Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2014
According to the classic Catholic doctrine of property, owners who have more than they need are obliged to share their surplus with others who have less than they need. From the patristic era to the work of John Paul II, this obligation has been understood to arise most fundamentally from the character of the objects owned: the material world is a gift from the Creator, intended to meet the needs of all humanity. Three centuries ago, John Locke argued that 99 percent of the value of modern wealth is attributable not to natural resources but to human labor and invention, implicitly restricting the classic obligations of property owners to a mere 1 percent of wealth. Catholic moral theology has yet to integrate Locke's insight about human creativity and economic productivity into an adequate doctrine of property. This article surveys the problem and provides an outline of a constructive response.
1 This paper was presented at a conference on “Creativity, Values, and the Catholic Imagination” at the College of St. Benedict and St. John's University, October 1998. An earlier form of this essay was presented at a conference on “The Legacy of Monsignor John A. Ryan” at the University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota, in September 1995. Thanks go to conference participants for their useful comments. I am especially grateful for helpful suggestions from an anonymous Horizons referee.
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5 Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae, II–II, q. 66, a. 1.Google Scholar
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7 Ibid., I-II, q. 94, a. 5.
8 Ibid., II-II, q. 66, a. 7.
9 Ibid., II-II, q. 66, a. 5.
10 Ibid.
11 See, e.g., John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, par. 31.
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26 Centesimus Annus, par. 34.
27 John Paul II observes that “the State could not directly ensure the right to work for all its citizens unless it controlled every aspect of economic life and restricted the free initiative of individuals,” something he opposes. Still, “the State has a duty to sustain business activities by creating conditions which will ensure job opportunities” (Centesimus Annus, par. 48).
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45 As Susan Moller Okin has argued, the endorsement of universal self-interest and the denigration of altruism that occurs in the novels of Ayn Rand is only possible with a convenient forgetfulness of home life. In particular, the rearing of children places obligations on parents that many libertarians have trouble accounting for. See her Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 88.Google Scholar
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