82 ‘Calls Grow in China for Special Pardon to Mark PRC's 60th Birthday’ (Dui Hua Foundation, NGO press release, 2009).

83 Xinhua News Agency, ‘The Order for A Special Pardon by the President of the People's Republic of China’ (29 August 2015).

84 Dui Hua Foundation (n 79); S Chen, ‘Dongguan Intermediate Court: From Paying Restitution in Exchange of Lesser Punishment to Penal Reconciliation’ 21st Century Business Herald (7 February 2007).

85 Dui Hua Foundation (n 79).

86 Andrew, AM and Rapp, JA, Autocracy and China's Rebel Founding Emperors: Comparing Chairman Mao and Ming Taizu (Rowman & Littlefield 2000) 75 Google Scholar.

87 Shen (n 57) 899; Shapiro (n 69) 634–5.

88 See n 77.

89 Babcock et al. (n 36) (generally); Constitution of Kuwait 1962, art 75; Constitution of Pakistan 1973, art 45; Bahrain Penal Code 1976, art 90; Constitution of Nigeria 1999, art 175, 212 (President and State Governors). The Constitution of Afghanistan provides for Presidential clemency, without specifying exclusions for qisas offences, in art 64(18), as does the Jordan Penal Code 1960, art 51. In those two jurisdictions, it is unclear whether clemency is available in murder cases if the victim's heirs demand retribution.

90 Nevertheless, despite lacking a formal and binding power to commute, government representatives may still attempt to persuade the victim's family to accept diya or to grant afw (Ismail (n 40) 377; interview with Saudi Arabian NGO Staff (n 39); interview with Iranian NGO Staff (n 42)). Executive authorities can also choose to simply not enforce the death penalty, leaving the perpetrator indefinitely on death row, given that qisas punishments are now enforced by the State, rather than the victim's next of kin. This option has a legislative basis in Saudi Arabia, with the King able to ‘veto’ executions, even if there is no official power to pardon qisas offences. (Saudi Arabia Law on Criminal Procedure 2001, art 220(a); Duncan (n 32) 240). An identical power vests in the President of Yemen (Constitution of Yemen 1991, art 123).

91 Of the preceding six jurisdictions listed, four (Yemen, Iran, Sudan and Libya) are parties to the ICCPR. However, if the right to seek clemency is indeed a customary international law right (n 75 above), then it also binds the UAE and Saudi Arabia, unless these States are classified as persistent objectors, which remains controversial within customary international law ( Dumberry, P, ‘Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of Persistent Objector Revisited’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 779, 802 Google Scholar). Afghanistan and Somalia, whose executive clemency power in murder cases remains unclear, are also ICCPR State parties.

92 As noted above, there is some jurisprudential dispute as to which offences are classified as hudud (El-Awa (n 10) 2) and whether or not any hudud offences are pardonable by the State (Baderin (n 22) 73).

93 Babcock et al. (n 36) (Kuwait; Bahrain); International Federation for Human Rights, ‘Slow March to the Gallows: Death Penalty in Pakistan’ (January 2007) 17; K Lewis, ‘Pakistan: Paralysed Death-Row Prisoner “Suffering Life Worse Than Hell” after Stay of Execution Expires’ The Independent (London 26 April 2016). Nigeria is the notable exception, where the President and State Governors have been active in granting clemency to prisoners on death row, and while remaining formally retentionist, the country has rarely executed prisoners over the past 10 years (P Alston, ‘The Death Penalty’ (Project on Extrajudicial Executions, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law) 11–12; Babcock et al. (n 36)).

94 Ismail (n 40) 364–7; Hardy (n 10) 71; Osanloo (n 5) 318.

95 Saudi Arabia (UN Human Rights Council, ‘National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Saudi Arabia’ (UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/17/SAU/1, 5 Aug 2013a) [37]); Iran (UN Human Rights Council, ‘National Report Submitted in Acordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Iran (Islamic Republic of)’ (UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/20/IRN/1, 4 Aug 2013b) [4]); Libya (UN Human Rights Council, ‘National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: Libya’ (UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/22/LBY/1, 5 May 2015) [76]; Chenwi, L, ‘Fair Trial Rights and Their Relation to the Death Penalty in Africa’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 609 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 631 n 133).

96 Hood, R, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (Oxford University Press 2002) 167 Google Scholar (emphasis added).

97 Duncan (n 32) 247. Compare Pascoe (n 73) 177.

98 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 281.

99 Johnson and Miao (n 50) 308, 311 (emphasis added).

100 Pascoe (n 73) 176.

101 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 285. The aforementioned authors suggest that it is likely that VRAs will be explicitly recognized by the Communist Party leadership in the future, albeit perhaps on a more limited scope so as to exclude murder cases (Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 295).

102 Trevaskes (n 12) 38–40; Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 282–3, 287.

103 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 291–2.

104 Trevaskes (n 12) 44.

105 Baderin (n 22) 73 (generally); Babcock et al. (n 36) (UAE; Libya); Duncan (n 32) 234; Al-Hewesh, M, ‘Sharia Penalties and Ways of Their Implementation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’ in United Nations Social Defense Research Institute (ed), The Effect of Islamic Legislation on Crime Prevention in Saudi Arabia (Crime Prevention Research Centre 1976) 377 Google Scholar; interview with Saudi Arabian NGO Staff (n 39) (Saudi Arabia); interview with Iranian NGO Staff (n 42) (Iran).

106 Ghassemi, G, ‘Criminal Punishment in Islamic Societies: Empirical Study of Attitudes to Criminal Sentencing in Iran’ (2009) 15 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 159, 163 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (Iran); ‘Saudi Arabia – Retentionist’ (Hands off Cain, NGO website 2014).

107 Rahami, M, ‘Islamic Restorative Traditions and Their Reflections in the Post Revolutionary Criminal Justice System of Iran’ (2007) 15 EurJCrimeCrLCrJ 227, 235 Google Scholar (Iran); Pakistan Penal Code 1860, art 310(3), 313(2)(a) (Pakistan).

108 Bassiouni (n 20) 206–7 (generally).

109 See Iran Islamic Penal Code 2013, Book Four: Diyat.

110 DeCoste (n 72) 9; Moore (n 72) 129.

111 Acker and Lanier (n 67) 209; The New Paper, ‘Family Aghast after King Pardons Killer’ The New Paper (Singapore, 30 January 2008); Moore (n 72) 146.

112 Sebba (n 62) 230, 232; Rapaport (n 69) 1001; Sarat (n 62) 67.

113 Fu (n 12) 287, 291; Johnson and Miao (n 50) 311.

114 Trevaskes, S, ‘Yanda 2001: Form and Strategy in a Chinese Anti-Crime Campaign’ (2003) 36 ANZJCrim 272, 272–92Google Scholar. See generally Tanner, HM, Strike Hard! Anti-Crime Campaigns and Chinese Criminal Justice 1979–1985 (Cornell University East Asia Program 1999)Google Scholar.

115 See generally Miao, M, ‘Capital Punishment in China: A Populist instrument of social governance’ (2013) 17 Theoretical Criminology 233 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

116 Osanloo (n 5) 311, 318.

117 Gottesman (n 14) 446; Hascall (n 40) 60, 63; Peiffer (n 23) 517.

118 Baderin (n 26) 144.The non-religious motivations of States to encourage mercy include concern for the State's international image and multilateral norms, placating public unrest over wrongful executions, and compassion for those on death row given a lack of other discretionary means to show leniency.

119 Sun, W, ‘Is Penal Reconciliation Acceptable or Needed in Capital Cases?’ (2010) 1 China Legal Science 180, 180–91Google Scholar.

120 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights & International Bar Association, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers (United Nations 2003) 121.

121 For diya’s comparison with tort law, see Osanloo (n 5) 309–10 and Peters (n 21) 7, 20. For diya compared with restitution orders, see Hascall (n 40) 45–6; Wilson (n 39) 1; and El-Awa (n 10) 89–90. Although the PRC does possess a rudimentary system of State-funded victim compensation, and moreover victims also retain the right to pursue offenders in parallel civil actions, such awards are generally considered financially insufficient or unenforceable, hence the vital restitutory role played by VRAs (Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 283, 292; Z Nie, ‘Is Penal Reconciliation Applicable to Capital Cases’ People's Court News (12 October 2007); Fu (n 12) 290–1).

122 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 283. See also n 33.

123 al-Alfi (n 17).

124 Du, W and Ren, Z, ‘Forgiveness by the Victim and the Application of the Death Penalty’ (2005) Journal of Social Sciences 72, 72–6Google Scholar.

125 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 277–99; Fu (n 12) 291.

126 Cohen, R, ‘Language and Conflict Resolution: The Limits of English’ (2001) 3 International Studies Review 25, 41 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

127 Miao (n 53) 30; Trevaskes (n 12) 42.

128 Chinese Criminal Law 1997, art 48.

129 See n 53.

130 See n 45.

131 ibid.

132 In the PRC, settlements have been reached for as much as RMB 500,000 (approximately US$75,000) (Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 283). Turning to the Muslim-majority jurisdictions, in 2011, the default diya price for a male Muslim in Saudi Arabia was US$106,666 for premediated murder (‘Saudi Arabia triples blood money to SR300,000’ Emirates 24/7 News (11 September 2011). In 2014, the default price for premeditated murder of a Muslim male in the UAE was set at US$54,450 (‘United Arab Emirates – Retentionist’ (Hands off Cain, NGO website 2014). In Pakistan, although the base amount set by a judge may vary from case to case with the parties’ financial circumstances, in 2015 the default price was set at approximately US$53,000 (Goat (n 39)). In Iran, a 2012 article reported the diya price as US$47,000–62,500 (Osanloo (n 5) 317). In Niger State, Nigeria, the default amount of diya is set by legislation at US$35,000 (Weimann (n 35) 97). For contemporary default prices in other Muslim-majority jurisdictions, see Ismail (n 40) 378. Note however that all of these figures for diya reflect the negotiations’ starting point, rather than representing the final settlement reached under sulh (see n 42 and associated text above).

133 Peters (n 21) 66.

134 Hardy (n 10) 46.

135 Trevaskes (n 12) 44; Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 285; Fu (n 12) 292. Here, Trevaskes (n 12, 55) bemoans that: ‘the principal sentencing decision on life or death for the capital offender is reduced to a decision made by a party – the victim's family – who are not of the judiciary, or even of the legal system’.

136 However, Fu notes that some perpetrators and victims have now started to initiate the process on their own, without the assistance of the court (Fu (n 12) 292). See also n 45 above, on the possibility of tazir death sentences.

137 Trevaskes (n 12) 45.

138 Alsagoff, SA, Al-Diyah as Compensation for Homicide Wounding in Malaysia (International Islamic University Malaysia 2006) 151 Google Scholar.

139 Whytock (n 2) 1898. See also Michaels (n 4) 351.

140 Nevertheless, there is notable disagreement between Muslim scholars over whether Islamic law should be interpreted in a literal or revisionist manner. See An-Naim, A, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a (Harvard University Press 2009) 19 Google Scholar; Baderin (n 22) 11–12, 39–40, 219; Peters (n 21) 181, 184.

141 See n 95.

142 Dui Hua Foundation (n 79) and n 93 above.

143 In the PRC, as Weatherley and Pittam note, ‘abolition is not currently an option [for the Chinese government]. Public support for the death penalty is extremely high, with one survey suggesting that 80 per cent of respondents are in favour of retaining it’ (Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 280). As for the diya jurisdictions, the Quran and Sunnah's textual support for the death penalty in the case of hudud, tazir and qisas offences is often cited as a fatal obstacle to outright death penalty abolition in the Muslim world (Baderin (n 26) 144; Ridge, H, ‘Economic and Historical Influence on the Application of Capital Punishment in Turkey and Saudi Arabia’ (2014) 3(1) The Messa Journal 1, 20 Google Scholar; Amnesty International, ‘Affront to Justice: Death Penalty in Saudi Arabia’ (Amnesty International, 2008).

144 As, jurisprudentially speaking, this move contravenes a strict interpretation of Sharia doctrine in qisas (and hudud) cases, an alternative model is that employed by Saudi Arabia, whereby the King retains the legislative power to veto executions, rather than to formally commute death sentences to a lesser punishment (see n 90). Addressing the same conundrum, Philip Alston, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (n 93, 50) has pointed to a similar system previously in force in Tunisia, even if this did formally contravene ICCPR art 6(4).

145 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 279–89, 291.

146 Gottesman (n 14) 445 (on Pakistan). Reverting to fixed diya prices in all Muslim-majority countries, without the possibility for negotiation through sulh, may have the undesirable consequence of increasing the number of unofficial settlements outside the legal system, thereby preventing prosecution in the first place (interview with Iranian NGO Staff (n 42)). In these circumstances, the perpetrator will not have to serve a replacement tazir sentence of imprisonment at all, and will continue to be at liberty.

147 Johnson and Miao (n 50) 311.

148 Osanloo (n 5) 317–19.

149 Peters (n 21) 167, 178; Sudan Penal Code 2003, section 251.

150 Iran Islamic Penal Code 2013, art 383.

151 Sun (n 119) 180–91; Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 279, 289; Hood (n 96) 37, 167; Amnesty International (n 51); Lewis, MK, ‘Leniency and Severity in China's Death Penalty Debate’ (2011) 24 ColJAsianL 304, 329 Google Scholar.

152 Johnson and Miao (n 50) 311.

153 The radical alternative would be to abolish victim–perpetrator agreements altogether, replacing them with multiple levels of court review, formal executive clemency procedures, discretionary restitution orders in criminal cases and State-funded victim compensation schemes. However, this reformist option may fail in the jurisdictions concerned due to: a) court-ordered restitution relying on the defendant's financial position, b) a lack of State funding for victim compensation in developing States; c) the resource implications for the head of State to give fair consideration to thousands of clemency petitions a year in PRC, and d) the immutable textual basis of qisas and diya in the Quran, Hadiths and Sunnah.

154 Liang, G, ‘Ten Falsification Tests on Penal Reconciliation in Capital Cases’ (2010) Legal Science 3, 3–21 Google Scholar; Johnson and Miao (n 50) 311; al-Alfi (n 17) 230.

155 See nn 31–34 and associated text.

156 Du and Ren (n 124) 72–6; Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 278; Hascall (n 40) 74–5.

157 Sun (n 119) 180–91; Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 278.

158 Bian, J and Feng, L, ‘Constructing a Chinese Model of Penal Reconciliation on the Basis of Penal Reconciliation’ (2008) 26 The Forum of Politics and Law 3, 3–21 Google Scholar.

159 Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 283–4; Zedner, L, ‘Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?’ (1994) 57 MLR 228, 234–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Qafisheh (n 29) 488.

160 Fu (n 12) 291; Weatherley and Pittam (n 52) 284.

161 Cohen (n 126) 41.

162 Of the 10 most prolific death penalty States worldwide during the period 2007–12, seven utilized victim–perpetrator reconciliation agreements of one kind of another (PRC, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya) (S Rogers and M Chalabi, ‘Death Penalty Statistics, Country by Country’ The Guardian (13 December 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/mar/29/death-penalty-countries-world>).