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Party-System Reform in Democracy's Grey Zone: A Response to Moraski

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2013

Kenneth Wilson
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Abstract

This article analyses the party-system reforms introduced in Russia during Vladimir Putin's presidency. It contests Byron Moraski's interpretation, published in an earlier edition of this journal, which claims that the reforms introduced in Putin's second term were a response to the 2003 Duma election and were intended to preserve the unity and discipline of United Russia, the regime's ‘party of power’. This article argues that Moraski's explanation of the second-term reforms is flawed and contends that the first- and second-term reforms were part of a wider reform programme designed to centralize Russia's political system, consolidate its party system and contribute to the construction of a façade democracy. The article also challenges Moraski's argument that these reforms, while introduced to advance the regime's interests, could further democratization in the longer term by adding the crucial caveat that stronger opposition parties that could act as a democratizing influence will only emerge if practices of electoral manipulation lessen or fail.

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Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 44 , Issue 2 , 2009 , pp. 188 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2009.

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References

2 Moraski, Bryon, ‘Electoral System Reform in Democracy's Grey Zone: Lessons from Putin's Russia’, Government and Opposition, 42: 4 (2007), pp. 536–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The term ‘party-system reform’ is preferred here to Moraski's ‘electoral system reform’ because many of the reforms do not directly affect the electoral system.

3 Ibid., p. 536.Google Scholar

4 Moraski considers centralization and party-system consolidation as explanations, but only briefly, and rejects them (apparently because he does not see how these goals ‘actually benefit Putin’) in favour of the arguments that will be discussed below. Ibid. p. 550.Google Scholar

5 Previously 225 of the Duma's 450 deputies were elected by PR from national party lists with a 5-per cent threshold; the other 225 were elected from first-past-the-post single-mandate constituencies.Google Scholar

6 Moraski, ‘Electoral System Reform in Democracy's Grey Zone’, p. 550. Moraski's argument is not always consistent: confusingly on p. 541 he states that, ‘The seat maximization motive probably best explains the decision to raise the legal threshold from 5 per cent to 7 per cent.’Google Scholar

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15 This is not the only time when Moraski's article rests on a questionable factual basis. Moraski tells us, for instance, that the law ‘On Political Parties’ requires parties to have a minimum membership of 10,000 with at least 100 members in branches in more than half of Russia's regions. An amendment to this law, which passed in 2004, has, as we shall see later, required parties to have 50,000 members with not fewer than 500 members in more than half of the regions since 1 January 2006. Moraski also states that United Russia won three seats in by-elections held on 14 March 2004 (p. 555): in fact United Russia won only one of the three by-elections held on that date. (Data taken from Vestnik Tsentral'noi Isbiratel'noi Kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 7: 169 (2004), pp. 395–9 and the Duma website http://www.duma.gov.ru/, accessed 6 February 2008.)Google Scholar

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35 Article 3.2, ‘O politicheskikh partiiakh’.Google Scholar

36 In the period 1993–8 over 80 per cent of winning candidates in regional legislative elections were independents with no affiliation to either national or regional parties. Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn, ‘The Limited Reach of Russia's Party System: Underinstitutionalization in Dual Transitions’, Politics and Society, 29: 3 (2001), p. 396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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44 In 2007, for example, 65 governors – around three-quarters of the total – featured on United Russia's list. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘As Analyst Continues Evaluating Party's List of Candidates’, RFE/RL Newsline, 1 November 2007, at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/11/011107.asp..)Google Scholar

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48 In 2007 United Russia did increase its number of seats to 315 but had to win a huge 64.3 per cent of the vote to do so. Viktor Khamraev, ‘Vybory zanesli v protokol’, Kommersant, 10 December 2007.Google Scholar

49 Vladimir Putin, ‘Press-konferentsiia dlia rossiiskikh i inostrannykh zhurnalistov’, Moscow, 23 December 2004, at http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/12/23/1414_type63380type82634_81691.shtml.Google Scholar

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51 A list of the parties registered with the Federal Registration Service of the Ministry of Justice can be found online at: http://rosregistr.ru/index.php?menu=3010050000.Google Scholar

52 For details see K. Wilson, ‘Party-System Development Under Putin’, pp. 340–1.Google Scholar

53 This increased the state subsidies paid to parties winning at least 3 per cent of the vote from 50 kopecks to 5 roubles per vote. For further details see Wilson, ‘Party Finance in Russia’, p. 1103.Google Scholar

54 Article 2.1, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii o vyborakh i referendumakh i inye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Federal Law No. 93 from 21 July 2005, online at http://document.kremlin.ru/doc.asp?ID=028925.Google Scholar

55 For examples of such declarations see Wilson, ‘Party-System Development Under Putin’, pp. 342–3.Google Scholar

56 Diamond, Larry, ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy, 13: 2 (2002), p. 24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57 Schedler, Andreas, ‘The Menu of Manipulation’, Journal of Democracy, 13: 2 (2002), pp. 36–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

58 The number of seats won by the parties in 2007 is taken from Vestnik Tsentral'noi Isbiratel'noi Kommissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 19: 222 (2007), pp. 7–12.Google Scholar

59 Moraski, ‘Electoral System Reform in Democracy's Grey Zone’, p. 543.Google Scholar

60 Ibid.Google Scholar

61 The president's power of gubernatorial appointment is, as shown above, an exception. This, though, is not one of the reforms to which Moraski is referring.Google Scholar

62 Ibid., p. 542.Google Scholar

63 Ibid., p. 551.Google Scholar

64 This, no doubt, is also one of the reasons why the Kremlin was happy to move to a PR system, even though it made it more difficult to maintain United Russia's parliamentary supremacy: when the regime is able, to a very considerable degree, to determine election results the type of electoral system employed is of secondary importance.Google Scholar

65 On the possible development of United Russia along the lines of the PRI see: Gel'man, V., ‘Perspektivy dominiruiushchei partii v Rossii’, Pro et Contra, 4: 33, (2006), pp. 62–71.Google Scholar