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The Self before Self-Consciousness: Hegel's Developmental Account*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2013

Daniel Dahlstrom
Daniel Dahlstrom*
Affiliation:
Boston [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper examines three puzzles that arise from Hegel's account of the constitution of the self and self-consciousness. The puzzles mirror questions of the respective relation of (a) the self to self-consciousness, (b) self-consciousness to recognition of and by others, and (c) the struggle for recognition to ethical life. The paper argues that Hegel's developmental account of the constitution of the self and self-consciousness provides promising prospects for resolving puzzles about the status of the self before self-consciousness and the status of self-consciousness in the family before the struggle for recognition. However, the paper questions the adequacy of Hegel's account of ethical life, in view of the puzzle that it presents and appears unable to resolve. The paper suggests that Hegel's developmental account is too restrictive, since its move from a quest for mastery to mutual recognition apparently fails to account sufficiently for asymmetrical acts of generosity and sacrifice.

Type
Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , October 2013 , pp. 135 - 158
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2013 

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Footnotes

*

I am grateful to Tim Brownlee, Jeremy Butman, and Ian Dunkle for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. My study of Hegel generally and the topic of self-consciousness in particular is deeply indebted to Professor Klaus Düsing's formidable body of work. For his scholarship and support through the years, I am deeply thankful.

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