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French Rhineland Policy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Robert McCrum
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Extract

The victory of the Allied powers in November 1918 gave the French a unique opportunity to establish a secure frontier on the Rhine. Throughout the peace conference that followed, the politicians, generals and intellectuals of the right who perceived this opportunity most clearly conducted a vigorous campaign to achieve France's ‘natural frontier.’ The separation of the Rhineland from Germany had three incontestable advantages for France. It would diminish Germany's superiority in population; it would establish a buffer zone between the two countries, and it would render impossible a German concentration of troops west of the Rhine itself. Such a ‘paix française’, however, would have been insensitive to the main consideration of post-war diplomacy: the creation of a lasting European peace that satisfied the conflicting foreign policies of the major allies. Chiefly to preserve the victorious alliance, Clemenceau, who at first had favoured the demands of the right, was forced to abandon the proposed separation and to accept a compromise. The French generals like Foch and Mangin who had worked to ‘deprussify’ the Rhineland did not realize their dream. The disputed territory, though occupied by a temporary, inter-allied force, remained German.

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Articles
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The Historical Journal , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 623 - 648
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

Abbreviations used in the footnotes. CAB: British cabinet papers, Public Record Office. CMP: Charles Mangin papers, Archives Nationales. CTP: Procès-verbaux de la Commission des Traités de paix, Archives Nationales. FO: Foreign Office papers, Public Record Office. FRPPC: U.S. Department of State, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (Washington, 1942–1947).Google Scholar LGP: Lloyd George papers, House of Lords Record Office. RSBP: Ray Stannard Baker papers, Princeton University. US Army: Department of the Army, The United States army in the world war (Washington, 1948).Google Scholar

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6 The Rhine was to be the western military frontier of Germany; the left bank was to be permanently occupied by an inter-allied army, and the occupied territory, not being economically self-sufficient, was to have guaranteed outlets through an association of western nations in a customs union. Mermeix, , Fragments, VI, 210–19.Google Scholar

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23 7 Mar., LGP F/147/1/1.

24 4 Mar., CAB 23/15/ 541A. Cf. Headlam-Morley, J. W., A memoir of the Paris peace conference (London, 1972), p. 44Google Scholar: ‘Nobody seems to know what the French proposals are for dealing with the left bank of the Rhine.’

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53 Dorten, , La Tragédie, pp. 35–8Google Scholar provides a full, though partisan, account of these events. See also King, , Foch versus Clemenceau, pp. 28–43.Google Scholar

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55 Poincaré, , A la recherche, p. 112, 2 Feb., and p. 177, 24 Feb.Google Scholar

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57 Lloyd George to P. H. Kerr, 11 Feb., LGP F/89/2/8.

58 George, D. Lloyd, The truth about the peace treaties (London, 1938), I, 396.Google Scholar The international dimension of this question is discussed at length in the excellent study by Nelson, , Land and power, pp. 192–218.Google Scholar

59 28 Feb., CAB 23/15/538A. ‘The idea of maintaining a permanent military force on the Rhine was intolerable’, Lord Curzon in cabinet, 4 Mar. 1919, CAB 23/15/541A.

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61 ‘Notes of a discussion with M. Tardieu and Dr Mezes’ by P. H. Kerr, 11/12 Mar., LGP F/89/2/40. See also papiers Tardieu 45.

62 4 Mar., CAB 23/15/541A.

63 George, Lloyd, The truth, 1, 403.Google Scholar

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69 Poincaré, , A la recherche, p. 337Google Scholar, 15 Apr. Clemenceau later described the fifteen year occupation as ‘la chose la plus difficile à obtenir’, CTP, 5e séance, 11 July 1919, p. 76.

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72 Clemenceau: ‘Nous ne pouvons pas vivre isolés; le temps du “splendide isolement” est passé’. CTP, 5e séance, 11 July 1919, p. 8. French dependance on the Anglo-American alliance was not merely strategic. Throughout the conference, British and American subsidies saved France from even higher inflation and from a subsistence crisis.

73 FO 608/142, ref. 477/1/9.

74 CTP, 5e séance, 11 July 1919, p. 55, and aoe séance, 29 July, p. 60.

75 28 Feb., CAB 23/15/538A; 4 Mar., CAB 23/15/54A.

76 See page 664 below.

77 This was the attitude taken by members of the Commission des traités de paix. See séances 5, 11 and 20.

78 Foch ‘is kept in complete ignorance of all that is going on. Clemenceau tells him nothing.’ Callwell, C. E., Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London, 1927), II, 185.Google Scholar See Poincaré, , A la recherche, p. 414, 6 May.Google Scholar

79 Marshal Joffre remarked that Clemenceau would not ‘brook anyone else's authority or admit of divided authority’. FRPPC, 1, 382.Google Scholar

80 ‘There are considerable rumours of differences of opinion between Foch and Clemenceau, though not on fundamental points.’ British intelligence report, LGP F/389/2/p.

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85 Ibid. pp. 270–1, 20 Mar. Henrietta was his wife.

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88 Foch also permitted the rumour of his intended resignation to fly around. ‘The question of the left bank of the Rhine now looms largest in the Paris negotiations and if not solved in a way which gives security to France, may lead to the resignation of Marshal Foch’, Morning Post, 19 04 1919.Google Scholar

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91 CTP, IIe séance, 17 07, pp. 118–19.Google Scholar

92 Poincaré, , A la recherche, p. 338Google Scholar, 16 Apr. This plan was being canvassed widely. Alexandre Ribot noted in his diary ‘Dubost m'a dit que si Clemenceau était renverser, Poincaré ferait un ministère présidé par Foch’. Journal d'Alexandre Ribot et correspondances inédites 1914–22 (Paris, 1936), p. 269.Google Scholar

93 Poincaré, , A la recherche, p. 348, 18 Apr.Google Scholar

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95 CTP, IIe séance, 17 07, p. 118.Google Scholar

96 Poincaré, , A la recherche, pp. 315–16Google Scholar, 6 Apr. Poincaré refused Clemenceau's resignation.

97 Ibid. p. 345, 17 Apr. Cf. Weygand, , Mémoires, II, 41.Google Scholar

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100 Poincaré, , A la recherche, p. 290, 2 May.Google Scholar The published transcript omits ‘Mais puis-je faire?’ but it is to be found in the original manuscript at the Bibliothèque Nationale.

101 Poincaré, , A la recherche, pp. 412–14, 6 May.Google Scholar

102 Hankey, M. P., The supreme control at the Paris peace conference 1919 (London, 1963), pp. 146–7.Google Scholar

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122 US Army, x, 1129.Google Scholar Mangin's move seemed particularly outrageous because Liggett and Wilson were under the impression that the fifty deputies were French. This misunderstanding, resolved on 27 May, was an added source of embarrassment to Clemenceau, for it appeared that French parliamentarians were actively engaged in trying to sabotage one of the most controversial provisions of the treaty.

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128 The Mangin papers contain numerous drafts of proclamations to the Rhinelanders, and a secret document entitled ‘Organisation de la fédération populaire rhénane’. CMP 149 AP 21 and 22. Cf. Mangin, L.-E., La France, p. 53.Google Scholar

129 Unsigned memorandum for Maj.-Gen. McAndrew, 2 June, US Army, x, 1149.Google Scholar

130 Gen. von Hammerstein to Gen. Nudant, 3 June, ibid., p. 1154. If the new republic had been successful, there is some evidence that it would not have been suppressed by the allies. Lord Robert Cecil, while he agreed that ‘we should take no action to encourage its formation’, considered that ‘If and when it has established an independent existance we can consider its recognition’. Winston Churchill supported this view. LGP F/6/6/5O and CAB 23/15/541A.

131 ‘Si les Rhénans veulent se donner à la France, je ne m'y refuserai pas’, Clemenceau. CTP, 5e séance, 11 July, p. 79 and p. 12.

132 Mantoux, , Délibérations, II, 270–2.Google Scholar

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134 Mangin, C., ‘Lettres’, p. 524.Google Scholar