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European Law as Transnational Law – Europe Has to Be Conceived as an Heterarchical Network and Not as a Superstate!

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Karl-Heinz Ladeur

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Due to the Europeanisation of law, and the constitutionalisation of the European Union in particular, the Habermas argument seems to be quite appealing to many. Globalisation is interpreted as having curbed the State's capability to impose norms on the transnational process of expanding markets. This evolution seems to have not only reduced the action potential of the State but, at the same time and even more importantly, it also has reduced the value of citizenship. Citizenship can no longer be the core element of the relationship between the individual and the State in the postmodern society. It cannot be constituted via a direct relationship with the State, which at the same time constitutes the realm of deliberation because the diffuse networks of transnational inter-relationships beyond the State cannot be reflected by the process of public deliberation. The space of the State is, on the one hand, too small. On the other hand, it may appear to be too big. Against this background Europe cannot be regarded as the bearer of the European acquis étatique (the acquired state).

Type
GLJ@TEN – Europe as Transnational Law
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 10 , Issue 10: Contributions to the German Law Journal's 10th Anniversary Symposium “The Transnationalization of Legal Cultures” , 01 October 2009 , pp. 1357 - 1365
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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