The effective separation of sex (‘in bed’) and fertilization (‘under the microscope’) has already been practised successfully for the past 25 years by well over one million people – virtually all of them suffering from infertility problems. But why, where and when will fertile people resort to assisted reproductive techniques to become parents? And why are the prospects for fundamentally new methods of birth control so dim?

In 1999, the Whitney Museum of American Art had a very successful exhibition called The American Century. Indeed, there were two exhibitions, The American Century, Part I about the first half of the 20th century and Part II dealing with the following 50 years. The presentation was divided up into decades, each of them having its own motto. The one for the 1950s was: ‘America takes command’. This may sound rather martial but the motto is indeed very appropriate, as one could argue that as from then on American leadership also included cultural leadership.

The name of the exhibition, ‘The American Century’, was of course derived from the title of the famous article that Henry Luce, the editor/publisher of journals such as Life and Time, published in Life on 17 February 1941. Luce wanted the Americans to play a major role in the war for freedom and democracy that was in progress at that time and the building of the better world that would have to come after that. In his article Luce insisted that ‘our vision of America as a world power includes a passionate devotion to great American ideals’. The idea of America as a world power and, indeed, as the world power of the future, is, of course, much older than the concept of the 20th century as the American century. Already in 1902, the British liberal journalist and advocate of world peace through arbitration, W.T. Stead published a book with the title The Americanization of the World, or the Trend of the Twentieth Century. According to Stead, the heyday of the British Empire was over and the US was the Empire of the future. The enormous success of America was due to three things: education, production and democracy. Britain's choice was between subjugation or cooperation. Stead even proposed the merger of the two countries. In the following decade, this idea that America was Britain's successor and that the two countries should – and could – form a union because of their intimate familiarity, became popular among British writers.

This paper deals with the Institutions of the European Union in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (hereinafter: ‘the draft Constitution’) submitted to the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003. It describes these institutions and their task from a perspective of the Union's democratic legitimacy. The paper is based on a book entitled The European Union: a Polity of States and Peoples, which will be published by Stanford University Press and Hart Publishing, Oxford. In this book, I examine the democratic legitimacy of the European Union as a whole. The book parts from the proposition that the Union is a ‘body politic’ which develops into a federal system, however not a State, with a parliamentary consensual (non-majoritarian) form of government. In the meantime, the draft Treaty has been amended by the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) held in Brussels on 17/18 June 2004. In so far as the amendments relate to the subject of this paper, they are mentioned below in the text or the endnotes.

Words can be confusing and titles can be misleading, particularly if titles consist of one simple word. Two titles suffice to illustrate this phenomenon. In 2000, a book appeared with the title Empire and in 2002 another book appeared with exactly the same title. In the first Empire, Michael Hardt, an American literary theorist, and Antonio Negri, an Italian political philosopher, argued that although classical imperialism is over, Empire is alive and well, albeit in a new form. For them ‘Empire’ means the following: ‘Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire.’ This is a rather special definition of Empire because what one usually has in mind when using that word is something very different. It is the Empire that the other book, written by the British historian Niall Ferguson, is about. This book describes, as the subtitle indicates, The Rise and Demise of the British World Order. But it is also about something more, as is apparent from the rest of the subtitle: and the Lessons for Global Power. These lessons are intended for the rulers of the Empire of today, the Americans. While the first Empire is the Bible for anti-globalists, Ferguson's book can be considered as the New Testament of the advocates of America's imperial ambitions.

In September 2003, in a referendum, Sweden said ‘no’ to the euro. This might have shocked the European political establishments, but for Swedish observers the result came as no surprise. Swedish ordinary citizens were already sceptical of the whole EU project when Sweden applied for membership in 1991; thereafter, Sweden was the only member country with a EU-negative majority in its delegation to the European Parliament. For once the dominant Social Democratic Party in Sweden, otherwise so superbly skilful in forming opinion, had not anchored its EU-policy among the voters. Instead, the politics leading to Swedish membership were a rather Machiavellian process that – in the light of the assumption of politics as rational action – reveals a fascinating internal political game between central figures in the Social Democratic Party.

Quantitative genetics, using data from twin and adoptee studies, has shown substantial genetic influences on all forms of psychiatric disorder; however, with just a few exceptions, the evidence indicates that the disorders are multifactorial, with influences that are both genetic and environmental. In recent years, molecular genetics has begun to identify individual susceptibility genes; examples are given for schizophrenia, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and Alzheimer's disease. Both quantitative and molecular genetics have shown the importance of gene-environment interplay with respect to the commoner disorders of emotions and behaviour. In particular, it has been found that genetic influences moderate people's vulnerability to environmental risks. Five main alternative routes by which genes indirectly (via their effects on proteins) lead to multifactorial psychiatric disorders are described. Four main research issues are highlighted: the fuller delineation of the mechanisms involved in nature–nurture interplay and its role in aetiology; determination of how genes play a role in the neural underpinning of psychiatric disorders; identification of the ways in which genes suggest a dissection of disorders; and an understanding of the role of risk dimensions and disorder dimensions.

On 1 May 2004, Europe changed. This date marks both a beginning and an end. The enlargement of the European Union signals the beginning of a new phase in the history of Western Europe, and, for the new members from Eastern Europe, the end of a long period of exclusion and separation. Commentaries on this epochal event usually focus on ‘hard’ institutional factors such as political rearrangements, legal coordination and economic readjustments, etc. I will focus more on the ‘soft’ cultural and human factors; what I consider to be the intangibles and imponderables of a new, emerging Europe. I am convinced that culture really matters in social life.

The future is notoriously difficult to predict, but it can be invented. One option would be to develop a strategy directed towards sustainable consumption because, while the patterns of consumption of food, energy and materials, including water, differ greatly in various parts of the world, if business continues as usual, rates of consumption threaten to become a serious source of conflict. Among the challenges of the new century are a better understanding of what is meant by the transition towards sustainable consumption and how science and technology could be used to improve the efficiency with which resources are utilized, new products and processes invented, and the environmental cost of modern lifestyles best evaluated. Efforts to influence the phenomenon of over-consumption in nations that are more developed economically, and address under-consumption in nations that are less developed, are not topics that can be resolved by scientists and technologists alone. Interdisciplinary studies have become increasingly important to elucidate best methods of production, benefits, threats and consumer behaviour. Implementation of new remedies from science and technology, however, requires dialogue with the public on a case-by-case basis and should begin at the earliest stages of innovation. Sustainable consumption as a strategy lies at the heart of sustainable development; it provides the basis of social equity currently undermined by the rich–poor divide and a route to conflict avoidance.

We already have considerable insight into the working of the brain, that part of our body which generates the mind, which makes us hope and wish and feel, and finally allows us to comprehend ourselves as ‘Self’. However, the big questions about what thinking, consciousness and emotions really consist of cannot be answered yet. Continued research on the brain persists, tackling one of the greatest challenges for the human mind, namely: to discover its own preconditions, to unravel its own prerequisites. May we hope (or fear) that, in the future, brain research we will be able to give the final answer to that everlasting question of philosophy ‘What makes us human?’ Or is there an epistemological barrier when we look at the human brain and the subjectivity generated by it? There are fundamental cognitive problems regarding the extreme complexity of the brain's system and the brain–mind question. On the other hand, the findings of brain research are already so compelling that their interpretations should be guidelines for the humanities and the social sciences.

Urban history, at least in Germany, has mainly concentrated on the Medieval and Reformation cities on the one hand and Industrial and Contemporary cities on the other. However, recent debates among Early Modernists have produced the view that ‘confessionalization’, that is the formation of three or four modern church systems based on specific confessions of faith, was one of the most influential factors in producing the fundamental changes that occurred between 1550 and 1650 in Europe. This had a huge effect on the cities of Europe and their inhabitants. This paper compares Catholic and Protestant cities in Europe around 1600 with regard to their specific architecture and their religious and civic rituals. Rites and other religious functions or institutions have always been an important part of urban life. Lewis Mumford refers to religious funeral rites in his magisterial analysis of urban life in a universal perspective: ‘The city of the dead antedates the city of the living. In one sense, indeed the city of the dead is the forerunner, almost the core, of every living city.’ In Europe, the relationship between the Church and the towns or cities was especially close and, in a sense, fundamental because of the medieval history of the European towns and the structure and profile of pre-modern European societies in general. We start with a brief overview of these preconditions for urban life during Europe's confessional period, and then go on to take a closer look at the confessional city itself.

This paper deals with the residences of public authority across Europe from the emergence of the state system to the present. It is concerned with the addresses, the buildings, their surroundings and the symbolic significance from the point of view of builders and the public. The building styles have been heavily influenced by the examples of imperial and papal Rome, and a dominant model of a European capital city building has evolved. There are also some systematic differences, particularly for those countries with a dramatic history of constitutional change and for those with a decentralized process of state-building in the early stages of the process. In the second half of the 19th century, and probably again currently, the residences of public authority should be read in conjunction with the positioning of a series of civic institutions. The display of state authority has been increasingly accompanied by the representation of national identity. More recently, however, a touch of cosmopolitanism has been added in many capitals. The reading of these capitals is therefore now more ambiguous. This will probably intensify under the impact of the emerging European multilevel governance system. At the same time, this governance system has become increasingly based in Brussels. For this city to symbolically represent Europe is a very difficult ambition in the context of its multiple capital roles. However, Brussels has a long history of dealing successfully with such urban challenges in spite of major conflicts and drawbacks.

In this article, I examine how defeat in war has shaped intellectual discourse in postwar Japan, particularly intellectual debates on war guilt. Known as ‘war responsibility debates’ in Japanese, the disconnection that is imposed on national identity by defeat has led to a number of different responses from Japanese opinion leaders and scholars. Implicit in these responses is a desire to restore fundamental continuity, either by revising the appraisal of war, or by making guilt the unifying element in a transwar national identity. Defeat is the crux of the issue around which intellectuals have had to navigate in their quest for a continuous history for postwar Japan. This article considers the contributions made to this debate by Maruyama Masao, a pioneering thinker on political thought in postwar Japan; by the scholars in the Science of Thought Research Group in their study of political apostasy (tenkō) and the more recent advent of revisionist historians in the ‘Liberal School of History’ group. I conclude that this ongoing debate should itself be regarded as a positive phenomenon, as it continues to presume a basic link between the war and accountability that is fundamental to the integrity of Japan's postwar democracy.

What distinguished the mass transatlantic migration that occurred between Columbian contact and the early nineteenth century from the movements of peoples around the globe that occurred both before and after this phenomenon? Two central distinguishing features were the large element of coercion in the movements across the early modern Atlantic world, and the central importance of identity in shaping both the direction of migration and its composition. On the first of these, coercion was a sine qua non, not only of the well-known slave trade, but also of the much smaller migrations of convicts and – given the temporary, if voluntary, signing away of the migrants' freedom – indentured servants and contract labourers. On the second, the question of who became slaves was determined by the refusal of Europeans to enslave other Europeans.

European Art History steadfastly continues to classify artistic production according to national schools. This system of categorization inevitably leads to defining the national character of a people through its art. This is not to deny that regional differences are important in European art history. However, for the most part, regional differences have little to do with nations as such – if only because these nations were usually created long after the work of art in question, which is being used to assert national characteristics. Far more serious, however, is the fact that by assessing national divergences, the similarities between works of art from different regions of Europe fall into second place. During the past few years, Dutch art historians have become increasingly aware of the importance of the European dimension when studying the art of the Low Countries. But this new research will only produce important results when it goes hand in hand with a fundamental reconsideration of art history and nationalism.

Cannabis is the most widely used illegal recreational drug in Europe; up to 5% of the total population are regular users in some countries. Smoking cannabis can damage the lungs, and some users may become psychologically dependent on the drug. Heavy cannabis use may also be associated with an increased risk of psychiatric illness — although no cause and effect relationship has been established. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus among medical and scientific experts that the health hazards of cannabis have been exaggerated. European countries differ widely in their attitude to enforcing the 1961 UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which declared cannabis to be an illegal narcotic. In the Netherlands the so-called ‘Dutch Experiment’ has decriminalized cannabis use for almost 30 years without any serious adverse social or public health consequences. On the other hand, most Scandinavian countries maintain a fiercely punitive legal regime, while other countries in Europe are moving towards a relaxation of the criminal penalties for possession and use. There is an urgent need for more debate about the need to reform the cannabis laws and for more consistency across Europe.

Rapid developments in neuroscience over the past four decades continue to receive wide media attention. Each new reported advance points to ever tightening links between mind and brain. For many centuries, what is today called ‘mind-talk’ was familiar as ‘soul-talk’. Since, for some, the possession of a soul is what makes us human, the challenges of cognitive neuroscience directly address this. This paper affords the non-specialist a brief overview of some of the scientific evidence pointing to the ever tightening of the mind-brain links and explores its wider implications for our understanding of human nature. In particular it brings together the findings from so-called bottom-up research, in which we observe changes in behaviour and cognition resulting from experimental interventions in neural processes, with top-down research where we track changes in neural substrates accompanying habitual modes of cognition or behaviour. Further reflection alerts one to how the dualist views widely held by New Agers, some humanists and many religious people, contrast with the views of academic philosophers, theologians and biblical scholars, who agree in emphasizing the unity of the person.

Homer's Iliad and Odyssey were created, probably in the second half of the 9th century BC, in the framework of the Greek epic tradition of oral formulaic poetry, which started in the Peloponnese in proto-Mycenaean times (c. 1600 BC). The epic verse, the dactylic hexameter, must have been taken over from the Minoan Cretans. Whereas most 19th century scholars were analysts, considering Homer's epics' conflations of older and more recent epic poems, most modern scholars are unitarians, recognizing the unity of both epics, thanks to modern insights in the nature of oral traditional poetry and to modern narratology. Although many modern scholars ascribe the Odyssey to a later poet than that of the Iliad, there are no convincing arguments against the Ancients' opinion that both epics are the work of one single poet called Homer. Both Iliad and Odyssey are characterized by the principle of ‘unity of action’, a principle not found in other ancient epic poetry. There are reasons to suppose that Homer learnt the art of epic versification in Smyrna, his native city, by listening to performances of Aeolic singers. Driven by Ionic self-consciousness he transposed the epic Aeolic Kunstsprache into Ionic, thus creating the so-called Homeric dialect. He could perform his monumental epics at great religious festivals and at the courts of princes. There is evidence that he gave performances in the island of Euboea, the only prosperous region of the contemporary Greek world, and that there his epics were eventually written down. Thus, Homer's epics are the end-point of the oral epic tradition and the starting point of written Greek and European literature.

The European debate on immigration is marred by stereotypes, such as the supposition that Europe is full, that asylum seekers can be separated from economic immigrants, that the sending countries suffer from brain drain and that immigrants take jobs away from the population in the receiving countries. Many of these arguments can be reversed, but recently immigrants have indeed been costly to the EU taxpayer. However, demographic decline will force Europe to devise a system by which labour immigration can be profitable again for the host countries.

The history of mnemonic concepts encompasses utopian and sceptical views that produce either a hypertrophic memory or denounce any representation as false. Each literary text incorporates or stores other texts, thus mnemonic space unfolds between and within texts. In storing and accumulating cultural data, the literary text in its intertextual dimension functions as part of cultural memory. A fantastic text points to a silenced repressed memory, confronting culture with its oblivion. Yet the fantastic in restoring the displaced and vanished parts of culture is not merely a mnemonic memory: its speculative potential strives for arbitrary creations that erase the accepted mnemonic imagery.

In many languages, the concept of ‘Civil society’ has had an astonishing career over the last 10 to 15 years, in disciplines such as history and sociology as well as with the public at large. This article presents a short history of the concept, offers a definition and explores the reasons for its popularity by identifying its conceptual ‘opponents’, which have changed over time. It discusses the changing relations between civil society, the market economy, government and the private sphere. It deals with the affinity between civil society and the middle classes in some areas and periods. It finally explores the trends and limits of the emergence of a transnational civil society in Europe. It is an overview that deals with the present problems from a historical perspective.