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Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Armin von Bogdandy ,
Philipp Dann  and
Matthias Goldmann

Abstract

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Type
Introduction and Concept
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 9 , Issue 11: Special issue - The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions , 01 November 2008 , pp. 1375 - 1400
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 ECJ, Case C-117/06, Möllendorf, 2007 ECR, forthcoming. On the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee see Clemens Feinäugle, in this issue.Google Scholar

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3 Bogdandy, Armin von & Goldmann, Matthias, The Exercise of International Public Authority through National Policy Assessments. The OECD's PISA Policy as a Paradigm for a New Standard Instrument, 5 International Organizations Law Review (forthcoming 2008).Google Scholar

4 For different interpretations of this transformation see e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (1998); Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Empire (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004). From a domestic viewpoint see e.g. Transforming the Golden-Age Nation State (Achim Hurrelmann, et al. eds., 2005).Google Scholar

5 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Stewart, Richard, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15 (2005); Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 663 (2005); Esty, Daniel C., Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 Yale Law Journal 1490 (2006).Google Scholar

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8 The origins of the term global governance can be traced back to Rosenau, James N., Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in Governance without Government 1 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992); Kooiman, Jan, Findings, Recommendations and Speculations, in Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions 249 (Jan Kooiman ed., 1993). The concept of “governance” was borrowed from economics. See Williamson, Oliver E., The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications, 140 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 195 (1984).Google Scholar

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11 See e.g. Latham, Robert, Politics in a Floating World, in Global Governance Theory 23 (Martin Hewson & Timothy J. Sinclair eds., 2000); Koskenniemi, Martti, Global Governance and Public International Law, 37 Kritische Justiz 241 (2004). On the related liberal bias of international organizations see Barnett, Michael & Finnemore, Martha, The Power of Liberal International Organizations, in Power in Global Governance 161, 163–169 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005). However, various critical perspectives on global governance have emerged. See e.g. Contending Perspectives on Global Governance (Alice D. Ba & Matthew J. Hoffmann eds., 2005).Google Scholar

12 It may suffice to cite only a few examples: Cohen, Amichai, Bureaucratic Internalization: Domestic Governmental Agencies and the Legitimization of International Law, 30 Georgetown Journal of International Law 1079 (2005); Grant, Ruth W. & Keohane, Robert O., Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 American Political Science Review 29 (2005); Howse, Robert & Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 Governance 73 (2003); Slaughter, Anne-Marie, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 347 (2000-2001); Wahl, Rainer, Der einzelne in der Welt jenseits des Staates, in Verfassungsstaat, Europäisierung, Internationalisierung 53 (Rainer Wahl ed., 2003); Weiler, Joseph H. H., The Geology of International Law - Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 547 (2004); Zürn, Michael, Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems, 39 Government and Opposition 260 (2004). For a taxonomy see Bogdandy, Armin von, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy and Globalization, 15 Eur. J. Int'l Law 885 (2004).Google Scholar

13 See Feinäugle, Clemens, in this issue. See also the contributions by Maja Smrkolj, Karen Kaiser, and Diana Zacharias, in this issue.Google Scholar

14 Venzke, Ingo, in this issue; Ravi Pereira, in this issue.Google Scholar

15 For an overview see, Ba & Hoffmann (note 11).Google Scholar

16 See Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Das Allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee 16–18 (2nd ed. 2004). See also Kingsbury, Benedict, International Law as Inter-Public Law (http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/fall06/globalization/papers/Kingsbury,NewJusGentiumandInter-PublicI1.pdf). For a similar account see d'Aspremont, Jean, Contemporary International Rulemaking and the Public Character of International Law, IILJ Working Paper 2006/12, http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-12-dAspremont-web.pdf.Google Scholar

17 Definition is meant here as developing sufficient conceptual characterizations that cover the most important cases. We do not aim at a full definition. For details see Hans-Joachim Koch & Helmut Rüßmann, Juristische Begründungslehre 75 (1982).Google Scholar

18 Our concept of authority is, thus, different from that of the New Haven School, which is defined as “the structure of expectation concerning who, with what qualifications and mode of selection, is competent to make which decision by what criteria and what procedures.” See McDougal, Myres & Laswell, Harold, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 American Journal of International Law 1, 9 (1959). In fact, this concept of authority resembles our concept of legitimacy.Google Scholar

19 On standard instruments see Matthias Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

20 This concept of authority is similar to the concept of power developed by Barnett & Duvall (note 10). The main difference between their concept of power and our concept of authority is that authority needs a legal basis. More narrow is the definition of authority as the power to enact law unilaterally. See Christoph Möllers, Gewaltengliederung 81–93 (2005).Google Scholar

21 An example of such legal determination would be the refugee status determination by the UNCHR. See Smrkolj, in this issue.Google Scholar

22 Ekkehart Reimer, Transnationales Steuerrecht, in Internationales Verwaltungsrecht 181 (Christoph Möllers, Andreas Voßkuhle & Christian Walter eds., 2007).Google Scholar

23 Friedrich, in this issue.Google Scholar

24 von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 3).Google Scholar

25 Id. Google Scholar

26 From a political science perspective see Barnett, & Duvall, (note 10); Kenneth W. Abbott und Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 International Organization 421 (2000); Lipson, Charles, Why are some international agreements informal?, 45 International Organization 495 (1991).Google Scholar

27 Dreier, Horst, Vorbemerkung vor Art. 1 GG, in I Grundgesetz–Kommentar, margin number 125 et seq. (Horst Dreier ed., 2nd ed. 2004); Schmidt-Aßmann (note 16), 18 et seq. Google Scholar

28 Some put the task to discharge public duties at the heart of their approach, see Ruffert, Matthias, Perspektiven des Internationalen Verwaltungsrechts, in Internationales Verwaltungsrecht 395, 402 (Christoph Möllers & Andreas Voßkuhle & Christian Walter eds., 2007). We prefer to build on the concept of public authority, but qualify it by reference to public interest.Google Scholar

29 Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional government and politics 247 et seq. (1950); Karl Loewenstein, Political power and the Governmental Process (1957); Henkin, Louis, A New Birth of Constitutionalism, in Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy 39 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994); d'Aspremont (note 16).Google Scholar

30 For a similar approach relying on functional context see Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Transnationales Verwaltungsrecht, 63 Juristenzeitung 373, 376 (2008).Google Scholar

31 For a comparison of functionally equivalent private and public governance activities see Goldmann, Matthias, The Accountability of Private vs. Public Governance “by Information”: A Comparison of the Assessment Activities of the OECD and the IEA in the Field of Education, 58 Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 41 (2008).Google Scholar

32 Kingsbury (note 16).Google Scholar

33 On the variety of entities that are not international organizations but exercise some sort of public authority, see Philippe Sands & Pierre Klein, Bowett's Law of International Organization 16–7 (2001); Klabbers, Jan, The Changing Image of International Organizations, in The Legitimacy of International Organizations 221, 236 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).Google Scholar

34 The early European Union provides a fine example. See Bogdandy, Armin von, The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal System, 36 Common Market Law Review 887 (1999).Google Scholar

35 Examples from thematic studies include: Bettina Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue; von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 3). See also Möllers, Christoph, Verfassungs- und völkerrechtliche Probleme transnationaler administrativer Standardsetzung, ZaöRV 65 (2005), 351–389; Benvenisti, Eyal, Coalitions of the Willing and the Evolution of Informal International Law, in Coalitions of the Willing – Avantgarde or Threat? 1 (Christian Calliess, Georg Nolte & Peter-Tobias Stoll, 2007).Google Scholar

36 See Anuscheh Farahat, in this issue.Google Scholar

37 See id.; Christine Fuchs, in this issue.Google Scholar

38 On such a concept of administration see Isabel Feichtner, in this issue.Google Scholar

39 In particular the sociological approach, see e.g. Max Huber, Die soziologischen Grundlagen des Völkerrechts (1928); Slaughter, Anne-Marie, International law and international relations, 285 Recueil des Cours 13 (2000).Google Scholar

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41 Felix Hanschmann, Theorie transnationaler Rechtsprozesse, in Neue Theorien des Rechts 347, 357 (Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen & Andreas Fischer-Lescano eds., 2006).Google Scholar

42 Koh (note 40).Google Scholar

43 Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 International Organization 175–205 (1993); Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, Compliance with International Environmental Accords, 1 Global Governance 119–48 (1995); Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Nonbinding Norms in the International Legal System (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). Similar is the research on new modes of governance. See e.g. Trubek, David M. & Trubek, Louise G., New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 1–26 (2006); Hard Choices, Soft Law (John Kirton & Michael Trebilcock eds., 2004).Google Scholar

44 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-makers 17 et seq. (2005).Google Scholar

45 Abbott, & Snidal, (note 26).Google Scholar

46 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004).Google Scholar

47 Gunter Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Regime-Kollisionen (2006).Google Scholar

48 For a similar critique of the exclusivity of external approaches see Paulus, Andreas, Zur Zukunft der Völkerrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland: Zwischen Konstitutionalisierung und Fragmentierung des Völkerrechts, 67 ZaöRV 695, 708–15 (2007).Google Scholar

49 An excellent example are the G8 summits, see Martina Conticelli, I Vertici Del G8 (2006).Google Scholar

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55 Supra, note 7.Google Scholar

56 The contrast between horizontal and vertical perceptions of world order becomes apparent by cross-reading the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume and the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DR Congo v. Belgium), ICJ Reports 2002, 35 and 63.Google Scholar

57 Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (2005); Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism, in Consittutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation 5 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006).Google Scholar

58 In detail Bogdandy, Armin von, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from Germany, 47 Harvard International Law Journal 223–242 (2006).Google Scholar

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60 International Law Association, Accountability of International Organisations, Final Report, 2004, available at: http://www.ila-hq.org/html/layout_committee.htm.Google Scholar

61 Bernstorff, Jochen von, in this issue; Bogdandy, Armin von, General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field, in this issue.Google Scholar

62 On this see our former project, Restructuring Iraq. Possible Models based upon experience gained under the Authority of the League of Nations and the United Nations, 9 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2005).Google Scholar

63 For this category see e.g. Reimer (note 22); Glaser, Markus, Internationales Sozialverwaltungsrecht, in Internationales Verwaltungsrecht 73 (Andreas Voßkuhle, Christoph Möllers & Christian Walter eds., 2007); Bast, Jürgen, Internationalisierung und De-Internationalisierung der Migrationsverwaltung, in Internationales Verwaltungsrecht 279 (Andreas Voßkuhle, Christoph Möllers & Christian Walter eds., 2007); Ruffert (note 28). See also Christoph Ohler, Die Kollisionsordnung des Allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts (2005).Google Scholar

64 Sabino Cassese (note 53); Christian Tietje, Internationalisiertes Verwaltungshandeln (2001).Google Scholar

65 Most of the research assembled within the Global Administrative Law movement falls into this category. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, (note 5); Esty (note 5).Google Scholar

66 Kingsbury, Benedict, Omnilateralism and Partial International Communities: Contributions of the Emerging Global Administrative Law, 104 Journal of International Law and Diplomacy 98 (2005).Google Scholar

67 Stewart, Richard, US Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 63 (2005); Esty (note 5); Savino, Mario, EU “Procedural” Supranationalism: On Models for Global Administrative Law, paper presented at the NYU Global Forum on 13 December 2006, on file with the authors.Google Scholar

68 Krisch, Nico, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EJIL 247 (2006).Google Scholar

69 This call for intradisciplinary comparison and inspiration has been criticized. Yet, almost all elements of international law have been developed with an eye on domestic law. Private law, in particular contracts, are an obvious example.Google Scholar

70 Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, I The Law of International Civil Service (2nd ed. 1994).Google Scholar

71 Henry G. Schermers & Niels Blokker, International Institutional Law (4th ed. 2003); Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2002); Nigel D. White, The Law of International Organizations (2nd ed. 2005); Sands & Klein (note 33), Ignaz Seidl-Hohenfelder & Gerhard Loibl, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen EINSCHLIEßLICH der supranationalen Gemeinschaften (7th ed. 2000); Peter Fischer & Heribert Köck, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen (3rd ed. 1997); Handbook on International Organizations (René-Jean Dupuy ed., 1988)Google Scholar

72 See Alvarez (note 44).Google Scholar

73 Id. See also Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2007); Jurij D. Aston, Sekundärgesetzgebung internationaler Organisationen zwischen mitgliedsgtaatlicher Souveränität und Gemeinschaftsdisziplin (2005). Studies on individual instruments are too numerous to be mentioned. See the GAL bibliography (2006) compiled by Maurizia De Bellis, available at: http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/GALBibliographyMDeBellisJune2006.pdf. Many studies combine internal and external perspectives. On competencies see Ruffert, Matthias, Zuständigkeitsgrenzen internationaler Organisationen im institutionelllen Rahmen der internationalen Gemeinschaft, 38 Archiv des Völkerrechts 129 (2000); Danesh Sarooshi, International Organizations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (2005).Google Scholar

74 For a well argued book hinting in that direction see Christian Seiler, Der souveräne Verfassungsstaat zwischen demokratischer Rückbindung und überstaatlicher Einbindung (2005).Google Scholar

75 Ruffert (note 28), at 396.Google Scholar

76 15 of them are published in this issue.Google Scholar

77 See Part B.III.Google Scholar

78 On our understanding of international institutions, see part B.III.Google Scholar

79 See Schermers & Blokker (note 71), at § 30; Seidl-Hohenveldern & Loibl (note 71), at § 1.Google Scholar

80 The questionnaire was not designed to provide a strict question-and-answer format. Rather, it was intended as a suggestion, proposing different avenues to approach the subject as well as suggesting the testing of new notions or concepts at the subject at hand. It was meant to be less a straight-jacket and more a walking stick or road map. If a notion or a question did not apply or did not make sense, the researchers were free to leave it out. The questionnaire's intention was hence rather to unify our perspectives and concentrate the attention to similar issues.Google Scholar

81 Such procedural understanding of administrative action is typical of Anglo-American administrative law. See Stewart, Richard, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harvard Law Review 1667 (1975). For its importance in German administrative law thinking, see Andreas Voßkuhle, The Reform Approach in the German Science of Administrative Law: The “Neue Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft,” in The Transformation of Administrative Law in Europe 89 (Matthias Ruffert ed., 2007).Google Scholar

82 As cross-cutting analysis on this aspect, see von Bernstorff, in this issue.Google Scholar

83 “Instrument” in this context does not mean the constituting treaty or agreement but relates to the concrete acts by which institutions intend to reach their policy objectives.Google Scholar

84 For example: refugee status by the UNHCR (see Smrkolj, in this issue); the world heritage label by the UNESCO (see Zacharias, in this issue); or the assumption of the connection to terrorist organizations by the UN Security Council Al-Quaeda Committee (see Feinäugle, in this issue)Google Scholar

85 For example: Codes Alimentarius Commission (see Pereira, in this issue).Google Scholar

86 For example: OSCE High Commissioner on Minorities (see Farahat, in this issue); OECD Multinational Enterprises (see Schuler, in this issue).Google Scholar

87 Hoffmann-Riem, Wolfgang, Rechtsformen, Handlungsformen, Bewirkungsformen, in II Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts 885 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann & Andreas Voßkuhle eds., 2007).Google Scholar

88 On this difference in comparison to American scholarship, Oliver Lepsius, Was kann die deutsche Staatsrechtslehre von der amerikanischen Rechtswissenschaft lernen?, in Staatslehre als Wissenschaft (supplement to Die Verwaltung) 330 (Helmut Schulze-Fielitz ed., 2007).Google Scholar

89 On these aspects in a cross-cutting perspective, see Armin von Bogdandy & Philipp Dann, in this issue.Google Scholar

90 See von Bernstorff, in this issue.Google Scholar

91 See von Bogdandy & Dann, in this issue; de Wet, Holding International Institutions Accountable, in this issue.Google Scholar

92 See von Bogdandy, in this issue; Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

93 Teubner & Fischer-Lescano (note 47).Google Scholar

94 Krisch (note 68).Google Scholar