Amid the outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, there has been a call to use innovative digital tools for the purpose of protecting public health. There are a number of proposals to embed digital solutions into the regulatory strategies adopted by public authorities to control the spread of the coronavirus more effectively. They range from algorithms to detect population movements by using telecommunications data to the use of artificial intelligence and high-performance computing power to detect patterns in the spread of the virus. However, the use of a mobile phone application for contact tracing is certainly the most popular.

Due to its borderless nature, COVID-19 has been a matter of common European interest since its very first detection on the continent. Yet this pandemic outbreak has largely been handled as an essentially national matter. Member States adopted their own different, uncoordinated and at times competing national responses according to their distinctive risk analysis frameworks, with little regard1 for the scientific and management advice provided by the European Union (EU), notably its dedicated legal framework for action on cross-border health threats.2 To justify such an outcome as the inevitable consequence of the EU’s limited competence in public health is a well-rehearsed yet largely inaccurate argument3 that calls for closer scrutiny.

A number of virological, epidemiological and ethnographic arguments suggest that COVID-19 has a zoonotic origin. The pangolin, a species threatened with extinction due to poaching for both culinary purposes and traditional Chinese pharmacopoeia, is now suspected of being the “missing link” in the transmission to humans of a virus that probably originated in a species of bat. Our predation of wild fauna and the reduction in their habitats have thus ended up creating new interfaces that favour the transmission of pathogens (mainly viruses) to humans. Domesticated animals and wild fauna thus constitute a reservoir for almost 80% of emerging human diseases (SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, Ebola). These diseases are all zoonotic in origin. As if out of a Chinese fairy tale, the bat and the pangolin have taught us a lesson: within an increasingly interdependent world, environmental crises will become ever more intertwined with health crises. Questions relating to public health will no longer be confined to the secrecy of the physician’s consulting room or the sanitised environment of the hospital. They are now being played out in the arena of international trade, ports and airports and distribution networks. Simply put, all human activity creates new interfaces that facilitate the transmission of pathogens from an animal reservoir to humans. This pluri-disciplinary article highlights that environmental changes, such as the reduction in habitats for wild fauna and the intemperate trade in fauna, are the biggest causes of the emergence of new diseases. Against this background, it reviews the different measures taken to control, eradicate and prevent the emergence of animal diseases in a globalised world.

This article offers a reflection on the testing strategies deployed in the generation of epidemiological data in the European Union (EU). I will argue that, while in the early days of the pandemic, Member States proceeded to testing in a rather scattered way, the shortage of resources seems to have acted as a driver of coordination, which is now increasingly being discussed at EU level. I will examine the legal and institutional framework supporting such embryonic coordination efforts and offer a preliminary assessment of their implications for a European approach to epidemiological knowledge-making.

The world economy is sliding yet into another recession (having arguably barely recovered from the previous economic downturn) due to the worldwide pressures and tensions created by the COVID-19 pandemic.1 With most countries in the world under lockdown (or in similar situations), almost all food is now consumed in the household. Arguably, agricultural producers and the retail industry appear to be the best placed to weather the storm in order to respond to such a change in demand. However, this is overly simplistic. Recent news of empty shelves in supermarkets whilst dairy farmers have been forced to pour milk down the drain have gone viral.

This contribution analyses whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provides clarifications on the normative implications that the precautionary principle entails in the context of Regulation 1107/2009, laying out the EU authorisation procedure for pesticides, in its recent judgement in Case C-616/17. In this judgement, which is a response to a request for a preliminary ruling by a French criminal court on the compatibility of certain aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle, the CJEU concludes that the questions of the referring court reveal nothing capable of affecting the validity of the regulation. According to the CJEU, to ensure conformity with the precautionary principle, the EU legislature must establish a normative framework that makes available to competent authorities sufficient information to adequately assess the risks to health resulting from the pesticide in question. However, the CJEU’s substantive analysis of the compatibility of the different aspects of Regulation 1107/2009 with the precautionary principle is not conducted concretely in light of this legal standard, but constitutes a mere testing of the general adequacy of Regulation 1107/2009. Furthermore, the CJEU’s judgement examines Regulation 1107/2009 in a vacuum without considering problems that have occurred in its implementation or application.

The world is currently facing the worst pandemic in a century and we were caught unprepared. COVID-19 has proven highly contagious and with severe consequences that are still unfolding. As of 16 April 2020, there were over 2 million confirmed cases and over 136,000 related deaths reported worldwide.1 Over 1 million of those confirmed cases were in the preceding 14 days, with the USA accounting for nearly half of those. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is now warning that the world is about to suffer the worst economic recession since the Great Depression in the 1920s.2

COVID-19 hits all of the cognitive triggers for how the lay public misjudges risk. Robust findings from the field of risk perception have identified unique characteristics of a risk that allow for greater attribution of frequency and probability than is likely to be aligned with the base-rate statistics of the risk. COVID-19 embodies these features. It is unfamiliar, invisible, dreaded, potentially endemic, involuntary, disproportionately impacts vulnerable populations such as the elderly and has the potential for widespread catastrophe. When risks with such characteristics emerge, it is imperative for there to be trust between those in governance and communication and the lay public in order to quell public fears. This is not the environment in which COVID-19 has emerged, potentially resulting in even greater perceptions of risk.

The COVID-19 pandemic is changing the face of Europe. Member States’ divergent responses to this crisis reveal a lack of unity in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe. At best, this undermines the effectiveness of health protection within the European Union (EU). At worst, it risks breaking up the Union altogether. Divergent national responses to COVID-19 reflect different national preferences and political legitimacy, and thus cannot be completely avoided. In this article, we argue that these responses should be better coordinated. Without coordination, the price for diversity is high. Firstly, there are damaging spill-overs between Member States, which undermine key pillars of European integration such as the free movement of persons and of goods. Secondly, national policy-making is easily captured by local interest groups. Our proposal is that the EU indicates – not mandates – a European exit strategy from asymmetric containment policies of COVID-19. In particular, the EU should help Member States procure and validate tests for infection and immunity. The EU should also indicate ways in which testing could be used to create safe spaces to work, thereby restoring the free movement of persons and of goods. We see a great advantage in such EU guidance: it could improve mutual learning between Member States, which have faced different timings of the epidemic and learned different lessons. Although the local political economy has so far delayed learning and undermined cooperation, the EU can mitigate both effects and indicate the way for Europe to resurrect united from the ashes of COVID-19.

The regulation of pesticides in the European Union (EU) relies on a network of hard law (legislation and implementing acts) and soft law (non-legally binding guidance documents and administrative and scientific practices). Both hard and soft laws govern how risk assessments are conducted, but a significant role is left to the latter. Europe’s pesticide regulation is one of the most stringent in the world. Its stated objectives are to ensure an independent, objective and transparent assessment of pesticides and achieve a high level of protection for health and environment. However, a growing body of evidence shows that pesticides that have passed through this process and are authorised for use may harm humans, animals and the environment. The authors of the current paper – experts in toxicology, law and policy – identified shortcomings in the authorisation process, focusing on the EU assessment of the pesticide active substance glyphosate. The shortcomings mostly consist of failures to implement the hard or soft laws. But in some instances the law itself is responsible, as some provisions can only fail to achieve its objectives. Ways to improve the system are proposed, requiring changes in hard and soft laws as well as in administrative and scientific practices.

Frequently, decisions related to health protection are taken directly on the basis of scientific assessment and they are not clearly understood, as is highlighted in the Xylella example. Therefore, this article suggests that coherent processing of information in risk assessment may allow also a “third party” (who has not already expressed a specific interest in the procedure) to participate. In order to truly grasp the EU administration, an accountable way of communicating is helpful. Therefore, communication around the democratic process might be based on EU administrative principles and rules supporting a composite administrative system: it must not neglect the implications of compliance with the multilingual principle and its consequences for EU law, which would also lead to greater trust in risk assessment.