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Party Mergers and Splits in New Democracies: The Case of South Korea (1987–2007)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2013

Abstract

This study explores how a party's organizational mode affects its stability in new democracies. A party organization was stable under these three conditions: when the relationship from lower to upper organizations has institutionalized a strong vertical organization mode; when the central party power is concentrated on the leadership; and when the leadership has been safely shifted after elections. In the case of two ruling parties in South Korea, each mode produced differences in party stability. The dissimilar organization modes of two parties resulted in different organizational stability.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2010.

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24 Panebianco defines a horizontal relationship by a central party's relationship with external support networks. He asserts that the existence of a strong external support network does not positively affect a strong organization's development. Still, in Korea, it is no exaggeration to say that there is virtually no external support network considering the low level of subscription to a party and vulnerable organizational structure. Thus, this study lays down a horizontal relationship as a party's relationship with non-party individual supporters rather than as an institutionalized support organization. See Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 63–5.

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27 Ibid., pp. 55–7.

28 Figure 1 has been modified and redrawn from Panebianco, Political Parties, p. 57. Party Z1 (h1, v0) assumes a combination of parties comprised of one person. Party Z1 has only a horizontal relationship and internal cohesion becomes hard to achieve. On the other hand, Party Z2 (h0, v1) managed and organized by early party members only, with no record of joining or defecting can be found in a one-party country where the whole nation is affiliated or is maintained in a very vulnerable and closed structure. In reality, individual parties will locate themselves somewhere between Z1 and Z2 just like P1, P2, and P3.

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