Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
In violent conflicts in places like Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, economic interests have crowded out ideologically articulate mass-based social movements for reform or revolutionary change to a degree that was not apparent during earlier anti-colonial struggles. Some scholars offer a ‘looting model’ of rebellion that explains the predations of politicians and warlords but it is not clear why people who receive few benefits from this – or even suffer great harm from them – fail to support ideologues instead, or why self-interested violent entrepreneurs do not offer political programmes to attract more followers. Yet some groups defy this ‘looting model’. Explaining why armed groups vary so greatly in their behaviour provides a means to address important questions: is it possible to construct public authorities out of collapsed states in the twenty-first century, or do local predations and global conditions preclude indigenous state-building in these places? Why do social movements for reform there seem so ineffective? What conditions have to be present for them to succeed? This article considers the nature of rebellion in failing states, focusing on Nigeria to find clues to explain variations in the organization of armed groups.
1 Collier, P. and Sambanis, N. (eds), Conflict Resolution: Understanding Civil Wars, special issue, 46: 1 (2002).Google Scholar
2 Author's field observations.
3 Contra E. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1999; E. Hobsbawm, Bandits, New York, New Press, 2000; J. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1987.
4 See, for example, Gurr, T., ‘Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s’, American Journal of Political Science, 41: 4 (1997), pp. 1079–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 A. Jega, ‘Youth Identity and Changing Roles in Urban Nigeria: Case Studies from Kano and Lagos’, paper from Nordic Africa Institute, Conference on Youth and Urban Popular Identities in Africa, 1998; and A. Momoh, ‘Youth Culture and Area Boys’, in A. Jega (ed.), Identity Transformation and Identity Politics Under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute, 2000.
6 M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg and P. Wallensteen, ‘Appendix A1: Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990–2001’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002.
7 J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
8 Human Rights Watch, The Destruction of Odi and Rape in Choba, New York, Human Rights Watch, 1999.
9 Human Rights Watch, Military Revenge in Benue: A Population under Attack, New York, Human Rights Watch, 2002.
10 IMF, Liberia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, Washington, DC, IMF African Department, 25 February 2003, pp. 6–7.
11 Bazenguissa-Ganga, R., ‘The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville’, African Affairs, 98: 1 (1999), pp. 37–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
12 I. Albert, ‘The Myth, Reality and Challenges of Nigeria's Reconciliation with Ndigbo’, in E. Osaghae, E. Onwudiwe and R. Suberu (eds), The Nigerian Civil War and Its Aftermath, Ibadan, Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies, 2002, pp. 283–6.
13 J. Ogundimu, ‘What ODF Wants’, Punch, 29 March 2003, p. 12.
14 K. Olabisi, ‘Teenager Kills Seven-Year-Old Boy for Ritual, Held by OPC’, Punch, 27 September 2000, p. 5; and M. Mumuni, ‘War Without End’, Tell, 31 July 2000, pp. 40–1.
15 B. Tunji, ‘Why We are Fighting, OPC Secretary’, Guardian, 22 July 2000, p. 15.
16 Oodua Youth Movement, Yoruba People's Charter of Self-Determination, pamphlet, 1994; and Oodua Youth Movement, The Yoruba Charter of Self-Determination, pamphlet, 2001.
17 M. Mojeed, ‘The Robbers in Uniform’, Tell, 13 January 2003, p. 23.
18 Anon., ‘How OPC, Bakassi Boys Operate’, Saturday Punch, 22 July 2000, p. 15.
19 G. Onyeacholem, ‘This House Stinks’, Tell, 4 September 2000, p. 18.
20 Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, p. 290.
21 D. Agekameh, ‘War of the Killer Gangs’, Tell, 12 June 2000, p. 25.
22 D. Agekameh, ‘Blood Law of the Bakassi Boys’, Tell, 28 August 2000, pp. 24–5; and M. Ubani, ‘Bakassi Boys’, Tempo, 3 August 2000, p. 10.
23 Interview with the author, Freetown, 9 May 2002.
24 D. Agekameh, ‘A Business Like Any Other’, Tell, 6 August 2001, p. 32.
25 Anambra State, ‘Report of the Administrative Board of Inquiry into the Onitsha Market Authority’, mimeo, 1982.
26 Albert, ‘The Myth, Reality and Challenges’, pp. 309–25.
27 O. Oyediran, ‘The Reorganization of Local Government’, in L. Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and O. Oyediran (eds), Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 193–211.
28 B. Ojeme, ‘Police Minister Okays Bakassi Boys’, Vanguard, 7 July 2000, p. 1.
29 S. Oshunkeye, ‘The Reign of Guns’, Tell, 24 March 2003, p. 35.
30 Agekameh, ‘Blood Law of the Bakassi Boys’, pp. 23–7.
31 E. Onwubiko, ‘Why Obasanjo Unbanned Bakassi Boys, by Mbadinuju’, Guardian, 30 August 2000, p. 11.
32 E. Eke, ‘Crisis is Part of Anambra State’, Guardian on Sunday, 29 October 2000, p. 8.
33 J. Awka, ‘Politics of Security’, The Week, 27 October 2003, p. 27.
34 Harnischfeger, J., ‘The Bakassi Boys: Fighting Crime in Nigeria’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41: 1 (March 2003), pp. 23–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
35 J. Awka, ‘Echoes of the Bakassi Boys’, The Week, 28 July 2003, p. 23.
36 D. Okebalama, ‘Bakassi Boys and Anambra Politics’, Sunday Punch, 17 September 2000, p. 11.
37 B. Akparanta, ‘We Assist Society – Bakassi Boys’, Guardian, 22 July 2000, p. 17.
38 A. Agbo, ‘Bakassi v MASSOB in Abia State’, Tell, 26 November 2001, p. 63.
39 J. Igbokwe, ‘Ngige Is Paying for his Sins’, Tell, 20 July 2003, p. 40.
40 Author's interview with organizer, 12 December 2002.
41 Ajayi, J., ‘Professional Warriors in Nineteenth Century Yoruba Politics’, Tarikh, 1: 1 (1965), pp. 72–81.Google Scholar
42 A. Hinderer, Seventeen Years in the Yoruba Country, London, Seeley, Jackson and Halliday, 1872.
43 Human Rights Watch, The O’odua People's Congress: Fighting Violence with Violence, New York, Human Rights Watch, 2003.
44 A. Olukunle, ‘30 Killed in OPC, Police Clash’, Punch, 17 July 2000, pp. 1–2; and Y. Alli, ‘Adesina Moves to Avert Fresh OPC, Traders Clash’, Punch, 21 August 2000, p. 6.
45 Agekameh, ‘War of the Killer Gangs’, p. 25.
46 Anon., ‘How OPC, Bakassi Boys Operate’, p. 15.
47 M. Ebosele, ‘Afenifere, Ohaneze for Security Body’, Guardian, 26 July 2000, p. 18.
48 M. Nwachukwu, ‘Laws in the Hands of Urchins’, Vanguard, 19 July 2000, p. 32.
49 V. Obia, ‘Nobody Can Ban OPC’, The Week, 18 February 2002, p. 14.
50 Nwachukwu, ‘Laws in the Hands of Urchins’, p. 32.
51 Gagnon, P., ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia’, International Security, 19: 3 (1994/5), pp. 125–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
52 P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999.
53 C. Ezeife, ‘Bakassi, Politicians and Police’, Punch, 5 August 2000, p. 12.