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Labour Politics and Democratic Transition in South Korea and Taiwan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Paul G. Buchanan  and
Kate Nicholls
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Labour politics and democratisation in south korea and taiwan

The article explores the evolution of labour politics during the transition from authoritarian to electoral rule in South Korea and Taiwan during the last decade and a half. It argues that labour politics is a crucial aspect of democratic consolidation because it facilitates the reproduction of contingent mass consent to the new regime. To this end, organized labour must be re-positioned as a political and economic actor, something that requires institutional and structural reform away from the authoritarian experience. Based on analysis of the pattern of political insertion and the legal framework governing the interaction between organized labour, business and the state before and after the electoral transition, as well as data on strikes, union density and membership, the essay concludes that substantive change in the labour politics partial regime is minor in both countries and that in fact, democratic consolidation remains an unachieved goal in each.

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Articles
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Government and Opposition , Volume 38 , Issue 2 , 2003 , pp. 203 - 237
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2003.

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References

1 On ‘most similar’ case method see Przeworski, Adam and Teune, Henry, The Logic ofComparative Social Inquiry, New York, John Wiley, 1970 Google Scholar. Also see Meckstroth, T. H., ‘“Most Different Systems” and “Most Similar Systems”: A Study of the Logic of Comparative Inquiry’, Comparative Political Studies, 8:2 (07 1975), pp. 132–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 An explicit and excellent effort to outline the structural and political bases for the comparison of Korea and Taiwan is made by Fields, Karl J., Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1995, pp. 1–27 Google Scholar.

3 According to the Asian Development Bank, GDP growth in Taiwan and South Korea ranks them third and fourth among fourteen Asian economies in the first quarter of 2002. Short-term interest rates in both countries were below 5 per cent and the local stock markets grew over 5 per cent relative to the previous year-end report (over 15 and 34 per cent, ranking them second and fourth respectively). The major difference is in GDP change relative to the same time-frame in 2001, which grew 3.7 per cent in South Korea and declined by 2.7 per cent in Taiwan. This may indicate more about the state of affairs in April 2001 than at the time of writing (April 2002). Forecasts for 2003 suggest that the situation will improve in both countries. Data available in ‘Emerging-market Trends‘, The Economist, 363:8269 (20 04 2002), p. 98 Google Scholar.

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5 In emphasizing the repressive aspects of authoritarian labour relations in these two cases, we clearly echo the argument of Deyo, Frederic C., Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989 Google Scholar.

6 According to Jong-Il You, the complete political exclusion of labour, the gross restrictions on its freedom of action, its repeated and severe repression, and the virtual absence of a social welfare system (to include no minimum wage until 1988) were coupled with ‘the managerial culture of authoritarian paternalism — authoritarian oppression for labour discipline and paternalistic co-optation for worker motivation — and the managerial practice of personalised hierarchical control’. Jong-Il You, ‘Changing capital-labour relations in South Korea’, in Sehor, Juliet and You, Jong-Il (eds), Capital, the State and Labour, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1995, p. 121 Google Scholar. On oriental despotism, see Tucker, Robert C. (ed.), The Marx–Engels Reader, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972, p. 596 Google ScholarPubMed; on the Asiatic mode of production see ibid., p. 5; and Krader, L., The Asiatic Mode of Production: Sources, Development and Critique in the Writings of Karl Marx, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1975 Google Scholar. We recognize that even this characterization does not encompass the cultural totality of the working-class experience in Korea or elsewhere. For an introductory brief on the neglected dimensions of Asian labour studies, see Mohapatra, Prabhu, Wess, Andrew and Sen, Samita, ‘Asian Labour: A Debate on Culture, Consciousness and Representation‘, Working Papers on Asian Labour, 1, Amsterdam, CLARA, 1997 Google Scholar.

7 According to the 1987 ILO Yearbook, South Koreans worked an average of 53.8 hours a week, had the biggest gender differential in pay (women earning 44 per cent of male salaries in 1980) and had a rate of fatal injuries more than double that of Singapore, Hong Kong, Argentina, Mexico, the US or Japan. As cited in You, Jong-Il, ‘Changing capital-labour relations in South Korea’, pp. 116 and 121 (Table 4.7)Google Scholar.

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11 For examples of those who do attempt to build a more comprehensive picture of this, see Althusser, Louis, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, London, New Left Books, 1971, pp. 121–73Google Scholar; Barrett, Michelle, The Politics of Truth, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991 Google Scholar; Burawoy, Michael, Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labour Process under Monopoly Capitalism, Chicago and London, Chicago University Press, 1979 Google Scholar; Hirst, Paul Q., On Law and Ideology, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1979 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Poulantzas, Nicos, State, Power, Socialism, trans. Camiller, Patrick, London, New Left Books, 1978 Google Scholar; and Therborn, Goran, The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology, London, Verso, 1980 Google Scholar.

12 This avoids the issue of the labour ‘aristocracy’ often mentioned in the Marxist literature (in which organized labour deliberately contracts with political elites to divorce its wage rates from the material standards of the population at large in order to help reduce the price of wage goods). We assume here no such deliberation. The literature on the impact of marginal wage rates on benefit provision and other forms of rent-seeking behaviour in capitalist democracies is extensive and constitutes the bulk of public choice literature. Probably the best place to begin is Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G., The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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15 The obstacles to coherent union strategies posed by labour movement divisions are well known in the dedicated literature. They are even decisive in larger export platforms. For an interesting account of the impact of ideological divisions on one such labour movement, see Carlile, Leslie E., ‘Sohyo versus Domei: Competing Labour Movement Strategies in the Era of High Growth in Japan,’ Japan Forum, 6:2 (1994), pp. 145–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 This is discussed at some length in Paul G. Buchanan, State, Labor, Capital, ch. 3. Also see Crouch, Colin, Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action, London, Fontana Books, 1983 Google Scholar; and Offe, Claus and Wiesenthal, Helmut, ‘Two Logics of Collective Action,’ in Zeitlin, Maurice (ed.), Political Power and Social Theory, 1, Greenwood, Conn., JAI Press, 1980, pp. 69–117 Google Scholar.

17 Schmitter, P. C., ‘The Consolidation of Democracy and the Representation of Social Groups‘, American Behavioral Scientist, 35:4/5 (03 1992), pp. 422–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 The notion of initial incorporation is offered by Collier, Ruth Berins and Collier, David, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labour Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991, pp. 15–18, 161–68, 752–53, and 783–85Google Scholar. The characterization of forms of incorporation and insertion are ours.

19 Figures are from Jeong, Jooyeon, ‘Pursuing centralized bargaining in an era of decentralization? A progressive union goal in Korea from a comparative perspective‘, Industrial Relations Journal, 32:1 (2001), p. 60 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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21 Chang, Kyung-San, ‘Social Ramifications of South Korea's Economic Fall: Neo-Liberal Antidote to Compressed Capitalist Industrialisation‘, Development and Society, 28:1 (06 1999), p. 49–91 Google Scholar. It should also be noted that the loss of manufacturing jobs in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis also contributed to the rise in unemployment.

22 On the impact of changing labour relations on Korean society, see Jong-Il You, ‘Changing capital-labour relations in South Korea’, op. cit. pp. 111–51 and sources cited therein.

23 Ibid., p. 143.

24 Jeong, Jooyeon, Foreign Labour Statistical Figures, Seoul, Korean Labour Institute, 2000, p. 52 (Table III.5)Google Scholar.

25 Jooyeon Jeong, Foreign Labour Statistical Figures, op. cit, p. 60.

26 Ibid., p. 61 (Table 1).

27 Koo, Hagen, ‘The Dilemmas of Empowered Labour in Korea,’ Asian Survey, XL:2 (03–April 2000), p. 231 (Table 1)Google Scholar; and Hyun-Chin, Lim, Suk-Man, Hwang and Il-Jon, Chung, ‘IMF's Restructuring, Development Strategy and Labour Realignment in South Korea,’ Development and Society, 29:1 (06 2000), p. 45 (Table 2)Google Scholar.

28 J. Jeong, Foreign Labour Statistical Figures, op. cit., p. 61 (Table 2).

29 The Labour Standards Act (1998) outlines minimum conditions necessary to ensure the welfare of workers in all economic sectors. It covers labour contracts, working hours, severance pay, health and safety, equal opportunity and compensation for industrial accidents. Under the Act employers can fire workers for ‘urgent’ management reasons warranted by changes in financial and competitive situations (although mass firing and discrimination by gender is illegal and notification and re-hiring procedures need to be followed). The Act denies pay to and allows replacement of strikers, permits flexible working hours and authorizes state intervention in labour disputes. Trade unions may engage in political activities as a side-line to their economic functions. The collective status of unions, to include shop floor representation and funding of national labour federations and union officials, was modified by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act of 28 March 2001. Employers do not have to pay wages to full-time union officials until the end of 2006 and workers are banned from organizing more than two unions for a single workplace until the same date. The present 44 hours working week authorized by the Korean Tripartite Commission in October 2000 is to be reduced to 40 hours over the next five years. With regard to individual labour rights, anti-discrimination rules, workplace accident compensation and unemployment insurance are outlined in the Equal Employment Act (covering workplaces with five or more workers), the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act and the Employment Insurance Act, all of 2001. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce: South Korea, New York, EIU, 07 2001, Section 10.2, pp. 51–2Google ScholarPubMed.

30 This follows the scheme laid out in Lee, Joseph S., ‘Economic Development and the Evolution of Industrial Relations in Taiwan, 1950–1993’, in Verma, Anil, Kochan, Thomas A. and Lansbury, Russell D. (eds), Employment Relations in the Growing Asian Economies, London and New York, Routledge, 1995, pp. 88–117 Google Scholar.

31 The details here are provided by Chu, Yin-wah, ‘Democracy and Organized Labour in Taiwan‘, Asian Survey, xxxvi:5 (1996), pp. 495–510 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 For a recent discussion of these issues see Kuo, Cheng-Tian, ‘Taiwan's Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective‘, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 35:1 (2000), pp. 85–111 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 See Chu, Jou-juo, ‘Labour Militancy in Taiwan: Export Integration vs. Authoritarian Transition‘, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 31:4 (2001), pp. 441–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hsiao, Hsin-huang Michael, ‘The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests’, in Cheng, Tun-jen and Haggard, Stephan (ed), Political Change in Taiwan, Boulder, Colo., and London, Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 57–74 Google Scholar; Shiau, Chyuan-jang, ‘Civil Society and Democratisation’, in Tsang, Steve and Tien, Hung-mao (eds), Democratisation in Taiwan: Implications for China, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 101–15Google Scholar. It is significant, as we shall see, that these second two authors do not treat organized labour as anything special in national political life; they are simply another group competing with other civil society organizations for a new place in the democratic system.

34 Jeong, J., Foreign Labour Figures, pp. 106–10 (Table VIII.1)Google Scholar.

35 Chu, J., ‘Labour Militancy in Taiwan’, p. 502 Google Scholar.

36 Jeong, J., Foreign Labour Figures, pp. 106–10 (Table VIII.5)Google Scholar.

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40 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce: Taiwan, New York, 12 2001, p. 50 Google ScholarPubMed.

41 J. S. Lee, ‘Economic Development and the Evolution of Industrial Relations in Taiwan, 1950–1993’, op. cit., p. 104.

42 Jeong, J., Foreign Labour Figures, p. 52 (Table III.5)Google Scholar.

43 On the similarities and differences between the two cases in the light of Latin American experiences see Haggard, Stephan and Kaufmann, Robert, The Political Economy ofDemocratic Transitions, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 279–82Google Scholar.

44 On the West European experience see Katzenstein, Peter, Small States in World Markets, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985 Google Scholar. On the varying fortunes of small countries that either abandoned or adopted neo-corporatist institutions during the 1980s and 1990s see Buchanan, Paul G. and Nicholls, Kate, Labour Politics in Five Small Open Democracies: Australia, Chile, Ireland, New Zealand and Uruguay, 2003 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 The phrase comes from Adam Przeworski with reference to Eastern European transitions to capitalism and democracy. We apologize for the liberties taken, although there are significant parallels to be drawn with our cases. See his Democracy and the Market, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991, ‘Conclusion’, specifically p. 191 Google Scholar.