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JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING TERRITORIAL SEA DELIMITATION UNDER ARTICLE 15 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 May 2017

Massimo Lando Open the ORCID record for Massimo Lando [Opens in a new window]
Massimo Lando*
Affiliation:
St. Catharine's College, University of Cambridge, [email protected].
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Abstract

Recent international jurisprudence has shown considerable uncertainty with regard to the delimitation of the territorial sea. While international tribunals endorse a two-stage approach to territorial sea delimitation, there is a lack of judicial consensus on the practical implementation of such an approach. This article argues that the rule-exception relationship between equidistance and special circumstances, as reflected in the drafting history of LOSC Article 15 and in jurisprudence prior to 2007, should inform the delimitation of the territorial sea. Cases since 2007 which have strayed from the earlier jurisprudence on LOSC Article 15, should be seen as a misconstruction of the law applicable to territorial sea delimitation.

Keywords

International Court of JusticeInternational Law CommissionInternational Tribunal for the Law of the Seamaritime boundariesmaritime delimitationterritorial seaUNCLOS
Type
Articles
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 66 , Issue 3 , July 2017 , pp. 589 - 623
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2017 

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References

1 1833 UNTS 3. On territorial sea delimitation, see Rothwell, DR and Stephens, T, The International Law of the Sea (2nd edn, Hart 2016) 431 Google Scholar; Anderson, DH, ‘Developments in Maritime Boundary Law and Practice’ in Anderson, DH (ed), Modern Law of the Sea – Selected Essays (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 408 Google Scholar; Churchill, RR and Lowe, AV, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press 1999) 182–3Google Scholar; Lucchini, L and Vœlckel, M, Droit de la Mer – Tome 2 (Pédone 1996) vol I, 64–6Google Scholar; Ciciriello, MC, Le Formazioni Insulari e la Delimitazione degli Spazi Marini (Editoriale Scientifica 1990) 141–4Google Scholar; Weil, P, Perspectives du Droit de la Délimitation Maritime (Pédone 1988) 147–8Google Scholar.

2 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), filed 3 December 2014 <https://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-23/case-no-23-merits/>; Maritime Delimitation in the Indian Ocean (Somalia v Kenya), filed 28 August 2014 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=SK&case=161&k=00>; Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), filed 25 February 2014 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=crnic&case=157&k=0f>.

3 Evans, MD, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in Rothwell, DR et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea (OUP 2015) 255–6Google Scholar; Yanai, S, ‘International Law Concerning Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in Attard, D et al. (eds), The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: Vol I – The Law of the Sea (OUP 2014) 318 Google Scholar.

4 Grotius, H, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Whewell, W (ed), CUP 1853) vol IGoogle Scholar.

5 Evans (n 3) 255.

6 Rothwell and Stephens (n 1) 431. See also Von Mühlendahl, P, L'Equidistance dans la Délimitation des Frontières Maritimes (Pédone 2016) 91–3Google Scholar. According to Von Mühlendahl, the principal issue with LOSC art 15 is the choice of base points for the establishment of the equidistance line.

7 The territorial sea covers the maritime areas up to 12 nautical miles from the baselines, while the continental shelf and the EEZ cover the maritime areas under national jurisdiction beyond 12 nautical miles from the baselines. See LOSC arts 3, 57 and 76. Normally the baselines are located along the low-water line, but in exceptional cases they could be drawn as straight lines connecting points on the coast. See LOSC arts 5 and 7.

8 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway) (Judgment) [1993] ICJ Rep 38, para 55.

9 Although under art 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention (see fn 61 below) ‘equidistance’ and ‘median’ respectively refer to the situation of adjacent and opposite coasts, the ICJ held that they are equivalent expressions. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 57.

10 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain) (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 40, para 176.

11 In both Cameroon v Nigeria and Peru v Chile, the States party to the dispute had already agreed upon that part of their maritime boundary which covered the territorial sea. See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) (Merits) [2002] ICJ Rep 303, paras 263–4; Maritime Dispute (Peru v Chile) (Judgment) [2014] ICJ Rep 3, paras 149–51.

12 Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation) (Eritrea/Yemen) (1999) XXII RIAA 335, 375 (1999). According to art 2 of the special agreement, the tribunal was bound to apply the LOSC, since Eritrea, although not a party to the Convention, had accepted the application of its provisions for the delimitation of the maritime boundary with Yemen. See ibid, para 130. On Eritrea/Yemen, see Evans, MD, ‘The Maritime Delimitation between Eritrea and Yemen’ (2001) 14 LJIL 148 and 156Google Scholar.

13 Eritrea/Yemen (n 12) para 131.

14 ibid, para 114.

15 ibid, paras 23–5.

16 ibid, para 132. The tribunal had previously found that it had ‘little difficulty in preferring the Eritrean argument, which brings into play [LOSC] Article 15’. See ibid, para 125.

17 ibid, para 132.

18 ibid, paras 139–53. The Dhalaks are an island group situated close to Eritrea's coast.

19 See Tanaka, Y, ‘Reflections on the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration of 17 December 1999 (Second Phase: Maritime Delimitation)’ (2001) 48 NILR 211 Google Scholar.

20 See Qatar v Bahrain (n 10) para 176. The Court applied customary international law since Qatar was not a party to the LOSC. On Qatar v Bahrain, see Evans, MD, ‘Decisions of International Tribunals: The International Court of Justice’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 709 Google Scholar.

21 Qatar submitted that ‘the boundary of the two territorial seas is to be established by application of the equidistance method, at least as a first step in the delimitation process. Such a provisional median line has to be drawn by taking exclusively into consideration the two main opposite coasts, without regard to the numerous particular features existing in the area’. See Memorial of Qatar, para 11.37, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/7057.pdf>. See also Counter-Memorial of Qatar, paras 1.15–1.16, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/7061.pdf>.

22 Bahrain argued that ‘the rule expressed in Article 15 expressly requires, “whether the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other”, that the starting point be “the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured”. In a second phase, it is appropriate to enquire whether “it is necessary, by reason of historic title or other special circumstances”, to adjust or displace the median line in order to arrive at an equitable result.’ See Memorial of Bahrain, para 614, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/7055.pdf>. See also Counter-Memorial of Bahrain, para 467, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/11051.pdf>.

23 Qatar v Bahrain (n 10) para 176.

24 Concerning Fasht al Azm, the Court held that whether it was considered part of the island of Sitrah, or whether it was considered a low-tide elevation, it would constitute a special circumstance requiring a boundary passing between Fasht al Azm itself and the island of Qit'at ash Shajarah. See ibid, para 218. Qit'at Jaradah was deemed to be an ‘insignificant maritime feature’ which would have a disproportionate effect on the boundary, therefore the Court resolved that the boundary should pass ‘immediately to the east of Qit'at Jaradah’. See ibid, para 219.

25 Kwiatkowska, B, ‘The Qatar v Bahrain Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Case’ (2002) 33 Ocean Development and International Law 246 Google Scholar.

26 Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma wrote that ‘special circumstances may be taken into account only after the true median line has been drawn, and only with a view to adjustment in order to achieve and equitable solution’. See Qatar v Bahrain (n 10) para 181 (Joint Dissenting Opinion Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma) (emphasis in the original). Judge ad hoc Torres Bernárdez maintained that ‘special circumstances … are supposed to intervene in the delimitation operation after the establishment of the ‘median line’ … and not before or simultaneously’. See ibid, para 488 (Dissenting Opinion Torres Bernárdez) (emphasis in the original).

27 Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Guyana and Suriname (Guyana v Suriname) (2007) XXX RIAA 1, paras 288–9. See also Memorial of Guyana, paras 8.44–8.55, <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/904>; Reply of Guyana, paras 6.1–6.44, <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1040>.

28 Guyana v Suriname (n 27) paras 282–6. See also Counter-Memorial of Suriname, paras 4.56–4.72, <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1162>; Rejoinder of Suriname, paras 3.263–3.266, <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1206>.

29 Guyana v Suriname (n 27) para 296.

30 According to the tribunal, ‘special circumstances of navigation may justify deviation from the median line, and … the record amply supports the conclusion that the predecessors of the Parties agreed upon a N10°E delimitation line for the reason that all of the Corentyne River was to be Suriname's territory and that the 10° Line provided appropriate access through Suriname's territorial sea to the western channel of the Corentyne River’. See ibid, para 306.

31 ibid, para 323.

32 Gao, J, ‘Comments on Guyana v Suriname ’ (2009) 8 ChineseJIL 195–6Google Scholar.

33 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 659, para 267. This judgment was handed down on 8 October 2007, three weeks after the Guyana v Suriname arbitral award of 17 September 2007.

34 Nicaragua argued that ‘[t]he bisector of the lines representing the coastal fronts of the two Parties … constitutes the single maritime boundary for the purposes of the delimitation of the disputed areas of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf’. See CR 2007/12, 53 (Argüello). For Nicaragua's argument on coastal instability, see CR 2007/5, 15–17 (Pellet).

35 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 274. Honduras regarded the boundary it requested as a simplified or adjusted equidistance line. Moreover, according to Honduras ‘the bisector approach advanced by Nicaragua produces a result which is wholly indefensible’. See CR 2007/6, 36 (Greenwood).

36 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) paras 253–8.

37 ibid, para 268.

38 ibid, para 277.

39 ibid, para 278.

40 ibid, para 287.

41 ibid, para 280. Fietta and Cleverly welcomed this statement by the Court with approval, see Fietta, S and Cleverly, R, A Practitioner's Guide to Maritime Boundary Delimitation (OUP 2016) 106 Google Scholar.

42 Memorial of Bangladesh, paras 5.7 and 5.24, <https:// www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/Memorial_of_Bangladesh_Volume1.pdf>.

43 According to Myanmar, ‘St. Martin's Island must be considered … a special circumstance which calls for shifting or adjusting the median line which otherwise would have been drawn off the coasts of the Parties’. See Counter-Memorial of Myanmar, para 4.53, <https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/Counter_Memorial_Myanmar.pdf>.

44 While Myanmar's argument built upon the premise that the presence of St. Martin's Island, as a special circumstance, required the adjustment of a previously identified equidistance line, counsel for Bangladesh explicitly stated that ‘the equidistance/special circumstances method takes equidistance and then adjusts it’. See ITLOS/PV.11/5/Rev.1, 2 (Crawford).

45 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar) (Judgment) [2012] ITLOS Rep 4, paras 88–99 and 112–18.

46 ibid, para 129.

47 ibid, para 152.

48 ibid, paras 154–69.

49 Commentators have referred to the delimitation of the territorial sea in Bangladesh/Myanmar with approval. See Churchill, RR, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2012’ (2013) 28 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 571 Google Scholar; Magnússon, BM, ‘Judgement in the Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (14 March 2012)’ (2012) 27 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 624–5Google Scholar; Anderson, D, ‘Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar)’ (2012) 106 AJIL 823 Google Scholar; Kim, HJ, ‘La Délimitation de la Frontière Maritime dans le Golfe du Bengale: Courir deux Lièvres à la Fois avec Succès dans le Règlement de la Délimitation Maritime’ (2012) 59 Annuaire Français de Droit International 443, 446–50Google Scholar.

50 Similarly to Nicaragua in Nicaragua v Honduras, Bangladesh contended that ‘the unique geographic facts of this case, including both the instability of the Parties’ coastlines and the concave configuration of the Bay's north coast, mean that the equidistance method cannot be used for any part of the maritime delimitation, including in the territorial sea’. See Memorial of Bangladesh, paras 1.30 and 5.2, <http://www.wx4all.net/pca/bd-in/Bangladesh's%20Memorial%20Vol%20I.pdf>.

51 Counter-Memorial of India, para 5.33, <http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/India_CounterMemorial_Vol_I.pdf>. According to India, ‘the geography of the Bay of Bengal provides for a large number of possible locations for base points along the relevant coastline’, and that ‘[a]ppropriate base points are readily identifiable and, hence, exaggerated claims of instability should not come into play’. See Hearing Transcript, vol 3, 253 (Chadha) <http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/390>.

52 Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v India) (2014) 167 ILR 1, paras 246–247.

53 ibid, para 248. The tribunal added that it ‘also [did] not consider that the general configuration of the coast in the Bay of Bengal is relevant to the delimitation of the narrow belt of the territorial sea’.

54 ibid, paras 250–70.

55 ibid, paras 273–4.

56 The erratic modus operandi in Bangladesh v India stands in marked contrast to the previous cases, in which the tribunal concerned either used special circumstances as a corrective for the equidistance line (Eritrea/Yemen and Qatar v Bahrain), or considered special circumstances only before drawing the equidistance line (Nicaragua v Honduras and Bangladesh/Myanmar). The literature on Bangladesh v India has not criticized the method used in territorial sea delimitation. See Anderson, D, ‘Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary: Bangladesh v India’ (2015) 109 AJIL 153 Google Scholar; Kaldunski, M, ‘A Commentary on Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India Concerning the Bay of Bengal’ (2015) 28 LJIL 807–10Google Scholar; Tassin, VJM, ‘La Contribution au Droit International de l'Affaire de Délimitation Maritime Bangladesh/Inde dans la Baie du Bengale’ (2014) 60 Annuaire Français de Droit International 107 Google Scholar.

57 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 4 (Separate Opinion Ranjeva); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Merits) [2012] ICJ Rep 624, para 4 (Declaration Keith).

58 On the confirmatory function of travaux préparatoires, see Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ Rep 6, paras 55–6.

59 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 280; Qatar v Bahrain (n 10) para 176.

60 516 UNTS 206. Under art 12(1) TSC, ‘[w]here the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance with this provision’.

61 499 UNTS 311. Under art 6 CSC, ‘(1) [w]here the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. (2) Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured’.

62 ILC Yearbook (1953), vol II, 216, para 82.

63 ILC Yearbook (1953), vol I, 128, para 37 (François).

64 ibid 128, para 47 (Lauterpacht).

65 ibid 130, para 62 (Spiropoulos).

66 ibid.

67 ibid 131, para 17 (Lauterpacht).

68 ibid 132, para 21 (Spiropoulos).

69 ILC Yearbook (1956), vol II, 300.

70 ILC Yearbook (1954), vol I, 100, para 56 (Spiropoulos).

71 ibid 101–2, para 2 (François).

72 ibid 103, para 18 (Sandström).

73 ILC Yearbook (1954), vol II, 157–8. See also Bowett, DW, The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law (Oceana 1979) 36 Google Scholar.

74 ILC Yearbook (1956), vol I, 284, para 3 (Sandström).

75 ILC Yearbook (1956), vol II, 271.

76 Rosenne, S, League of Nations Conference for the Codification of International Law (Oceana 1975) vol II, 277 Google Scholar.

77 ILC Yearbook (1951), vol I, 287, para 123 (Hudson).

78 ILC Yearbook (1953), vol I, 74, para 6 (Lauterpacht).

79 ibid 127, para 23 (Pal).

80 ILC Yearbook (1956), vol I, 152, para 28 (Fitzmaurice).

81 Addendum to the Second Report on the Régime of the Territorial Sea, UN Doc A/CN.4/61/Add.1 (18 May 1953) 6–7 (Annex).

82 ibid.

83 Doc A/CONF.13/C.1/SR.60 (22 April 1958), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol III, 189, para 36.

84 Ciciriello (n 1) 143.

85 See section III.B below.

86 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, UN Doc A/9021(VOL.III)(SUPP) (1 January 1973) 90.

87 Doc A/CONF.62/WP.8 (7 May 1975), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol IV, 154.

88 Doc A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev.1 (6 May 1976), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol V, 155.

89 Doc A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (15 July 1977), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol VIII, 7.

90 Doc A/CONF.62/L.78 (28 August 1981), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol XV, 178.

91 Docs A/CONF.62/L.96 to L.126 (13 April 1982), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol XVI, 216–33.

92 Doc A/CONF.62/SR.165 (1 April 1982), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol XVI, 75, para 62.

93 Doc A/CONF.62/SR.126 (2 April 1980), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol XIII, 20, para 137.

94 Doc A/CONF.62/SR.162 (31 March 1982), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol XVI, 42, para 5.

95 In its declaration upon signing the Convention Belgium stated that it ‘regrets that the concept of equity, adopted for the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, was not applied again in the provisions for delimiting the territorial sea’. See Declaration by Belgium upon signing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (5 December 1984) (1985) 4 LOS Bulletin 10.

96 At the Eleventh Session of the Conference (1982), Turkey stated that ‘it is inadmissible to think that the intention of the authors of [Article 15] was to permit an inequitable delimitation. The reference in the Article to special circumstances, which is a means to arrive at an equitable result, also confirms this view. The reference in the Article to the median line does not give the median-line method prominence over other methods. The median line can be applied only if it produces an equitable delimitation’. See Doc A/CONF.62/SR.162 (31 March 1982), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol XVI, 76–7, paras 152–3.

97 Doc A/CONF.62/SR.189 (8 December 1982), Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol XVII, 82, para 246.

98 Bianchi, A, ‘The Game of Interpretation in International Law’ in Bianchi, A et al. (eds), Interpretation in International Law (OUP 2014) 51 Google Scholar. From the procedural point of view, the characterization of a norm as an exception entails that the party invoking the exception bears the burden to prove the existence of that exception. On LOSC art 15 and the burden of proof, see Alexander, LM, ‘The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries’ (1986) 5 Political Geography Quarterly 20–1Google Scholar.

99 Orakhelashvili, A, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (OUP 2008) 425 Google Scholar.

100 Alland, D, ‘L'Interprétation du Droit International Public’ (2012) 362 Recueil des Cours 189 Google Scholar.

101 United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996) 18.

102 See Access to‚ or Anchorage in‚ the port of Danzig‚ of Polish War Vessels (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Series A/B No 43, 142; United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998), para 157; US—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439-36S/345 (7 November 1989), para 5.9; Commission of the European Communities v Ireland, Case 113/80, [1981] ECR 1638; Vogt v Germany (App No 17851/91) [1995] ECHR 29, para 52; Silver v UK (App Nos 5947/62, 6205/73 and 7052/75) [1983] ECHR 5, para 97; Arctic Sunrise (Netherlands v Russia) (2016) 55 ILM 5, para 366; South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) (Philippines v China) (2016) 55 ILM 805, para 107.

103 According to the ICJ, ‘the method of straight baselines, which is an exception to the normal rules for the determination of baselines, may only be applied if a number of conditions are met. This method must be applied restrictively. Such conditions are primarily that either the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or that there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity’. See Qatar v Bahrain (n 10) para 212.

104 North Sea Continental Shelf (n 9) 186 (Dissenting Opinion Tanaka).

105 ibid.

106 Former ICJ President Guillaume commented that ‘[a]ny system of law requires a minimum of certainty, and any dispute settlement system a minimum of foreseeability’. See Guillaume, G, ‘The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators’ (2011) 2 JIDS 6 Google Scholar. See section IV.B below.

107 Although some may argue that using equidistance could threaten to overlook the equitable solution objective, special circumstances under LOSC art 15 operate in order to temper the strictness of equidistance. Therefore, while equidistance could be too strict a delimitation method, special circumstances ensure that its strictness be tempered in order to achieve an equitable solution.

108 Nicaragua v Colombia (n 57) para 128.

109 Bangladesh v India (n 52) para 339.

110 Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) (Judgment) [1985] ICJ Rep 13, para 45. Similarly, in Black Sea the Court stated that drawing a provisional equidistance line as a first stage in delimiting the EEZ and continental shelf was ‘[i]n keeping with its settled jurisprudence on maritime delimitation’, implying that there is a settled and consistent manner to delimit maritime boundaries. See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine) (Judgment) [2009] ICJ Rep 61, para 118.

111 See Bangladesh/Myanmar (n 45) paras 382–3; Nicaragua v Colombia (n 57) paras 178–9; Maritime Delimitation between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago (Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago) (2006) XXVII RIAA 147, paras 234–5. This article does not suggest that international tribunals have achieved a satisfactory level of consistency in their delimitation jurisprudence, but simply that there seems to be a move in that direction. For some recent criticism of the international tribunals’ approach to delimitation, see Evans, MD, ‘Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Whatever Next?’ in Barrett, J and Barnes, R (eds), Law of the Sea – UNCLOS as a Living Treaty (BIICL 2016) 41 Google Scholar.

112 De Brabandere, E, ‘The Use of Precedent and External Case Law by the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ (2016) 15 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 45 and 51Google Scholar. See also Lauterpacht, H, The Development of International Law by the International Court (CUP 1982) 14 Google Scholar; Hernández, GI, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (OUP 2014) 188–90Google Scholar.

113 North Sea Continental Shelf (n 9) paras 46 and 81.

114 ibid, para 55.

115 Some authors argued that the Court of Arbitration rejected that equidistance and special circumstances are the rule and the exception under art 6 CSC, but this view does not reflect the practical method employed by the Court of Arbitration to delimit the boundary. See Bowett, DW, ‘The Arbitration between the United Kingdom and France concerning the Continental Shelf Boundary in the English Channel and South-Western Approaches’ (1978) 49 BYBIL 5 Google Scholar; McRae, DM, ‘Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom and France: The Channel Arbitration’ (1977) 15 Canadian YBIL 182 Google Scholar; Brown, ED, ‘The Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case ’ (1979) 16 San Diego L Rev 493 Google Scholar.

116 Continental Shelf (France/UK) (1977) XVIII RIAA 3, para 199.

117 ibid, paras 201–2.

118 ibid, paras 244–51.

119 ibid, para 249. The Court of Arbitration's approach to the delimitation around the Channel Islands and in the Atlantic region also emerges from the map annexed to the award.

120 Jan Mayen (n 8) para 49.

121 ibid, para 56. On Jan Mayen, see Churchill, RR, ‘The Greenland-Jan Mayen Case and its Significance for the International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ (1994) 9 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 15 Google Scholar; Evans, MD, ‘Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway)’ (1994) 43 ICLQ 702 Google Scholar.

122 In Bangladesh v India, PS Rao explained that he ‘happily’ concurred with his colleagues on territorial sea delimitation. See Bangladesh v India (n 52) para 2 (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Dr. PS Rao).

123 Bangladesh/Myanmar (n 45) para 58 (Separate Opinion Gao).

124 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 11 (Separate Opinion Koroma).

125 ibid, para 18 (Separate Opinion Koroma).

126 ibid, para 121 (Dissenting Opinion Torres Bernárdez).

127 Section IV.C below. In North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ noted that ‘the distorting effects of lateral equidistance lines under certain conditions of coastal configuration are nevertheless comparatively small within the limits of territorial waters’. See North Sea Continental Shelf (n 9) para 59.

128 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 161 (Dissenting Opinion Torres Bernárdez).

129 Section III.A above.

130 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 122 (Dissenting Opinion Torres Bernárdez).

131 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) (Judgment) [1982] ICJ Rep 13; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (Guinea/Guinea-Bissau) (1985) XIX RIAA 149.

132 Section II.B above.

133 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 161 (Dissenting Opinion Torres Bernárdez). LOSC art 7(1) provides that ‘[i]n localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured’.

134 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 278. Dealing with the geographical coordinates for base lines also established under LOSC art 7, LOSC art 16(2) provides that ‘[t]he coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations’.

135 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 4 (Separate Opinion Ranjeva).

136 ibid, para 7 (Separate Opinion Ranjeva).

137 ibid, paras 8 and 11–12 (Separate Opinion Ranjeva).

138 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 268; Bangladesh v India (n 52) para 246. ITLOS did not cite any previous decision on the territorial sea delimitation method, see Bangladesh/Myanmar (n 45) paras 126–9.

139 Section II.B above.

140 The other two arbitrators in Bangladesh v India were Ivan Shearer and PS Rao.

141 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire) (Provisional Measures) Order of 25 April 2015, para 58, <https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Order_prov.measures_25.04.2015_orig_Eng.pdf>. See Lamus, A Sarmiento and Quintero, R González, ‘Current Legal Developments in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ (2016) 31 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 166 Google Scholar; Y Tanaka, ‘Unilateral Exploration and Exploitation of Natural Resources in Disputed Areas: A Note on the Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire Order of 25 April 2015 before the Special Chamber of ITLOS’ (2015) Ocean Development and International Law 317–19.

142 Section II.B above.

143 Sections III.A and III.B above.

144 Sections II.A and III.B above.

145 Section III.A.

146 Section II.B above.

147 In Jan Mayen, the ICJ stated that ‘special circumstances are those circumstances which might modify the result produced by an unqualified application of the equidistance principle’. See Jan Mayen (n 8) para 55. Although the Court was referring to special circumstances under art 6 CSC, special circumstances under LOSC art 15 are characterized by the same underlying logic. See section III.A above.

148 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 16 (Separate Opinion Ranjeva).

149 Leading commentators have expressed caution with regard to the possibility of law-making by international tribunals. See Crawford, J, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 37–41 Google Scholar; Charlesworth, H, ‘Law-making and Sources’ in Crawford, J and Koskenniemi, M (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (CUP 2012) 197 Google Scholar; Cassese, A, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 194 Google Scholar; Jennings, R and Watts, A, Oppenheim's International Law (9th edn, Longman 1992) vol I, 41–2Google Scholar.

150 Black Sea (n 110) para 30.

151 ibid, paras 115–22.

152 ibid, para 149.

153 Bangladesh/Myanmar (n 45) paras 146–52.

154 Section III.A above.

155 Nicaragua v Colombia (n 57) para 23 (Separate Opinion Abraham). Judge Abraham also mentioned ‘particular circumstances’ in other passages of his separate opinion appended to the 2012 Nicaragua v Colombia judgment, which suggest he may have attached some importance to this nomenclature. See ibid, paras 22, 26, 27 and 31 (Separate Opinion Abraham).

156 Bangladesh/Myanmar (n 45) para 28 (Separate Opinion Gao).

157 The international tribunals’ discretion in drawing maritime boundaries in the continental shelf and in the EEZ is linked to the flexibility of delimitation beyond 12 nm. See Tanaka, Y, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation (Hart 2006)Google Scholar; Cottier, T, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation (CUP 2015)Google Scholar. On the approach to delimitation beyond 12 nm up to 1989, see Evans, MD, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (OUP 1989)Google Scholar.

158 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 280.

159 See section II.B above.

160 Rothwell and Stephens (n 1) 428.

161 Report on the Régime of the Territorial Sea, UN Doc A/CN.4/53 (3 April 1952) 31.

162 ibid.

163 ILC Yearbook (1955), vol I, 220, para 2 (Salamanca).

164 ibid 220, para 5 (Salamanca).

165 Churchill wrote that ‘the principal drafters of Article 6 … considered special circumstances as embracing (and apparently limited to) exceptional configurations of the coast, and the presence of islands and navigable channels’. See Churchill (n 122) 18.

166 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey) (Judgment) [1978] ICJ Rep 3, para 85; Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) (Merits) [1962] ICJ Rep 6, 34.

167 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 277.

168 Black Sea (n 110) para 131.

169 Bangladesh v India (n 52) para 212.

170 ibid, para 215.

171 ibid, para 223.

172 ibid, para 214.

173 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 277.

174 Black Sea (n 110) paras 153–4.

175 Bangladesh/Myanmar (n 45) paras 273 and 337–40.

176 North Sea Continental Shelf (n 9) para 59.

177 Vukas, B, ‘A Quarter of a Century after UNCLOS III: A Personal Recollection’ in Kohen, M (ed), Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through International Law – Liber Amicorum Lucius Caflisch (Martinus Nijhoff 2007) 801 Google Scholar.

178 Nicaragua v Honduras (n 33) para 8 (Separate Opinion Ranjeva).