This article questions the utility of assessing radical right party placement on economic issues, which has been extensively analyzed in academic literature. Starting from the premise that political parties have varying strategic stakes in different political issues, the article considers political competition in multiple issue dimensions. It suggests that political competition is not simply a matter of taking positions on political issues, but rather centers on manipulating the dimensional structure of politics. The core argument is that certain political parties, such as those of the radical right, seek to compete on neglected, secondary issues while simultaneously blurring their positions on established issues in order to attract broader support. Deliberate position blurring – considered costly by the literature – may thus be an effective strategy in multidimensional competition. The article combines quantitative analyses of electoral manifestos, expert placement of political parties, and voter preferences, by studying seventeen radical right parties in nine Western European party systems.

We investigate the partisan foundations of political legitimacy. We argue that the goals parties pursue shape their supporters’ views about the political system via the messages they communicate about the desirability of the political system. Combining public opinion survey data collected in 15 democracies with data on the goal orientations and policy positions of 116 political parties, we find that office-seeking parties take more positive positions toward the status quo of the political regime than policy-seeking parties. Moreover, we find that these positions have consequences. Specifically, supporters of parties with more positive positions toward the system report systematically higher levels of support than supporters of parties that communicate more negative views. Taken together, these findings suggest that political parties play an active role in shaping citizens’ views of the political system and that office-seeking parties in particular mobilize consent among citizens in contemporary democracies.

Political trust and corruption have both elicited considerable academic and popular commentary in recent years. Much attention has been focused on the extent to which corruption has contributed to citizens’ increasing distrust of their politicians. But little attention has been paid to the possibility that distrust may condition responses to alleged corruption, and no work has hitherto demonstrated the veracity of this relationship in a mature democracy. Drawing on data from the United Kingdom, this paper finds that less trusting individuals are consistently more censorious of politicians’ misbehaviour and more likely to perceive the presence of corruption than are their more trusting peers. The paper further demonstrates that people who are less trusting become relatively more critical (compared with the more trusting) as the generally perceived corruptness of a certain scenario declines. It also demonstrates how trust increases in importance as a predictor of ethical judgements when behaviour is generally reckoned to be less corrupt. Further analysis suggests that this effect is partly connected to uncertainty. Less obviously corrupt acts are associated with higher levels of uncertainty, which appears to open up a space for trust to play an even more significant role in shaping individual's judgements of politicians’ behaviour.

In this paper, we apply a revised version of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al. to European Parliament (EP) debates. This updated measurement instrument, after the inclusion of new indicators, helps us identify not just the principles of European Union (EU) deliberation but most importantly the favourable contextual conditions of supranational deliberation. We illustrate the new DQI coding for selected debates over the last EU parliamentary term and discuss how the data can be employed to assess the overall quality of deliberation in the EP. At the same time we demonstrate that institutional issues matter for the quality of EP discourse, as do Members of the European Parliaments’ personal characteristics. Issue attributes on the other hand, influence supranational deliberation but not in the expected direction.

The global increase in inequality raises concerns among scholars and policy-makers. However, limited evidence exists to identify how inequality affects citizens’ behavior. This study explores the effects of economic inequality on participation in civil society associations by testing hypotheses derived from resource and conflict theories. Using a multilevel Poisson model in 18 post-communist countries, this study finds that inequality has a nonlinear effect on civil society. Economic inequality has a drastically demobilizing effect on associational participation in countries with lower income inequality; meanwhile high inequality has a slightly weak mobilizing effect on associational participation. Further tests show that the effect of inequality varies across different socioeconomic groups, but that the poor are most affected.

The paper analyses how perceptions of government quality – in terms of impartiality and efficiency – impact on attitudes to taxes and social spending. It builds on data from the European Social Survey 2008 from 29 European countries. The paper shows a large degree of congruence between expert-based judgments and the general public's perceptions of the quality of government. It also shows that the quality of government has a clear, independent effect on attitudes to taxes and spending, so that people who perceive institutions as efficient and fair want higher taxes and spending. But government quality also conditions the impact of egalitarianism on attitudes to taxes and spending: in high-quality-of-government egalitarianism has a clearly stronger impact on these attitudes. It is concluded that government quality is an important and so far neglected factor in explaining attitudes to welfare policies.

Drawing on the original data collected during a period of university student protest in Greece, we explore whether the expected gains from the act of protesting itself influence an individual's decision to participate in collective action. More particularly, we investigate the extent to which the process incentives qualify the weight individuals attach to the primary elements of the original cost–benefit equation of rational choice theory as well as other considerations in their decision-making process. Our findings point out that the magnitude of the effect of the process incentives is very strong and its inclusion in a rational choice model improves our understanding of students’ participation in protest activities. Turning to indirect effects, we show that process incentives behave as a first stage precondition for the students’ decision to participate in collective action. In the absence of perceived benefits associated with the process of protesting, the importance of attaining the public good becomes much less important in their decision-making process.

In democratic theory, two frequently occurring ideas are that deliberation and direct voting in referendums can increase perceived legitimacy of democratic procedures. To evaluate this claim, we conducted a controlled field experiment in which 215 high school students participated by being subject to a decision on a collective issue. The decision was made either by direct voting or as a non-voting procedure (decision made by the teacher). Additionally, we manipulated the opportunities for deliberation prior to the decision. Our primary finding is that both voting and deliberation significantly increase perceived legitimacy compared with a procedure in which these components are absent. However, applying both voting and deliberation does not yield significantly higher perceived legitimacy than applying voting without deliberation. We also found that perceived influence in the decision-making process mediates the effect of both voting and deliberation, whereas the epistemic quality of the decision, which is heavily emphasized in deliberative democratic theory, gained no support as a mediator.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play an active role in European and global governance, and many commentators see them as a link that connects the international level with citizens. But not all CSOs active at the international level do have a substantial number of members. The question we investigate in this article is to what extent membership distinguishes these CSOs from other transnational actors. To what extent do member and non-member CSOs differ in their roles and activities? Is it plausible to argue, as it quite often happens, that CSOs with members are more legitimate than others? On the basis of a survey of 60 exemplary CSOs we find that membership CSOs neither differ substantially from non-member CSOs in their political behavior, nor do they differ in important aspects of legitimacy, such as transparency or efforts to include beneficiaries.

In the wake of the deepest and longest recession that the United Kingdom has experienced since the 1930s and the Irish Republic has experienced since the 1980s, this paper examines the origins, sustenance, and puncturing of the growth dynamic both economies have enjoyed since the early 1990s. It identifies, in both cases, elements of an ‘Anglo-liberal growth model’. For as long as it lasted, this took the form of a consumer boom fuelled by growing private indebtedness (typically secured against property in a rising housing market) and was itself dependent on the nurturing and sustenance of a low inflation–low interest rate equilibrium. Of the two cases, it is the United Kingdom that presents the purer form of Anglo-liberal growth; in Ireland, a hybrid growth model can be seen to have developed in which Anglo-liberal growth was allied to a more conventional (and ultimately more sustainable) export-oriented growth dynamic. The paper seeks to gauge the character, paradigmatic significance, and effectiveness of the interventions made in the attempt to shore up the Anglo-liberal growth model and the rather different prospects for the resumption of growth in the years ahead. It argues that the Anglo-liberal growth model is, indeed, fatally flawed. In such a context, it is difficult to see how sustained economic growth can be restored, in the UK case, in the absence of a completely new growth model and, in the Irish case, without the cleansing of the long-standing export-oriented growth model of the Anglo-liberal trappings it has acquired in recent years.

In this article, we demonstrate that the collective actions of undocumented migrants possess similar symbolic dimensions, even if the contexts of their actions differ. We explain this finding by focusing on the power relations that undocumented migrants face. Given that they occupy a very specific position in society (i.e., they are neither included in nor completely excluded from citizenship), they experience similar forms of power relations vis-à-vis public authorities in different countries. We argue that this leads them to participate in collective actions as acts of emancipation. Our analysis illustrates this argument by comparing marches by undocumented migrants in three countries: France, Germany and Canada-Quebec. Through an in-depth analysis, we demonstrate that these marches redefine the legal order and politicize the presence of undocumented migrants in the public sphere. By highlighting the cognitive, emotional and relational dimensions of collective actions, we show that the symbolic dimension of these three marches relates to the empowerment, pride and solidarity of undocumented migrants.

Active labor market policies consist of a diverse set of policy tools with which to address joblessness and the degree to which governments invest in various policies as a response to rising unemployment varies widely. Fleshing out the determinants by policy type holds the promise of illuminating more clearly contestation over activation. To this end, this study analyzes the role of partisanship as well as welfare state regimes and the economy on spending patterns. We begin by detailing a theoretical framework for understanding variation in active labor market policies. Bonoli categorizes active labor market policies according to their market orientation and emphasis on human capital investment. In a study of social service reforms, Gingrich explains how all parties employ market-based reforms to empower some groups over others. These theories are then used to derive partisan hypotheses for direct job creation, training, labor market services, and employment incentives. Hypotheses for the four main types of active labor market policies are tested with regression analysis of 22 countries between 1985 and 2008. High spending on direct job creation, a non-market oriented policy type, is marginally significantly higher in the social democratic regime and by left governments prior to the activation turn. Left parties spend significantly more than other parties on training policies and after the activation turn these policies also become a distinct feature of the social democratic welfare state regime. The same trend exists for employment incentives. Center-right parties and those within the Christian democratic regime also spend marginally significantly higher on training policies before the activation turn, which is explained by results for deindustrialization. No partisan or regime effects are found for labor market services, which supports the view that all countries rely on these policies. The literature also suggests that a composite measure masks political conflict since this policy type encompasses diverse policies.

This article builds on previous research on Europeanization and political opportunity structures (POS) for mobilization, to explore the processes of transnational LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) mobilization in the European Union (EU). In the case of LGBT activism, European integration affects contentious politics by altering POS – both vertically and horizontally – for mobilization and changing the tactics of LGBT activism. Using the cases of Germany and Poland to trace cross-border connections between norm entrepreneur and target state, the findings suggest that LGBT activism relies on transnational resources – primarily, social spaces and organizational capacity – that are scarce in many member states but readily available in others. These horizontal opportunities among member states, alongside top-down vertical ones provided by Brussels, serve as mobilizing structures that bring together distinct groups of international actors. Europeanization also alters the tactics that transnational actors use when engaging with authorities in the target state. Employing socialization mechanisms that highlight appropriate behavior, actors tactically frame their demands in a European discourse by associating the issue of LGBT acceptance with democratic responsibilities as members of the EU community.

Why do some governments adopt unpopular reforms entailing far-reaching liberalization of the labor market, while others opt only for marginal adjustments or even regulatory reforms? This paper explains the likelihood of different types of reforms as an effect of different constellations of government partisanship and veto players. Combining the ‘blame avoidance’ and ‘veto players’ logics of politics, I argue that veto players have either a constraining or enabling effect depending on the partisan orientation of government. Liberalization is most likely to be adopted either by right parties facing few veto players, or by left parties in contexts with a high degree of power sharing. Regulatory reforms are most likely when left governments enjoy strong power concentration, but marginal regulation may also be adopted under external pressure by right governments facing many veto players. An analysis of employment protection reforms in 24 European Union countries during 1990–2007 supports the argument that the effect of political constraints and opportunities on the choice of reforms is shaped by partisan differences.

The ‘going public’ of religious actors is taking central stage both in religious studies and political philosophy. But this ‘going public’ of religious actors is controversial. The debate revolves around the question of whether religious actors must frame their religious convictions in terms of secular reasons or whether they should be allowed to introduce religiously grounded beliefs into public political argument without constraints. Despite vigorous and ongoing debate, there is little systematic and empirical research on this question. This article focuses on the public statements of religious actors in the context of Swiss direct democratic votes on abortion and immigration. Our empirical findings reveal an interesting gap: while many political philosophers and religious thinkers have moved to a position where religious actors can – and even should – openly employ religious arguments, the practice of religious actors in Switzerland is different. The larger denominations of Catholics and Protestants especially have a tendency to use a great amount of secular vocabulary. In addition, our findings also reveal that the use of religious or secular reasons varies considerably according to different issues, different media types (religious vs. secular press), different religious traditions, different alliance structures, and different media genres, while there is no clear time trend.

This article provides a comprehensive theoretical model for analysing the influence of European party federations (Europarties) on their Central and Eastern European (CEE) partner parties. It draws on the concepts of Europeanization and party change and is, in principle, applicable to similar processes of party enlargement elsewhere. In the process of their Eastern enlargement, Europarties have searched for suitable CEE partner parties on which they have tried to exert influence. Thus far, little is known about the precise mechanisms involved and the actual impact of these processes. We argue that Europarty influence leads to party change on the side of the CEE partners, which brings about ‘West-Europeanization’. Europarties are expected to apply a double strategy that consists of a process of political exchange based on a largely asymmetric power relationship in favour of Europarties and a socialization strategy in which Europarties try to socialize their partners and convince them of the appropriateness of change. We present the theoretical and analytical tools for the analysis of the arguably largest extension of transnational party organizations, which provides ample testing ground for more general theories on party change. Furthermore, we present preliminary empirical evidence on the two most important cases, namely the European People's Party and the Party of European Socialists, which indicates that Europarties played an important role in the development of CEE parties and party systems in general.

The institutional architecture of the European Union is based on two fundamentally competing ideas: supranational rule and national sovereignty. These two underlying ideas are not reconcilable and work at different levels in the background of the policy debate. While on the normative level public sentiments remain strongly linked to the idea of state autonomy, on the cognitive level the paradigm of a functional necessity to cooperate is decisive for actual policy making. Only in some policy domains, such as the single market program, have policy-makers attempted to re-couple normative and cognitive ideas. In contrast to this, the central argument is that policy-makers mostly adhere to an alternative strategy: the systematic decoupling of normative and cognitive ideas. Focusing on public administration, it is shown how deft policy instrumentation allows actors to realize program ideas that satisfy demands for increased supranational governance. At the same time, however, these instruments are in dissonance with how policies are framed against the background of public sentiments that assume domestic bureaucratic independence.

This article tests the cross-national equivalence of the political protest scale, as developed by Barnes and Kaase, in 20 Western European countries using a battery of items included in the fourth wave of the European Values Study. The scale measuring the concept of political protest is widely used, but no evidence of cross-country equivalence has yet been provided in the literature. The article illustrates the concept of political protest, the relationship between concept formation, operationalization, and measurement equivalence, and the possible consequences of a lack of equivalence. It is argued that comparative research may be threatened by a lack of measurement equivalence. The spread of international surveys eases comparative designs, but at the same time enlarges the chances that we compare what is not actually comparable. The article then outlines an empirical strategy to assess the political protest scale's measurement equivalence. To assess cross-country equivalence, Mokken Scale Analysis, a nonparametric scaling method within the family of Item Response Theory models, is used. This has been shown to work better than Confirmatory Factor Analysis when dealing with dichotomous and polytomous items forming ordinal scales. The results show that the cross-country equivalence of the political protest scale depends on the type of measure the scholar wishes to build and use.

We present a model of deliberative inclusion, focusing on reciprocity in the interaction between structural minorities/disadvantaged groups and majorities/privileged groups. Our model, however, comes with a ‘friendly amendment’: we have put the ‘burden of reciprocity’ mainly on majorities and privileged groups. It is mainly their obligation to seriously listen and respond to the demands and arguments of minorities and disadvantaged groups and show a willingness to respect and accommodate these interests. Empirically, we apply our model to the interaction of linguistic groups in the Swiss parliament. We find a highly egalitarian, sometimes even minority-favoring mode of interaction between the German-speaking majority and linguistic minorities. The German-speaking majority seems to be willing to take the ‘burden of reciprocity’ when linguistic minorities’ vital interests are concerned. Conversely, linguistic minorities are slightly more self-referential and adversarial under such conditions.