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Big Data and Changing Concepts of the Human
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 June 2019
Abstract
Big Data has the potential to enable unprecedentedly rigorous quantitative modeling of complex human social relationships and social structures. When such models are extended to non-human domains, they can undermine anthropocentric assumptions about the extent to which these relationships and structures are specifically human. Discoveries of relevant commonalities with non-humans may not make us less human, but they promise to challenge fundamental views of what it is to be human.
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References
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