The article evaluates finance-led growth as an explanation for regional divergence in Italy over the years 1890–1910. Regional banking disparities are documented and the hypothesis developed that the financial crisis of the early 1890s struck the fledgling Southern Italian banking system at a vulnerable moment, distorting its subsequent development and handicapping the region's economy. The South is revealed to have been a chronically (over the entire period) and comprehensively (on every indicator) unhealthy environment for banks. Further evidence indicates that regional divergence in bank assets was largely due to the South's failure to develop the entire range of large banks. Size-class transition matrix analysis reveals that the typical Southern bank failed to reach a large size because it was born smaller (and less frequently) than in the North, suffered a higher mortality rate, especially in the smaller classes, and had lower growth probabilities, especially in the larger categories. The salience of deposits on the liability side and government securities on the asset side suggests that they reflected more than directly caused the development of their local economies.

Debasement has generally been condemned as a defect of premodern money, that was eventually amended by the institution of the gold standard. Building on monetary history and thought from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, this article argues that debasement was instead an instrument designed to maintain the metal standard where it was needed, in the circuit of long-distance trade, while preserving the possibility of an autonomous distribution within local economies. The theoretical distinction between monetary functions (measure and means of exchange) was made effective by the articulation of ideal and real money (via debasement and enhancement), providing complementary economic areas with complementary currencies. Moreover, the distinction between monetary functions also appears as a constituent feature of money from the perspective of a reappraisal of the milestones of monetary thought, from Smith to Keynes.

This article examines how corporate financing has been adjusted during the high growth period after World War II. First, it discusses how the Ministry of Finance tried on the one hand to liberalise the system after the 1950s, but on the other hand, did not want to undermine the ‘Treasury circuit’ that allowed its administration to control the economic situation. Secondly, during 1960s, the relationships between state and banking industry became so tight that they strengthened the banking cartel and increased the banking system's contribution to the financial system. The high costs of issuing capital in France contrast with the low interest rates during the period. The French choice of financial system for economic development clearly did not favour markets, but focused on deposit and investment banks, and settled on both a ‘state-based’ and ‘bank-based’ system.

This article describes the role played by Dutch banks in the confiscation of Jewish property during World War II. ABN AMRO's predecessors, then seven commercial banks, surrendered the lion's share of Jewish financial assets to the Nazis. How can this be explained? One possible answer is that the banks allowed their own, commercial, interests to prevail over those of their Jewish clients. Other factors were: strategies of deception by the German authorities, low level of resistance among Dutch Jews, German pressure on banks to release Jewish assets and, finally, the lengthy duration of the war.