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Hermeneutical Dissent and the Species of Hermeneutical Injustice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Trystan S. Goetze Open the ORCID record for Trystan S. Goetze [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

According to Miranda Fricker, a hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a deficit in our shared tools of social interpretation (the collective hermeneutical resource), such that marginalized social groups are at a disadvantage in making sense of their distinctive and important experiences. Critics have claimed that Fricker's account ignores or precludes a phenomenon I call hermeneutical dissent, where marginalized groups have produced their own interpretive tools for making sense of those experiences. I clarify the nature of hermeneutical injustice to make room for hermeneutical dissent, clearing up the structure of the collective hermeneutical resource and the fundamental harm of hermeneutical injustice. I then provide a more nuanced account of the hermeneutical resources in play in instances of hermeneutical injustice, enabling six species of the injustice to be distinguished. Finally, I reflect on the corrective virtue of hermeneutical justice in light of hermeneutical dissent.

Type
Articles
Information
Hypatia , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , Winter 2018 , pp. 73 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Hypatia, Inc.

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