This article aims to theorise corruption from a “macro” perspective. It elaborates upon a range of social sciences literatures, notably from criminology and political sciences, that have discussed various “macro”-level factors contributing to corruption, including market characteristics. Its most distinct contribution to the literature is in importing the concept of “systemic risk” – thus far chiefly examined in the financial regulation literature – to the analysis of corruption. It draws on the financial literature on systemic risk and macro-prudential regulation and supervision. In so doing, it elaborates upon concepts such as “network” and “contagion” as to theorise the effects of corruption on resource allocation. This is supplemented by reference to the legal canon of literature on market regulation.

Understanding of the causes and correlations for algorithmic decisions is currently one of the major challenges of computer science, addressed under an umbrella term “explainable AI (XAI)”. Being able to explain an AI-based system may help to make algorithmic decisions more satisfying and acceptable, to better control and update AI-based systems in case of failure, to build more accurate models, and to discover new knowledge directly or indirectly. On the legal side, the question whether the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides data subjects with the right to explanation in case of automated decision-making has equally been the subject of a heated doctrinal debate. While arguing that the right to explanation in the GDPR should be a result of interpretative analysis of several GDPR provisions jointly, the authors move this debate forward by discussing the technical and legal feasibility of the explanation of algorithmic decisions. Legal limits, in particular the secrecy of algorithms, as well as technical obstacles could potentially obstruct the practical implementation of this right. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the authors explore not only whether it is possible to translate the EU legal requirements for an explanation into the actual machine learning decision-making, but also whether those limitations can shape the way the legal right is used in practice.

Some understandings of European Union health law are based on a presumption of law as a static and closed system. This approach to the Union as a legal entity has important ramifications. The Union is a political system created by and subject to the rule of law. Its successes (and failures) are attributable to the legalisation of solving externalities and ensuring Member State solidarity to gain benefits from integration. Member States, which create and sustain the Union by repeated acts of sovereign choice, choose to subject themselves to the rule of (Union) law. This protects both the Member States and the Union institutions (imperfectly, but nonetheless) from charges of illegitimacy. While recognising the benefits of such an approach to European Union integration and law-making, we take the view that law also has an important dynamic potential. That dynamic potential is inherent in all law, for law is embodied in text, and always open to interpretation, as the external contexts that give legal text meaning in the real-world change through time. We trace the dynamic potential of Union health law by looking at its legal basis to its foundational Treaties, and we plot its trajectory going forward.

Glyphosate’s authorisation will expire in 2022 and its re-approval will take place in a changed legal and political landscape: the national phase of risk assessment is entrusted to a taskforce of four Member States, and, from 2021, the reform of the general food law will apply, imposing, inter alia, more ambitious transparency standards. Taking stock of these developments, this contribution analyses, from a legal perspective, whether and how the glyphosate dispute has contributed to the development of the EU’s regulatory epistemology, with specific regard to food governance. It identifies the “manifesto” of the EU’s regulatory epistemology in the 2002 guidelines on the collection and use of expertise and reads them in the light of the glyphosate dispute. In particular, it focuses on the legal arrangements reflecting the principles established in the 2002 guidelines (quality, openness, effectiveness) and analyses them against the tensions that emerged throughout the dispute with regard to the sources, levels and purposes of EU regulatory knowledge-making. It then considers whether and how such tensions have been addressed by legislative reform and whether this has resulted in a further refinement of the EU’s regulatory epistemology.

The 2017 glyphosate reauthorisation process has exposed key weaknesses of the EU’s institutional system. First, the role of Germany as Member State rapporteur and the subsequent decision to appoint a group of Member States to form the Assessment Group on Glyphosate (AGG) suggest that the nature of scientific assessments become blurred. These assessments are apparently not just purely objective, science-based and procedural elements of the authorization procedure, but require support from a significant number of Member States as well. Second, the arduous comitology trajectory in the glyphosate reauthorisation process has caused the Commission to initiate questionable changes to comitology. These changes would corrupt the coherence of the EU’s legislative system in general and the constitutional distinction between delegated and implementing acts in particular. Moreover, they would overlook the more obvious solution of relying more on discretion on the part of the Commission. Lastly, the glyphosate reauthorisation has questioned the dichotomy between legislation and executive rule-making, an equally central element of the EU’s constitutional order. This dichotomy is based on a distinction between essential elements that belong to the legislative domain and non-essential element which are more technical in nature. It has been claimed that weighing the economic benefits of pesticides against the health and environmental costs associated with their use is in essence a legislative choice. This claim highlights not so much the practical problem of how to draw the line between political and technical decision-making, but rather denies the very meaning of the dichotomy altogether. Yet, the current system on the placing on the market of plant protection products – based on the legislation providing the general framework and the executive applying this in concrete cases – is certainly not devoid of coherence and logic.

COVID-19 emerged as a cross-cutting problem across governance sectors and levels, urging the creation of a European Health Union. There are already a number of integrated European governance strategies – such as the European Energy Union (2015) and the European Green Deal (2019) – adopted for overcoming problems of governance fragmentation and inadequacy of fragmented policy responses to cross-cutting policy challenges. Past studies focused on the interaction between crisis and policy change and investigated the activation of different mechanisms to enhance integration. This article contributes to the debate over the creation of a European Health Union by unpacking the acknowledged dimensions of policy integration – policy frame, subsystem involvement, policy goals and policy instruments – in order to assess their manifestations in the new EU4Health policy and to establish what contextual conditions triggered the activation of the integration-enabling mechanisms that led to a more integrated European Health Union. In so doing, it offers an analytical illustration and discusses implications for decision-making.

We shall first introduce the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in producing new intellectual creations, distinguishing approaches based on knowledge representation and on machine learning. Then we shall provide an overview of some significant applications of AI to the production of intellectual creations, distinguishing the extent to which they depend on pre-existing works, and the different ways in which such pre-existing works are used in the creative process. In addition, we shall discuss some methods to automatically assess the similarity of works and styles, in the context of AI technologies for text generation. Finally, we shall discuss the legal aspects of AI-reuse of copyrighted works, focusing on the rights of the authors of such works relative to the process and the outputs of AI.

A number of virological, epidemiological and ethnographic arguments suggest that COVID-19 has a zoonotic origin. The pangolin, a species threatened with extinction due to poaching for both culinary purposes and traditional Chinese pharmacopoeia, is now suspected of being the “missing link” in the transmission to humans of a virus that probably originated in a species of bat. Our predation of wild fauna and the reduction in their habitats have thus ended up creating new interfaces that favour the transmission of pathogens (mainly viruses) to humans. Domesticated animals and wild fauna thus constitute a reservoir for almost 80% of emerging human diseases (SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, Ebola). These diseases are all zoonotic in origin. As if out of a Chinese fairy tale, the bat and the pangolin have taught us a lesson: within an increasingly interdependent world, environmental crises will become ever more intertwined with health crises. Questions relating to public health will no longer be confined to the secrecy of the physician’s consulting room or the sanitised environment of the hospital. They are now being played out in the arena of international trade, ports and airports and distribution networks. Simply put, all human activity creates new interfaces that facilitate the transmission of pathogens from an animal reservoir to humans. This pluri-disciplinary article highlights that environmental changes, such as the reduction in habitats for wild fauna and the intemperate trade in fauna, are the biggest causes of the emergence of new diseases. Against this background, it reviews the different measures taken to control, eradicate and prevent the emergence of animal diseases in a globalised world.

The regulation of pesticides in the European Union (EU) relies on a network of hard law (legislation and implementing acts) and soft law (non-legally binding guidance documents and administrative and scientific practices). Both hard and soft laws govern how risk assessments are conducted, but a significant role is left to the latter. Europe’s pesticide regulation is one of the most stringent in the world. Its stated objectives are to ensure an independent, objective and transparent assessment of pesticides and achieve a high level of protection for health and environment. However, a growing body of evidence shows that pesticides that have passed through this process and are authorised for use may harm humans, animals and the environment. The authors of the current paper – experts in toxicology, law and policy – identified shortcomings in the authorisation process, focusing on the EU assessment of the pesticide active substance glyphosate. The shortcomings mostly consist of failures to implement the hard or soft laws. But in some instances the law itself is responsible, as some provisions can only fail to achieve its objectives. Ways to improve the system are proposed, requiring changes in hard and soft laws as well as in administrative and scientific practices.

It is a striking feature of European Union (EU) health law and policy that it has developed in a relative lack of awareness from the general public. This situation can be partly explained by the existence of only a limited competence in the field and the recourse to other legal bases to enact public health measures, particularly Article 114 TFEU. The use of internal market powers to conduct EU health policy has given rise to several problems, affecting the legitimacy of EU action and its capacity to adequately protect human health. Only a Treaty change can provide the EU with the clear competence and the solid legislative powers that it needs to tackle the various health challenges that Europe faces and will continue to face.

This contribution explores the application of data science and artificial intelligence to legal research, more specifically an element that has not received much attention: the research infrastructure required to make such analysis possible. In recent years, EU law has become increasingly digitised and published in online databases such as EUR-Lex and HUDOC. However, the main barrier inhibiting legal scholars from analysing this information is lack of training in data analytics. Legal analytics software can mitigate this problem to an extent. However, current systems are dominated by the commercial sector. In addition, most systems focus on search of legal information but do not facilitate advanced visualisation and analytics. Finally, free to use systems that do provide such features are either too complex to use for general legal scholars, or are not rich enough in their analytics tools. In this paper, we motivate the case for building a software platform that addresses these limitations. Such software can provide a powerful platform for visualising and exploring connections and correlations in EU case law, helping to unravel the “DNA” behind EU legal systems. It will also serve to train researchers and students in schools and universities to analyse legal information using state-of-the-art methods in data science, without requiring technical proficiency in the underlying methods. We also suggest that the software should be powered by a data infrastructure and management paradigm following the seminal FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable and Reusable) principles.

Amid the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, there has been a call to use innovative digital tools for the purpose of protecting public health. There are a number of proposals to embed digital solutions into the regulatory strategies adopted by public authorities to control the spread of the coronavirus more effectively. They range from algorithms to detect population movements by using telecommunications data to the use of artificial intelligence and high-performance computing power to detect patterns in the spread of the virus. However, the use of a mobile phone application for contact tracing is certainly the most popular.

The purpose of parliament is to present a discussion of policy in a fashion that will bring about a consensus that results in collective action. Such a collective action serves the common good of the state, although second-order effects and Pareto optimality is difficult – if not impossible – to obtain. Parliament attempts to address the second-best world in a socially optimal fashion. As such, accountability and scrutiny are the key tools through which such a body can address the challenges faced by a financial sector confronted with profound difficulties. Such accountability is of paramount importance to provide sustainable public trust in parliament.

This contribution analyses whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provides clarifications on the normative implications that the precautionary principle entails in the context of Regulation 1107/2009, laying out the EU authorisation procedure for pesticides, in its recent judgement in Case C-616/17. In this judgement, which is a response to a request for a preliminary ruling by a French criminal court on the compatibility of certain aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle, the CJEU concludes that the questions of the referring court reveal nothing capable of affecting the validity of the regulation. According to the CJEU, to ensure conformity with the precautionary principle, the EU legislature must establish a normative framework that makes available to competent authorities sufficient information to adequately assess the risks to health resulting from the pesticide in question. However, the CJEU’s substantive analysis of the compatibility of the different aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle is not conducted concretely in light of this legal standard, but constitutes a mere testing of the general adequacy of Regulation 1107/2009. Furthermore, the CJEU’s judgement examines Regulation 1107/2009 in a vacuum without considering problems that have occurred in its implementation or application.

Calls for a European Health Union apparently challenge long-standing beliefs that national healthcare system organisation is a Member State competence. Interaction between Member State and European Union (EU) levels therefore fundamentally requires reflection in the design, overall structure and legal basis of any European Health Union. Article 168(7) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides the current version of the seemingly limited EU competence with regards to national healthcare system organisation and has received surprisingly little attention thus far. On the one hand, within the wider EU health competence ‘web’, Article 168(7) TFEU constrains EU adoption of measures incentivising Member States to use particular treatments or to increase intensive care units in response to COVID-19. On the other hand, Article 168(7) TFEU is challenged by the perceived influence of Country-Specific Recommendations issued in the context of the European Semester on national health policies. This opinion piece provides an original assessment of Article 168(7) TFEU to argue that Treaty change to redress the balance between EU and Member State competence regarding national healthcare systems may be uncalled for given both the flexibility afforded by the provision and the complexity and diversity of Member State healthcare systems.