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The Cominform: Tito's International?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2010

Geoffrey Swain
Geoffrey Swain
Affiliation:
Bristol Polytechnic
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Abstract

Although it is now recognized that the Stalin-Tito dispute was sparked off by Tito's desire to intervene decisively in the Greek civil war, the ideological context of that decision has never been fully explored. This article suggests that, since the early days of the Second World War, Tito had been committed to establishing a popular front ‘from below’, i.e. under clear communist control. He did this not only in Yugoslavia, but used his position in the war-time Comintern to persuade other communist parties to do the same. As a result he was dissatisfied with the all-party coalition governments established with Stalin's consent throughout Europe in 1945. Tito favoured a communist offensive, while Stalin, aware of the international position of the Soviet Union, favoured a more cautious approach. When Stalin summoned the first meeting of the Cominform in September 1947 and made Tito its de Facto leader, Tito mistakenly assumed he was to head a new international committed to a revolutionary offensive not only in Eastern Europe but in Greece and even Italy and France.

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Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , September 1992 , pp. 641 - 663
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

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31 Luigi Longo, a Spanish veteran, became the leader of the Italian partisans; Franqois Vittori, the Corsican leader, had fought in Spain; while four of the Yugoslav partisan Army Commanders were ‘Spaniards’. Davidson, B. — in Seemes from the anti-mazi war (London, 1980), pp. 166–7Google Scholar —refers to the career of Antonio Ukmar, a veteran of Spain who had since then fought in Ethiopia, France, Corsica, Yugoslavia and Italy.

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34 Much has been written about the nature of Yugoslav support for the December events, and in particular the telegram sent by the KKE liaison officer with the KPJ informing the KKE leadership the ‘Tito and the Bulgarians’ advised resisting the call to disarm ELAS. The date of this telegram's arrival with the Greek communist! is disputed: , Woodhouse (The struggle, p. 99)Google Scholar gives 97th November and Loulis the 30th, which appears on the text of the telegram reproduced in his The Greek CP, p. 168. Recent scholars have doubted the ‘Cold War’ view that the Yugoslavs instigated the uprising, seeing its origins in Papandreou's duplicity, see Vlavianos, H., ‘The Greek communist party’, p. 188.Google Scholar However, the support of Belgrade must have given the KKE confidence, particularly the erroneous prediction in the telegram that Britain would not intervene.

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38 Tito did not tell Moscow of his visit to Romania in December 1947, nor of the fateful decision to send troops into Albania, see Dedijer, V., Tito sptaks (London, 1954), p. 315Google Scholar; Markoviè, D. and Krzavac, S., zavtra Informbiroa (Belgrade, 1987), p. 29,Google Scholar citing Kardelj's memoirs. Tito admitted to the Central Committee that he had made an error in not consulting the Soviet Union about stationing troops in Albania, see ‘Minutes of the KPJ central committee meeting of 1 Mar. 1948’, reproduced in , Dedijer, Novi prilozi, III, 303–6.Google Scholar He even offered to resign as a consequence, see Djilas, M., Vlast (London, 1983), p. 139.Google Scholar(Djilas refers to a meeting of the ‘expanded politburo’ rather than the central committee, reflecting an ambiguity in the relationship between the two. It is clear, however, that he is talking about the body of Tito's key advisers, who can be referred to as either ‘core members of the central committee’ or ‘the expanded politburo’, rather than the ‘full plenum of the central committee’ which met in April 1948.)

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54 The Times 24 Dec. 1947. The paper's correspondent speculated that the talks broke down because the non-communists resented Yugoslav interference. However, this point is rather contradicted by a further claim in the article that the Yugoslavs were opposing the formation of a Greek democratic government because of the risk of international repercussions. Reading between the lines, it seems that the Yugoslavs were cautious about backing a government which was not broad enough to win over some degree of international recognition.

55 The Times, 24 Dec. 1947.

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64 , Djilas, Vlast, p. 105.Google Scholar A conference of East European communist parties was planned for July 1947 to discuss the Marshall Plan, but Gottwald's decision to Tall into line on rejecting Marshall Aid made the conference unnecessary, see Djilas, M., Conversations with Stalin, (London, 1969), p. 100Google Scholar.

65 The fullest account of the founding conference of the Cominform is still that of Reale, E., Nascila del Cominfom (Rome, 1958).Google Scholar However, both Dedijer's Jiovi prilozi and Strbac's Suiob give new information. The source for both is, apparently, the minutes taken at the KPJ central committee meeting immediately after the conference which discussed its achievements; the minutes themselves are reproduced by Dedijer. Strbac reproduces the telegram inviting die KPJ to attend, and the relevant extracts from Kardelj's Mtmoirs, containing a summary of his speech. Amongst the new information provided by these sources is dear evidence of the hostility of die Polish communists to the whole venture. They asked the Russians quite bluntly what die purpose of the meeting was, and on being told an ‘information co-ordination bureau’ insisted that it, and all its activities, be legal. The Poles felt such a bureau should meet ‘only when necessary’ rather than every three or four months as the conference agreed. However, die Hungarians, Bulgarians and Yugoslavs joined in resisting die Soviet suggestion that die Cominform should have a permanent council: it was too reminiscent of die old Comintern executive. More details on die Polish atdtude to die Cominform can be found in Toranska, T., ONI: Stalin's Polish pmppets (London, 1987), pp. 282–3Google Scholar.

66 , Djilas, Vlcst, p. 113.Google Scholar The inclusion of Slansky amongst those singled out by Zhdanov is worthy of comment. In 1952 die trial of the CPCz General Secretary would shake the communist world. His role at die foundation conference of die Comintern suggests that while not a ‘Titoite agent’, diere were grounds for linking him to die policies of both Tito and Zhdanov.

67 For a lasting peace, for a people's democracy, 10 Nov. 1947.

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69 Kardelj, cited by , Strbac, Sukob, p. 244.Google Scholar The Yugoslav and Soviet delegations were not agreed about everything. Their perspectives on Greece were still very different. Kardelj endorsed the Greek struggle, but Zhdanov not only ignored the topic in his speech but tried to prevent corridor discussion of it, see , Reale, Nascita, p. 122Google Scholar; and , Djilas, Vlasl, p. 113Google Scholar.

70 It is clear from Kardelj's memoirs — cited by , Strbac, Sukob, p. 244Google Scholar — that Kardelj consulted Tito by telegram on the issue of Belgrade becoming the headquarters. This appears to have happened on the night of 26–7 September. On this occasion, if on no other — and it seems likely that they were in touch throughout the conference — Kardelj had time to brief Tito before he made his speech to the Second Congress of the People's Front on the 27th.

71 I am quoting from the version published in the KPJ daily Borba, on 28 Sep. 1947. Tito's speech was given wide international coverage; even an English edition was produced. See Borba, a Nov. 1947, 27 Dec. 1947.

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76 For a tasting peace, for a people's democracy, 15 Jan. 1948.

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78 Borba, 28 Feb. 1948.

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80 For a lasting peace, for a people's democracy, 1 Jan. 1948 and 15 Jan. 1948.

81 Ibid. 1 Dec. 1947.

82 , Estruch, Historia, II, 151Google Scholar; Carrillo, S., Dialogue on Spain, (London, 1976), p. 96Google Scholar.

83 For a lasting peace, for a people's democracy, 15 Feb. 1948.

84 Ibid. 1 Mar. 1948.

84 , Djilas, Vlast, p. 115.Google Scholar An announcement of the meeting appeared in For a lasting peace, for a people's democracy, 1 Dec. 1948.

85 This can be deduced from the order of events. We know from , Dedijer, Tito speaks, p. 308,Google Scholar that the changes in the journal had to be made at the very last minute, after the whole issue had been typeset and proof copies run off. We also know from , Dedijer in Tito speaks, p. 307 andGoogle Scholar Novi priloii, III, 331 that Zhdanov was virtually the editor of the journal, going through it line by line. For changes to be made at the very last minute, they must have gone past Zhdanov, to be stopped by Stalin. For relations between Zhdanov and Stalin, see Ra'anan, G. D., International policy formation in the USSR: factional debates during the Zhdanovshekina (Hamden, 1983)Google Scholar.

87 For a lasting peace, for a people's democracy, 1 Dec. 1947, 15 Dec. 1947; Borba 27 Dec. 1947, 15 Jan. 1948, 18 Jan. 1948, 31 Jan. 1948, 5 Feb. 1948, n Feb. 1948.

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89 Royal Institute Tor International Affairs, The Soviet-Yugoslao dispute (London, 1948), pp. 151–6Google Scholar.