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Corporate Practices and National Governance Systems: What do Country Rankings Tell Us?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Peter Cornelius

Abstract

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Nations compete for investment capital, and the assurances investors seek as they decide to provide that capital are universal. Motivated by the growing appetite for a global benchmark of corporate behaviour, this paper examines the relationship between the measured quality of corporate governance at the firm level and national competitiveness. It begins by analyzing the perceived quality of institutions in the 23 largest capital markets. Hypothesizing that good corporate governance at the company level may compensate for perceived weaknesses in the institutional framework, the paper then focuses on the pilot governance index developed by the Financial Times and ISS and compares it with new survey evidence from the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report. Finally, the paper discusses corporate governance in the EU accession countries and the extent to which the quality of governance has affected the mode of entry for foreign investment.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , 01 March 2005 , pp. 583 - 604
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 For this argument, see Lutgart van den Berghe, Corporate Governance in a Globalising World: Convergence or Divergence? A European Perspective (2002); this notion has recently again been underscored by the new EU Internal Market Commissioner, Charlie McGreevy, at the occasion of announcing the European Corporate Governance Forum in Brussels, 20 January 2005, available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/26&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited 21 February 2005.Google Scholar

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