In the midst of the economic crisis sweeping across the European continent, popular support for European integration has become a common theme in political discourse. This article revisits the debate regarding popular support for European integration. Although many journalists, politicians and pundits currently argue that the public is becoming increasingly sceptical of further steps towards integration, this study qualifies that claim and suggests that public opinion towards Europe is best described as ambivalent. Also, it shows that ambivalence regarding European integration is higher in Western than in Central and Eastern Europe. This is probably due to the fact that as citizens in Western Europe have gained more experience with the positive and negative consequences of integration over the years, they have also become more ambivalent about the European project. Rather than suggesting that citizens are by and large turning their backs on Europe, I put forward the view that we seem to be witnessing growing uncertainty about the future scope and depth of the integration process. This, I argue, could be viewed as a natural by-product of experiencing both the virtues and the vices association with membership. Consequently, attitude ambivalence as such may be demonstrative of a maturation of public opinion concerning European integration.

This article is a study of the contradictions of conservatism. It shows that most modern writers since Oakeshott have defined conservatism in an abstract manner. Here I argue that their definition, although not wrong, is an incomplete definition which is only coherent because it is incomplete. It is only the first stage in understanding conservatism, which has to be understood also as a negation of rival ideologies and, further, as a political position which points to a tradition or truth outside itself and which can, in service of this tradition or truth, be radical. Since it is part of the standard definition of conservatism that it cannot be radical, this means conservatism, taken as a whole, contradicts itself.

Dominant party systems are defined by a lack of party alternation at the national level; however, dominant party systems do not inherently preclude electoral competition at the macro level, the micro level, or both. Nonetheless, little systematic work has documented the competitiveness of elections under a dominant party system. This article describes the nature of competition under one of sub-Saharan Africa's most enduring dominant party systems, Botswana. By examining electoral outcomes at the constituency level, this article demonstrates that elections in Botswana produce significant levels of competition, especially when compared to other sub-Saharan countries. Furthermore, electoral competitiveness appears unrelated to the party system at large: namely, competitiveness is no less or greater under dominant party systems than under multiparty systems.