The judgment of the European Court of Justice of 13 September 2005 decided an important institutional conflict in the Union. At the request of the Commission, the Court annulled the Council’s Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA on the protection of the environment through criminal law. In so doing, the Court acknowledged that the member states can be obliged under Community law and its system of conditions to impose criminal sanctions if this is necessary to protect Community law. It is beyond doubt that they thus can be obliged under Union law and its conditions. The underlying questions are about the relationship between the first and third pillars and the logic of each.

The position of human rights within the European Union legal order has been an issue since the early years of the original European Economic Community. For many years, the development of human rights as general principles of Community law was characterized by dialogue and debate between the Communities' Court of Justice on the one hand, and certain national constitutional courts on the other, as regards the protection of human rights recognized in national constitutions by the Community legal order. But in recent years, there has been a parallel dialogue between the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, as regards the Community legal order's protection of the rights guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).

Three great constitutional conflicts — Great Britain: Commons v. Lords — Parliament Act 1911 — United States: President v. Supreme Court over New Deal — Court Packing plan Belgium: King v. conscience — Democracy wins in each of these cases.

The European Union has been tightening its grip on the criminal laws of the member states. Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union introduced the framework decision as the appropriate instrument to harmonize criminal law. In this way, member states may be required to adopt minimum levels of criminal definitions and sanctions. This is a matter of ‘third pillar’ law. The case under scrutiny, however, is a perfect illustration of the delicate relationship between EU first pillar law and domestic criminal law.

As a result of the 2004 enlargement there are now twenty languages that are accorded official, and theoretically equal, status in the institutions of the European Union. With the expansion of the Union’s linguistic landscape some Union bodies, while allowing the use of more and more languages, have paradoxically limited the circumstances under which most of them may be used. To put it mildly, these efforts, as Advocate-General Poiares Maduro said in his opinion in Case C-160/03, Kingdom of Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 ECR I-2077, have been ‘a matter of some controversy’.

It is uncommon for a provision of the EC Treaty to remain all but unnoticed for fifty years by both legal literature and the case-law of the European Court of Justice. However, that is what happened to Article 292 EC, which states that ‘Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein.’ This provision can be taken to mean that if a dispute arises between European Union member states involving Community law, they shall bring the dispute exclusively before the European Court of Justice.

The court in this case decided that state subsidy to political parties that discriminate against women is prohibited by international treaties, notably the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

This raises a number of issues. Where the discrimination is for religious reasons, does sex equality need to be balanced against religious freedom? Both are usually seen as fundamental rights. What about discrimination against men, in favour of women; is that also against the law? Finally, is the obligation not to discriminate only binding on the state, or also on the party itself? Could such a party be banned from politics? Some of these issues were touched on by the court, although not convincingly, and some of them, such as religious freedom, were scandalously ignored.