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The Whistleblower Protection Directive (2019/1937): A Satisfactory but Incomplete System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 October 2020

Arnaud VAN WAEYENBERGE Open the ORCID record for Arnaud VAN WAEYENBERGE [Opens in a new window]  and
Zachariah DAVIES
Arnaud VAN WAEYENBERGE
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of EU Law – HEC Paris, France; email: [email protected].
Zachariah DAVIES
Affiliation:
Associate in the Ashurst EU and Competition law practice, Brussels, Belgium; email: [email protected].
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Abstract

On 23 October 2019 the European Union enacted the Whistleblower Protection Directive. The directive introduces important common standards of protection for whistleblowers reporting on breaches of EU law and significantly increases the level of protection afforded to whistleblowers in many EU Member States. Many of the features of the directive go further than pre-existing national whistleblower protection regimes, particularly in relation to the categories of persons who may benefit from the protections under the directive and in terms of the flexibility of the prescribed reporting procedures. Nevertheless, the directive's effectiveness may be limited by certain grey-areas and missed opportunities in the final text of the instrument.

Type
Reports
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 12 , Special Issue 1: Special Issue on COVID-19 and Soft Law , March 2021 , pp. 236 - 244
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

We are very grateful to Louise Fromont, Klara Matous and Matteo Winkler, who provided comments on previous versions of this article. All remaining errors, mistakes and controversial points of view remain our own.

References

1 Estimate by Executive Director of the European Center for Whistleblower Rights Mark Worth, reported in an article by Richard Summerfield, “Effective whistleblower protection” (Financier Worldwide Magazine, February 2019) <https://www.financierworldwide.com/effective-whistleblower-protection#.XQPfqRJfjb0> (last accessed 1 June 2020).

2 See, in this regard, “Whistleblower Protection Laws in Europe” (European Center for Whistleblower Rights, March 2018) <https://www.whistleblower-rights.org/whistleblower-protection-laws> (last accessed 1 June 2020).

3 France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Commission, “Whistleblower Protection Factsheet” (Directorate General for Justice and Consumers, April 2018) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/placeholder_11.pdf> (last accessed 1 June 2020). For a comparative law perspective outside continental Europe, see D Lewis, “Whistleblowing at Work: On What Principles Should Legislation Be Based?” (2001) 30(2) Industrial Law Journal 169. For a sociology of law perspective on the basis of the French system, see O Leclerc, Protéger les lanceurs d’alerte – La démocratie à l’épreuve de la loi (Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 2017). For an ethical reflexion on the concept of “whistleblowing”, see PB Jubb, “Whistleblowing: A restrictive definition and interpretation” (1999) 21(1) Journal of Business Ethics 77.

4 M Worth et al, “Safe or Sorry: Whistleblower Protection Laws in Europe Deliver Mixed Results“ (Report, Blueprint for Free Speech 2018) <https://www.changeofdirection.eu/assets/uploads/BLUEPRINT%20-%20Safe%20or%20Sorry%20-%20Whistleblower%20Protection%20Laws%20in%20Europe%20Deliver%20Mixed%20Results.pdf> (last accessed 1 June 2020).

5 See Guja v Moldova App no 14277/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008), the first judgment on this form of protection. For a description and analysis of the subsequent case law, see V Junod, “Lancer l’alerte: quoi de neuf depuis Guja?” (2014) 98 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 459 and E Cobbaut, “Les Lanceurs d’alerte: Un Objet Juridique Non Identifié?” (2018) 1 Auteurs et Média 41.

6 Council of Europe, “Recommendation on the protection of whistleblowers” CM/Rec(2014)7.

7 European Parliament, “Legitimate measures to protect whistle-blowers acting in the public interest when disclosing the confidential information of companies and public bodies” (Report) 2016/2224(INI).

8 Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law [2019] L 305/17 (the “Directive”). For first analyses, see S Chami, “Vers une protection harmonisée des lanceurs d’alerte” (2020) 1 Journal de Droit Européen 14; J Kaufmann, K Häferer and K Grimhardt, “The new EU Whistleblowing Directive” (2019) 21(1) Computer Law Review International 14; M Šepec et al, “The European Whistleblowing Directive: a legislative barrier between journalists and their sources?” (2020) Media, Culture and Society; andAJ Tapia Hermida, “Protección de los denunciantes (‘whistleblowers’) de infracciones de la regulación de los servicios financieros en la Unión Europea. Análisis panorámico de la Directiva (UE) 2019/1937” (2019) 25 Revista de Derecho del mercado de valores 5.

9 Directive, Recitals 4 and 5.

10 For a legal overview of the protection of whistleblowers under European law before the entry into force of the Directive, see K Blay-Grabarczyk, “Le statut incertain des lanceurs d’alerte en droit européen” in M Disant and D Pollet-Panoussis (eds), Les lanceurs d’alerte (Paris, La Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 2017).

11 According to the explanatory statement accompanying the proposal for the Directive, the European Commission conducted a twelve-week-long public consultation, three targeted stakeholder consultations, two workshops with Member State experts and one with academic and human rights experts.

12 In particular, freedom of expression and the right to information, the right to fair and just working conditions, the right to respect for one’s private life, the protection of personal data, healthcare, environmental protection, consumer protection and the general principle of good administration to the extent that the proposal will increase the level of detection and prevention of infringement(s).

13 Figure presented by the Commission in its impact assessment, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law” COM/2018/218 final.

14 Acts listed in the Annex to the Directive and outlined in Art 2(1)(a).

15 Directive, Arts 2(1)(b) and (c).

16 Directive, Art 2(2).

17 Directive, Arts 5(1)(i) and (ii).

18 Directive, Arts 4(1), (2) and (3).

19 “Facilitators” are defined as “a natural person who assists the reporting person in the reporting process in a work-related context, the assistance of which should be confidential”. Directive, Art 5(8).

20 Directive, Art 4(4)(b).

21 On this topic, see also JF Daniel Weyde et al, “Cleary Gottlieb Discusses EU’s New Whistleblower Protections” (CLS Blue Sky Blog, 24 October 2019) <http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/10/24/cleary-gottlieb-discusses-eus-new-whistleblower-protections/> (last accessed 1 June 2020).

22 Directive, Arts 6(1)(a) and (b).

23 Position expressed by Virginie Rozière, rapporteur of the draft directive to the European Parliament, in her website article “That is why I think that we must allow the possibility to choose between internal or public reporting and guarantee a high level of confidentiality and protection to the person making it” (10 July 2019) <https://virginieroziere.eu/cp-virginie-roziere-presente-son-rapport-sur-la-protection-des-lanceurs-dalerte-au-parlement-europeen/> (last accessed 1 June 2020).

24 “Protection des lanceurs d’alerte: la position de la France pourrait faire échouer le projet de directive européenne” (Transparency International France, 11 March 2019) <https://transparency-france.org/actu/communique-protection-des-lanceurs-dalerte-la-position-de-la-france-pourrait-faire-echouer-le-projet-de-directive-europeenne/> (last accessed on 1 June 2020).

25 Directive, Art 8(1). Art 8(3) excludes private entities with fewer than fifty employees from this provision.

26 Directive, Art 11(1).

27 Directive, Art 15(1)(a). This deadline may be extended to six months for external reporting if duly justified (Art 11(2)(d)).

28 Directive, Art 15(1)(b).

29 “[S]uspension, lay-off, dismissal or equivalent measures; demotion or withholding of promotion; transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages, change in working hours; withholding of training; a negative performance assessment or employment reference; imposition or administering of any disciplinary measure, reprimand or other penalty, including a financial penalty; coercion, intimidation, harassment or ostracism; discrimination, disadvantageous or unfair treatment; failure to convert a temporary employment contract into a permanent one, where the worker had legitimate expectations that he or she would be offered permanent employment; failure to renew, or early termination of, a temporary employment contract; harm, including to the person’s reputation, particularly in social media, or financial loss, including loss of business and loss of income; blacklisting on the basis of a sector or industry-wide informal or formal agreement, which may entail that the person will not, in the future, find employment in the sector or industry; early termination or cancellation of a contract for goods or services; cancellation of a licence or permit; psychiatric or medical referrals”.

30 Directive, Art 21(5).

31 Directive, Art 21(2).

32 Directive, Art 21(8).

33 Directive, Art 22.

34 SM Boyne, “Financial Incentives and Truth-Telling: The Growth of Whistle-Blowing Legislation in the United States” in G Thüsing and G Forst (eds), Whistleblowing – A Comparative Study, vol 16 (New York, Springer International Publishing 2016) p 280.

35 For a review of the literature on this issue, see C Maslen, “Whistleblower Reward Programs” (Anti-Corruption Helpdesk, Transparency International, 27 September 2018) <https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf> (last accessed 1 June 2020).

36 Directive, Art 23(1). Other persons referred to in Art 4(4) of the Directive (ie facilitators, third parties linked to the information such as colleagues or relatives, as well as certain legal persons) are also covered by this provision.

37 Directive, Art 23(2).

38 See Transparency International France, “Texte de compromis du trilogue du 14 Mars 2019: Proposition de directive du Parlement Européen du conseiller sur la protection des personnes dénonçant les interactions au droit de l’union” (Analysis, Transparency International France, 16 April 2019) <https://transparency-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Analyse-directive-EU-protection-lanceurs-dalerte.pdf> (last accessed 1 June 2020).

39 In this regard, see the discussion of the material scope of the Directive above.

40 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure [2016] OJ L157/1. For further discussion on the Trade Secrets Directive, see V Cassiers and A Strowel, “La directive du 8 juin 2016 sur la protection des secrets d’affaires” in V Cassiers, M Joassart, A Strowel and Q Van Enis (eds), Le secret (Wavre, Anthémis 2017) p 44.

41 Cobbaut, supra, note 5, 74. For an analysis of the issue of tensions between whistleblower protection and trade secrets prior to the existence of the Directive, see V Abazi, “Trade Secrets and Whistleblower Protection in the European Union” (2016) 3 European Papers 1061.

42 Free translation of an excerpt from J Decoster, “L’Europe protège l’alerte” (2019) 6 Esprit 29, 31 <https://www.cairn.info/revue-esprit-2019-6-page-29.htm> (last accessed 1 June 2020).

43 ibid, 30.