There are various reasons why an author may wish to return, not to the ‘classic’ he wrote thirty years ago (this is a widely practised and accepted form of narcissism), but to a book he has only recently published. One such reason could be that he suffers from an acute case of what the French call esprit de l'escalier (spirit of the staircase) — thinking of the brilliant remark one might have made during the conversation only as one walks down the staircase after leaving the party. Another possibility is that the book was attacked and that some new ideas occurred to the author as he replied to his detractors. Also, upon reflecting on his book, the author may discover some connecting link between it and his earlier writings which he feels he would like to explore. While we are working on a new book we are often providentially protected by the illusion that we are engaged on an entirely novel and original enterprise. We may need this feeling to set out at all. Only after we are finished do we recognize that an argument we have put forth is closely related to points which we have made long ago or which, alternatively, stand in some tension to it.

Queen Elizabeth II Has Now Entered The Forty-First year of her reign. This is an exceptional achievement in a historical period marked by speed and turbulence. Indeed, in the exercise she has also become the personality with the longest record of continuity of service and experience in high politics, not only in this country but in the whole world. This is an obvious advantage for the new generation of British political leaders who will seek her counsel.

These Words Spoken By President Clinton At His Inauguration on 20 January 1993 can usefully serve as a leitmotif for the present issue of the journal Government and Opposition. The issue is itself the outcome of a conference organized by the journal and the Department of Government of the University of Manchester. The theme was the ‘Influences of Domestic and International Factors on Processes of Policy-Making’. However, this title does not quite catch the interactive quality of the phenomenon which the group was seeking to examine. Increasingly, it has been contended, policies at the domestic level whether in what we once called the first, second or third worlds are being profoundly influenced by international or ‘global’ considerations. But it is also the case that international agreements are being accommodated to the sensitivities of the domestic politics of the partners.

THE NEWS FROM AMERICA IS (WHAT ELSE COULD IT BE?) BILL Clinton – America's first first-name-only-please President, informality and accessibility being hallmarks of democratic populism in the 1990s. It might seem as if this is the roller-coaster presidency: if you do not like Clinton's bad (good) reputation today, just wait a month and you can be sure that things will have turned upside down. When I started this piece in the spring, he was way, way down; today just a few months later, following a successful Japanese trip (his weak rivals in the G-7 group made him look good), his two successful judicial appointments (Ruth Bader Ginsberg to the Supreme Court and Louis J. Freeh to the FBI), his paper-thin but indispensable budget victory in the Congress, and his shepherding of the historic Israeli-Palestinian peace protocol, he's looking good. By the time you read this, however, he's likely to be down again, or perhaps down but once again up. His political career has been on a rollercoaster from the start and the media seem determined to keep him and the country rocking — and rolling.

By The Standards of The Solar System, Where are found the only comparable bodies of whose existence we have certain knowledge, the earth is not a large planet. For most of recorded history, on the other hand, it has certainly seemed so to its inhabitants, and only in recent decades has a different perception come to prevail, as instanced, for example, by the much-remarked Ward-Dubos book of 1972, Only One Earth — The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet. In 1872 Phileas Fogg needed almost eighty days to go around the world, in 1961 Yuri Gagarin managed the feat in little more than eighty minutes, and nowadays less intrepid travellers than these think nothing of accomplishing the task using commercial aircraft in comfortably less than eighty hours. Photographic images and, in general, data of unlimited complexity meanwhile circle the globe virtually instantaneously. The technologies here are those of transport and communications but in most other areas of human activity too the twentieth century has seen similar technological strides.

THE TRANSITION FROM COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM TO a democratic socio-political organization and to a market economy system depends on several economic factors (capital, technology, skilled labour force, competent management) and also on political and cultural elements. The political speeches, whether delivered by government or opposition in Romania, underline almost exclusively the financial, technological or political aspects, neglecting quite completely the psycho-sociological dimension of this transitory period. The fact that the economic reforms somehow failed is only partly due to the lack of economic resources or to organizational setbacks. These are, of course, significant and undeniable reasons, but there is one more explanation rather forgotten, and that is the attitude of the Romanian population itself towards economic, social and political changes.

This Lecture Has a Dual Theme. Theme Number One is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the OECD, where I worked from the beginning of 1984 till the spring of this year. I was originally asked by Ghita Ionescu to prepare for Government and Opposition an article on the Organization, as one of a series which the journal has been carrying on different international agencies. Two such articles have already appeared: one by Sir Nicholas Bayne, on the GATT and the Uruguay Round, and the other by Andrew Crockett on the IMF. I am pleased to be following these distinguished authors, the more so since I think of them both as former quasi-colleagues — a term that I will explain later — at the OECD. But when the further idea of a lecture was raised, Professor Ionescu suggested that my subject-matter should be extended to cover international economic cooperation more generally, on the understanding that this broader theme would be linked to the specific case of the OECD.

ONE OF THE MOST NOTICED FEATURES OF OUR TIME IS that global problems are increasing at a faster rate than the evolution of the political capacities to manage them. This is not a new observation, or even a new condition. It has long been part of a pessimistic assessment of the prospects for modern industrial technological civilization that can be traced back to its origins, but has been particularly strong throughout the twentieth century. H. G. Wells's famous comment that ‘human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe’ is even more apposite to the contemporary mood than it was when first written. The spectre of communism no longer haunts Europe, but other spectres now haunt the global civilization which developed out of Europe. Some of the key trends of this global civilization threaten at best an era of mounting disorder and chaos in the world system, at worst the survival of the human species itself. The problems are increasing far faster than the ability to find solutions for them.

The Impact of Domestic Policy on International relations and vice versa has seldom been more clearly demonstrated than in late autumn 1992, with the near collapse in November of the Uruguay Round and the series of events in the European Community surrounding the Danish and French referenda and Britian's forced withdrawal from the ERM being only the two most glaring examples.

Observers of The Indian Political Scene Have Been puzzled by the performance and prospects of the Bharatiya Janata Party. It is the largest opposition group in the central legislature in New Delhi, and forms the government in four northern states, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan. The elements of opposition and government have taken new shape; and the rise of the BJP, say critics, constitutes a challenge not simply to Congress but to the Nehru-established state and its secular democratic inheritance. Its leaders couch their appeal in relation to the religious sentiments of the Hindu majority of India and they talk not only of roti but Ram — the bread of life itself. ‘Away with the “pseudo-secularism” of Western values: India must rediscover its past.’ Such is the simple message of the Hindutva party and its allies. It is an old theme but opponents and supporters alike believe that the 119 seats which the BJP now has in the Lok Sabha (India's lower house) give the demand for fundamental reform a new political force.

THE END OF ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE BY THE LIBERAL Democratic Party of Japan came as abruptly as the fall of the Berlin wall four years before. It started with the debate on electoral system change, ostensibly as an attempt to curb corruption. The LDP has been plagued by a series of large-scale corruption scandals since the Recruit scandal of 1989. The latest concerned former vice-president Shin Kanemaru's alleged violation of the political money regulation law and the income tax law in 1992–93. The Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, accepting a fair degree of compromise with opposition parties, wanted to pass a bill to change the current electoral system. The LDP initially wanted to change from the system of choosing a few persons in each district by one vote to the Anglo-American type system of selecting one person in each district by one vote. The opposition wanted to change to the continental European system of proportional representation. A compromise was made by the LDP's proposal to combine the latter two systems. Then two dissenting groups emerged suddenly in the LDP. One took the exit option by forming new political parties. The other took the voice option by backing away from the Miyazawa compromise plan. Miyazawa was humiliated by his failure to have the bill enacted and a motion of no confidence was passed. He then called for a general election, which took place on 18 July 1993. The outcome did not give a majority to the LDP and subsequently a non-LDP coalition was formed to produce a non-LDP government for the first time since the foundation of the LDP in 1955

IN MODERN ITALIAN, ‘POLITICAL CLASS’ IS A CONCEPT quite distinct from that of a ruling class. The notion of political class applies to a million people who are in full-time politics. The cream of these professional politicians is part of the ruling class: a term which applies to the people who effectively run the country working in business, finance, administration, politics, and so on.

In Italy the history of the changing importance of the political class has always been connected with the weakness of the ruling class, which was evident from the beginning of unification. Italy became a nation-state in 1861, largely thanks to the action of a tiny group of patriots consisting of ambitious aristocrats and romantic intellectuals. While in the same period the Prussian monarchy gave strong leadership to the process of unification in Germany, the Piedmont monarchy led the Italian process of national unification under the discreet partnership, open protection, or direct involvement of other major European states. From 1861 to the present time in Italian history many observers have pointed to the weakness of the ruling class and the interference of foreign powers.

I HAVE A STRONG RESISTANCE TO LOOKING BACK ON THINGS which I have written in the past: sometimes they may not seem too bad, but more often I notice inadequacies which are embarrassing if not painful. In any case, life and one's interests move on, and one leaves past writings for others to make what they will of them. But on reflection I thought that I would like to take a look at the question which I was addressing in Function, Purpose, and Powers, and see how it might appear more than a generation later.

The American Elections This Year Overturned conventional expectations. In March 1991 President Bush — leader of the free world during the fall of the Berlin wall and winner of the Gulf war — seemed invincible. With the troops home in victory parades, Bush's approval rating stood at 88 per cent in Gallup polls. Few thought he could lose against Governor Clinton, dogged by questions about the draft and marital fidelity, perceived as a second-rank Democratic contender from a small southern state. Yet President Bush won 37.7 per cent, the lowest share of the popular vote of any incumbent president since William Taft in 1912. Against most predictions, 19 per cent of the vote went to Ross Perot, the best result for a third party candidate since Teddy Roosevelt. Governor Clinton enjoyed a comfortable victory, with 43.2 per cent of the popular vote and 370 electoral college votes in 32 states. The result for Clinton was not a landslide, indeed his share of the popular vote was similar to Mondale's in 1984 and Carter's in 1980, and less than Dukakis's in 1988. But questions about a popular mandate are academic: Democrats now control both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, and almost two-thirds of governorships and state legislative chambers.

During Recent Years, Analysts of World Politics Have noted increasing tensions and conflicts between the countries of the OECD area. As the process of globalization is extending to include several new sectors of domestic economies, multilateralism is deteriorating and perhaps, in some sectors, reaching breaking-point. Globalization, widely acknowledged as a powerful engine for the growth of the world economy during the 1970s and 1980s is now splitting up into trading blocs and much more limited minilateralism. This contribution aims at analysing the extent to which policy-making could be improved so that it can address and deal with the effects of globalization and turbulence on domestic and international environments.

Americans in Paris Often Feel Neither American Nor French — which sometimes allows them to see both countries more clearly. I have just completed a year living in the Fifth Arondissement while occupying the French American Foundation's Chair of American Civilization at the Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales. If my sojourn does not licence me to play Tocqueville to the Americans, it does let me watch my fellow Americans from a distance and the culturally distant French from close up.

‘IF THE STATE DID NOT EXIST, WE WOULD HAVE TO INVENT IT. Comment.’ Few of the responses to this examination question qualified its suggestion that the state might be amenable to instantaneous contrivance or conscious design. The oversight on the part of my undergraduate charges pointed to the still potent legacy of a generation of Canadian political artificers whose projects of inventing the Canadian state had abetted the rise of a species of ‘constitutional politics’ given to the ever more elaborate concoction of comprehensive solutions to Canada's vexing constitutional shortcomings. These projects tended to politicize historically embedded elements in the constitutional order, serviceable if imperfect, which had been conventionally regarded as resistant beyond redemption to improved reformulation. This new-style politics was at centre stage in the long and eventful prime ministerial years of the Liberal Party's Pierre Trudeau, the great Cartesian inventor par excellence of the contemporary Canadian state. It would remain a central feature of the nine-year incumbency of Trudeau's Conservative Party successor, Brian Mulroney. Trudeau's vision of a reinvented Canada had proceeded from his background preparation for public life as an academic constitutional lawyer. Mulroney, aiming to finesse what the more cerebral Trudeau could not, would bring to bear on the affairs of the Canadian state the skills of a labour lawyer with the know-how to get Canada's perennially fractious provinces and interest groups to the political bargaining table, there to resolve once and for all any constitutional differences still outstanding.

THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM HAS COINCIDED WITH A crisis of capitalism. At the very time when discredited Marxist dogmas have been abandoned and the former Communist countries are seeking to privatize their industries and replace planning with the market, the capitalist economies have again displayed their traditional weaknesses. For inequality has widened, and large numbers of people are still said to be in poverty notwithstanding the fact that expenditure on the welfare state in its various forms absorbs much the larger part of public expenditure. Increasing scepticism about the welfare state has been accompanied by a loss of faith in macro-economic policy. Not only has mass unemployment returned on a scale that would once have been thought inconceivable but it appears to be assumed, with gloomy resignation, that the number without work, even if reduced by a cyclical recovery, will remain high for an indefinite period ahead. In these respects, the rich West presents a discouraging prospect to the aspiring East.

Maastricht Has Put Subsidiarity in The Forefront OF European Community (EC) guidelines. This new principle will allow the EC to take action wherever competences are shared in those areas where the member states cannot sufficiently achieve its objectives, but not beyond. The new Article 3b reads: