In violent conflicts in places like Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, economic interests have crowded out ideologically articulate mass-based social movements for reform or revolutionary change to a degree that was not apparent during earlier anti-colonial struggles. Some scholars offer a ‘looting model’ of rebellion that explains the predations of politicians and warlords but it is not clear why people who receive few benefits from this – or even suffer great harm from them – fail to support ideologues instead, or why self-interested violent entrepreneurs do not offer political programmes to attract more followers. Yet some groups defy this ‘looting model’. Explaining why armed groups vary so greatly in their behaviour provides a means to address important questions: is it possible to construct public authorities out of collapsed states in the twenty-first century, or do local predations and global conditions preclude indigenous state-building in these places? Why do social movements for reform there seem so ineffective? What conditions have to be present for them to succeed? This article considers the nature of rebellion in failing states, focusing on Nigeria to find clues to explain variations in the organization of armed groups.

The analysis of armed conflict in the post Cold War era has been profoundly influenced by neoclassical economists. Statistical approaches have generated important propositions, but there is a danger when these feed into policy prescriptions. This paper first compares the economics of civil war literature with the social movement literature which has also tried to explain collective action problems. It argues that the latter has a much more sophisticated set of conceptual tools, enriched by empirical study. The paper then uses the case of multipolar militarization in oil-rich Casanare, Colombia, to demonstrate complexity and contingency in civil war trajectories. State policy failure and civil actors can be an important source of explanation alongside the economic agendas of armed actors.

This paper provides narrative and analytical frameworks for understanding the changing approaches to the valuation, allocation and the management of water resources in the North and the South. The study emphasizes the allocative politics of this important element of environmental capital and its combination with other capitals over the last 50 years. In examining these allocative politics, the role of the concept of sustainability is demonstrated. Discursive hydro-politics are shown to mediate the contested claims on the freshwater resources required by society, the economy and the environment. An historical narrative illustrates five water management paradigms and how they conform to modernity theory. Cultural theory is shown to be particularly relevant for those wanting to support the recently evolved fifth paradigm approach to the allocation and management of water. The theory is supported by reference to the water-short Middle East and North Africa and the dialogue on large dams. The article concludes that a hydro-centric approach is inadequate; water management challenges are associated with complex and sometimes wonderfully invisible processes integral to a political economy.

It is often said that while many of the twentieth century's wars were fought over oil, those of the twenty-first will be fought over water. This paper seeks to counter this argument, as well as the assumption implicit in it that the two resources engender, or will engender, broadly similar types of conflict. Specifically it argues 1) that within the context of the contemporary global capitalism, oil and water are marked by starkly divergent political economies; 2) that the two resources thus have starkly contrasting impacts upon patterns of state formation; 3) that these factors together militate against the development of violent international water conflicts; and 4) that notwithstanding the above, water is already a significant cause of local violence in many parts of the global South.

To what extent is a drive to appropriate the world's oil a driving force behind American foreign policy? This paper argues that rather than viewing US foreign policy as driven by the expansionary forces of US oil companies seeking new reserves and markets, or by rising concern about levels of import dependence, it is more illuminating to ask how the broader nature of American geopolitics shapes policies towards international oil. The United States does seek to exercise a degree of influence over world oil second to none, but the form of that influence is very ambiguous and very different from the kinds of control over raw materials traditionally associated with imperial powers.

This article explores issues of energy supply security from the perspective of the EU–Russian energy relationship and of competing foreign energy policy paradigms. Using approaches developed by Peter Rutland within the context of Russia's energy policy towards the CIS and the three pillars of EU energy policy as a starting point, the article concludes that the overall EU–Russian energy relationship can be best explained through a framework of mutual interest and dependency: that is, the EU is becoming increasingly, but not totally, dependent on Russian energy, particularly gas; and Russia is becoming increasingly, but not totally, dependent on European markets. Nevertheless, other paradigms continue to yield useful insights in relation to individual components of the EU–Russian energy relationship.

This article examines the impact on Japan's political economy and foreign policy of its lack of natural resources. Applying the concept of Japan as a ‘reactive’ state to linked case studies of rice, oil and atomic power it explores aspects of the relationship between culture, institutions and political processes in domestic politics and foreign policy. In so doing it argues that Japan's poor resource endowments have driven it to engage (re)actively – and often unwisely – in international affairs, an engagement both facilitated and constrained by its close alliance with the United States. This mediated engagement will continue into the foreseeable future.