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Coalition oversight and blame avoidance in Greece

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2015

Eitan Tzelgov
Eitan Tzelgov*
Affiliation:
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, Varieties of Democracy Institute, University Of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
*
*E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article examines the behavior of Greek political parties before, as well as during, the recent austerity period. Drawing on coalition oversight and blame avoidance literature, it argues that the unpopularity of austerity governments leads to extreme levels of dissent within the coalition. I operationalize this ‘intra-coalition opposition’ behavior using parliamentary questions, a legislative institution that has not been studied in the context of coalition politics. The analysis demonstrates that junior members in unpopular austerity governments increase their use of parliamentary questions to a degree that matches or even exceeds the formal opposition. However, intra-coalition dissent is conditional on the type of unpopular government policies, and on the ideology of coalition members. Specifically, using a new method of text analysis, I show that while the socialist Panhellenic Socialist Movement uses its parliamentary questions to avoid or minimize the blame associated with austerity policies, the conservative New Democracy does not, because left-leaning parties are electorally vulnerable to austerity measures. The results have implications for studying dissent in coalition politics in general, and the politics of austerity in particular.

Keywords

partiesblame avoidanceparliamentary questionscoalitionsopposition
Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , February 2017 , pp. 95 - 114
Copyright
© European Consortium for Political Research 2015 

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