This article presents a cross-national analytical framework for understanding current attempts to reform medical governance – in particular, those by third parties to control the practice of medicine. The framework pays particular attention to the ways in which institutions shape policy reform. The article also outlines the main comparative findings of case studies of selected reforms and associated processes of negotiations in Denmark, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. These four countries were selected because they are characterised by theoretically interesting variations in the institutional contexts of medical governance. The analysis suggests that although all the four countries have pushed for more control over the way in which doctors practise medicine, in response to similar imperatives, each country differs in the path it has taken. More specifically, the instruments and techniques brought to bear in each case vary considerably and are directed by a country's political institutions towards a unique path.

This article explores the development of two policies for the governance of medical performance in the UK: the Department of Health's (DH) clinical governance policy and the medical profession's revalidation policy. After discussing the institutional context in which each of these policies emerged, we examine how and why they were constructed. While the clinical governance policy was in large part a swift reaction to high-profile cases of medical misconduct in the late 1990s, revalidation was the profession's response to the politicisation of its self-regulatory apparatus. The profession took notably longer than the DH to piece together its policy as a result of internal disagreements about the role clinical standards should play in the evaluation of a doctor's fitness to practice. Following the Fifth Report of the Shipman Inquiry in late 2004, the government stepped in and eventually introduced legislation that modifies the profession's policy. With clinical governance, the state – via arms-length regulatory organisations – has entered the clinic in new ways, strengthening hierarchy-based forms of governance in the governance of medical performance. However, the success of hierarchical forms of governance is likely to be restricted by the lack of a clear system of sanctioning and the state's reliance on a lengthy chain of command in the National Health Service for the implementation of clinical standards.

This paper analyses the introduction of a systemic standards based programme for governing medical performance in Denmark. The programme combines clinical, organisational, and patient related standards and measures, and contains both external evaluation and self-assessment based on standards. The substance of the programme is new compared to the previous decentralised or professionally driven state of affairs that was based on a largely voluntary introduction of clinical standards, combined with a case-by-case evaluation of malpractice incidents. The programme strengthens hierarchy-based forms of governance; these co-exist with salient components of network-based governance as well as some elements of market-based governance. Institutional and contextual factors are important in explaining why a systemic standards based programme emerged as a result of the policy negotiation processes. In particular, the programme reflects stronger governance ambitions from the government in response to claims of a relative decline in the quality of the regional health services. However, the actual design is mediated by institutionalised negotiation processes among the state, decentralised authorities, and health professionals.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, health policy in Italy has been characterised by continuous reform as reflected by the frequency of new measures. Importantly, the reforms have changed considerably many aspects of the health-care system, including the governance of medical performance. The new measures fall into two types: regionalisation and transformation of local providers into ‘health-care enterprises’. In relation to the governance of medical performance, more specifically, the reforms have entailed the introduction of budgeting and quality assurance, the creation of new managerial roles, and the transformation of existing roles, as well as the introduction of new mechanisms for evaluating medical performance. In terms of the specific forms of governance, the reforms have reinforced hierarchy-based forms of governing intermeshed with party governance, and have re-defined professional self-regulation by strengthening collective forms of professional self-regulation. The design and implementation of the reforms are subject to a complex process of negotiation, which involves a wide range of actors spread across different levels of governance and takes place in relation to all aspects of the governance of medical performance.

Studies of German health policy often highlight institutional constraints to reform. However, based on a case study of the introduction of clinical standards as part of the Disease Management Programmes for chronic illnesses, this article suggests that negotiating reform at an arm's length from the state can also lead to governance change, although the strengthening of hierarchy is not as prominent as that in some of the countries studied in this special issue. As such, the case of Germany offers interesting insights into the politics of governance change that occur in the shadow, but largely without the direct involvement of the state, which is typical of a corporatist health-care state. In this respect, the analysis identifies three leverages for change. First, the change in medical governance explicitly builds on earlier reforms and gives the reform alliance a competitive edge. Second, the organisations of the joint self-administration, as a more or less open ally of the state, play an influential role throughout the reform process. Importantly and third, this is complemented by the state steering at a distance.

This stimulating set of articles provides intriguing information and comments about medical governance in four countries. The commentary argues that the typology of governance approaches is not as useful as one would want for understanding either the political prospects or policy effects of governance measures. The politics of governance measures is distinctly related to efforts to avoid blame, and the effects of measures are better understood in terms of state capacity and a term, ‘authority’, that advocates of ‘governance’ usually avoid. Close attention to the requisites of authority provides some insight into the patterns of adoption and consequences of measures. These patterns are highlighted by comparing the four cases reviewed to experience in the United States.