Cultural borders play a significant part in modern European history as well as in the present. This Focus has been chosen in order to enhance reflections on the transcendence of cultural borders; how the crossing is conducted, why we want to move beyond cultural borders, and what actually lies beyond them. The individual articles investigate ways to transcend borders, primarily those of the European nation state, in different genres from the nineteenth century onward. This editorial article introduces the theme of thinking beyond borders and presents the contributions to this Focus. It attempts to situate the issue of Europe´s cultural borders within European history by delving into three relevant themes: the cultural construction of borders, the growing number of recognized nationalities, and the practices of Europeanization.

This article explores the absence of a consistent longer historical narrative about gender relations in European history, as the latter is presented in the recently opened House of European History in Brussels and, to some extent, in the European Parliament’s visitor centre, Parlamentarium. It is argued that gender equality is presented as part of a modern European identity, but that it is a phenomenon that isn’t given such a problematic history as many other phenomena – gender inequality is not construed as a part of European history in the way that, for example, totalitarianism and colonialism are. Gender inequality isn’t seen and constructed as a previous challenge to European unification and integration, and therefore gender equality can’t be perceived as a solution to a relevant problem in the narratives at hand.

One of the most frequently described cultural borders in European public discourse is that between Europe and Islam. Further to which, there are many concerns as to whether Islam can be integrated into Europe. This article argues that it is impossible to understand the real and imagined problems addressed in the ‘integration of Islam in Europe’ debate using the categories ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’. The question of categories is addressed through Bourdieu’s critique of journalism’s influence on research, leading to questions about suitable criteria of demarcation and meaningful terminologies. The route goes via classical theorists of science, such as Carnap, Popper and Kuhn, to Ricoeur, Said and Connolly. Some segments of the modern genealogy of the category of Islam in European studies are also touched upon. The article ends with a call for unpopular categories as an escape from the popular and political frames of debate.

Catchy slogans about tourism’s peace-promoting qualities abound – ‘passport to peace’, ‘a vital force for peace’ and ‘the peace industry’, to name but a few. Yet, despite the critical scrutiny of the peace–tourism nexus in recent decades, its historical roots remain unexplored. This article traces the origins of the idea that tourism can help advance peace and international understanding. It examines the aspirations of the various international tourist organisations founded during the interwar and early post-war period. While these organisations sought to foster peaceful relations across national and cultural borders, their discourse of tourism as a force for peace also gave legitimacy to a transnational tourist industry and government attempts to secure hard currency in the Cold War.

In the late works of María Zambrano (1904–1991), the author presents exile as a particular kind of experience, by which the structure and arquitectonics of human existence become visible. Similarly, in his posthumously published Passagen-Werk Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) introduces the flanêur – which he repeatedly likens to the immigrant or exile – as the representation of a particular kind of gaze, disclosing the arquitectonics and structure of capitalist bourgeois society. In this article, I suggest that the notions of figura and dialektisches Bild from the authors’ respective works are connected to an exile mode of perception, centred on the problem of translatability across cultural and linguistic borders. I believe that the similarities between the two authors can be explained by a reading which contextualizes them as a political generation with a shared experience of exilic boundary-crossing.

This article elaborates upon the idea of cultural borders from the perspective of European unification before EU-integration. It addresses discussions on how to manage or even transcend religious and linguistic borders, from William Penn, Novalis and Conrad Friedrich Schmidt-Phiseldeck, to Johann Caspar Bluntschli and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. The historical contexts are nationalism and Europeanization. These are further illuminated by the use of constructivist theory and the concept of a ‘stagist theory’ from Dipesh Chakrabarty and Roberto Dainotto which legitimizes the domination of some nations over others.

The fact that dystopian literature has a great potential for envisioning alternative futures is elaborated in this article in relation to the Finnish/British author Emmi Itäranta’s Memory of Water (2013). Itäranta’s gloomy low-fi novel is read alongside contemporary ecocritical theory with a focus on issues of vernacular cultures and knowledges versus ideas of cosmopolitan planetary citizenship. Reflections are made about the profound nature of the concept of borders: cultural, temporal, informational, geographical, political, in the event of massive catastrophes. The article investigates how Rob Nixon’s concept of ‘slow violence’ and Ursula Heise’s ‘eco-cosmopolitanism’ are played out in a novel, and how the novel in turn poses important questions for ecocritical theory. Thus, the interplay between ecocritical literary theory, on the one hand, and literature, on the other, is highlighted. What can dystopia make visible in contemporary theory?

Nationalism is a most general and worldwide phenomenon, known at least since European antiquity. It is also present in archaeological research, more intensively indeed in Central and Eastern Europe than in its Western counterpart. It is mostly connected with national prehistory, and its basic questions concern ‘ancientness’, ‘previousness’ and a high(er) culture, which are always the issues put forth in a comparison with others. Its emergence becomes more direct when manipulating constructed histories. Yet a decrease of its overall influence may be expected in the long run. Panhistorism in archaeology partly stems from the overestimation of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century archaeological finds and was the view generally adopted by Soviet-type Marxism. Its aim is to render history useful for political manipulation. Its followers and advocates, however, are generally ill-informed about the methodological issues of research developed in the second half of twentieth century. We may, therefore, be somewhat more optimistic as to its impending disappearance.

In recent years there has been a rapprochement between history and archaeology in Britain and Ireland. Two formerly quite distinct disciplines have learned to appreciate how documents and artefacts together can enrich our understanding of everyday life. Always important to understandings of classical, Dark Age, and medieval society, archaeology has also opened up new horizons for appreciating domestic and industrial buildings, burial patterns, urban morphology, land use and environment, and the consumption of both food and objects in the early modern period. I look at some recent research that has enhanced our knowledge of local, regional, national and transnational identities in a sometimes poorly understood ‘fringe’ area of Europe.

The murder of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, for many the ‘founder of archaeology’, in 1768 in a Trieste inn, did not mean the end for his work, which could be said to have been the key to understanding ancient Greece, which Europe was re-discovering at the time. In the late Enlightenment, Neoclassicism, followed by Romanticism, elevated classical, Hellenistic and Roman antiquity, and archaeological research, to the centre of academic quests, while the inclusion of archaeological sites in the era’s Grand Tours fed into a belief in the ‘Regeneration’/‘Wiedergeburt’ of Greece. The Modern Greek Enlightenment flourished during this same period, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, with a concomitant classicizing turn. Ancient Greek texts were republished by Greek scholars, especially in the European centres of the Greek diaspora. An admiration for antiquity was intertwined into the Neohellenic national identity, and the first rulers of the free Greek State undertook to take care of the nation’s archaeological monuments. In 1837, under ‘Bavarian rule’, the first Greek University and the ‘Archaeological Society of Greece in Athens’ were set up. Archaeologists flocked to Greece and those parts of the ancient Greek world that were still part of the Ottoman Empire. The showcasing of classical monuments, at the expense of the Byzantine past, would remain the rule until the latter half of the nineteenth century. Modern Greek national identity was primarily underpinned by admiration for antiquity, which was viewed as a source of modern Hellenism, and for ‘enlightened, savant, good-governed Europe’. Today, the ‘new archaeology’ is striving to call these foundations into question.

Public authorities in Europe are faced with increasing demands to accommodate religious diversity. This article traces some key issues concerning the limits of the secular State in Europe to accept and accommodate those ethno-religious minorities that are perceived to be partially different entities and claim some jurisdiction, without thereby rejecting guarantees from the receiving legal system. This multicultural challenge that minorities pose to institutionalized secularism is amongst the most complex political and long-term issues European states have to face. Such a challenge has not only to do with socio-economic disadvantage and discrimination in the labour markets but also with the constitutional status or corporate relationship with the State. On the other hand, European anxieties question whether or not Muslims can be and are willing to be integrated into European society and its political values; in particular, values of freedom, tolerance, democracy, sexual equality and secularism. Across Europe, multiculturalism seems to be in retreat and ‘integration’ is once again the watchword.

Ian Morris’s Why the West Rules – for Now (2010) is a brilliant book, dealing with Eurasian history from the first civilisations to the present. It takes an intermediate position in the famous debate about Europe and the rest of the world and European dominance during the last few centuries. Morris uses all kinds of sources. However, his general approach is staunchly materialistic: the motors of history are fear, sloth and greed. Cultural differences do exist, but can be explained by the former factors. This is an attitude not confined to archaeologists, nor necessarily shared by all of them, but may nevertheless have something to do with Morris’s background in this field. One objection is that Morris may have underestimated the importance of institutional factors; he does not discuss the division of Europe into separate states, which has often been regarded as a central factor in ‘the Rise of the West’. This in turn raises the question of the ‘two hand-maidens’ and their relationship to the EU. If political division is an essential feature of Europe, what will happen if this division disappears?

EU law has known coordination since its beginnings. A careful study of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (in the following: Treaty or TFEU; see Official Journal No C 326 from 26 October 2012, pp. 0001– 0390) and numerous secondary law acts results in a variety of Member States’ obligations in connection with coordination. Through the years, relevant secondary legislation has been issued. In recent years, EU legislature has established new rules in sensitive – from Member States’ point of view – areas of national budget law. The coordination of budgetary policies constitutes both a new and a crucial instrument. Over the years, first the Contracting States and then EU legislature established tens of obligations to consult EU institutions on national draft laws. These mechanisms assume increasing importance. This very remarkable and at the same time under-discussed category deserves its own legal terms and definitions. The current article reviews legal uncertainties resulting from the application of procedural rules, suggests solutions, and coins new terms such as hybrid legislative procedures (Section 2) and effet utile du contrôle préventif (Section 3) that are crucial for a new dogmatic approach regarding the obligations to consult. Because national and EU legislative procedures overlap in the case of obligations to consult, many mistakes may occur at any stage. Current research tries to determine the consequences of violations of obligations to consult EU institutions on national legislative procedures (Section 4). In this respect, it deals with the settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: Court or CJEU). The current article argues that the control of EU institutions over national law drafts is preventive and that the violation of a procedural obligation to consult can thus have only an indicative effect with regard to internal market disruption. New barriers to the internal market should not arise with the coming into force of a new law. This article introduces a new dogmatic approach towards obligations to consult, with the aim of avoiding legal uncertainty for national legislatures and practitioners.

Has the eurozone (EZ) really gained from integration? This study applied two econometric frameworks, mGARCH and gMMPI, to test this hypothesis, using panel data that span 1996–2014, a total of 19 years, involving the EZ, EU, G8, G20 and some emerging economies. The empirical outcomes initially showed that the EZ economies experienced neither superior output growth nor a better capital market return than non-EZ economies or the pre-EZ period. They further suggested that each EZ country had a higher degree of risk bearing and, as a group, a greater risk linkage. Moreover, the results indicated that the EZ had a higher productivity gain if the risk premium was counted as part of productivity. Nonetheless, the EZ did not show a substantial productivity gain when the effect of the risk factor was controlled. The ratio of risk bearing to risk premium gain was shown to be 1 to 0.97. The general conclusion is that, other than the risk premium, there was no extra productivity gain for the EZ from taking the risk.

We explain why and how the governing parties, AKP of Turkey and PT of Brazil, converged on the same path of relying on the poor as the main strategy to stay in power. With the neoliberal reorganization and internationalization of their economies, the capacity of these governments to set up developmentalist alliances with big capital, the middle classes and the organized working classes was weakened. Based on a most-different-systems design and on descriptive statistical analysis, we argue that both PT and AKP failed to build multi-class bases and thus had to mobilize the poor by using various strategies, most importantly expanding social assistance policies, which accelerated the emergence of a new welfare state.