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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
It is no Accident That Almost Every Major British political leader in the post-war period has been troubled by the question of consistency. As Harold Macmillan recognized when he identified his greatest fear as ‘events’, politicians are liable to be driven off their chosen courses when they least expect problems. Macmillan seems to have been referring to events outside his control, and in the increasingly interdependent world since 1945 the number of these events has greatly increased. Technological advances bring crises in far off places promptly into the cabinet room; instant responses from Downing Street are now possible, and the media expects them. If this were not enough, cabinet ministers are faced with the potential events which might be brought into existence by their policy decisions. Ministers can scarcely plan several moves ahead when their next action might cause a major upheaval, yet such foresight is demanded by commentators, supporters and opponents. In an atmosphere of economic difficulty the margin of error becomes tighter; initiatives are more likely to fail, and the cost of persevering with dubious policies becomes greater. Nowadays, if a politician wishes to hold to a unwavering line on every important issue his career is likely to be spectacular — and short. Perhaps only a highly-skilled follower of Machiavelli could escape from this predicament, by gaining a reputation for consistency without deserving it.
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