Notion of constitutional concept varies over time and space. Constitution for Europe as a further step in guaranteeing rights and separating powers. Amongst others French, Italian, German and Swedish national concepts in the Treaties of the European Communities and of the European Union. Several causes for difficult tracing of national concepts in the Constitution for Europe. Convention method: instead of by diplomats and EU experts, drafting by members of Parliament and (former) members of Government. More room for national concepts. The Intergovernmental Conference: the Empire strikes back, but with mixed impact. Parallels with other constitution making procedures. Concept of constitution: structure and size no argument for denying constitutional character; Constitution octroyée v. contrat social; Franco-American revolution v. British tradition.

We as constitutionalists owe it to ourselves and even to the 500 million other citizens of a member state and of the Union at the same time, to come up with a legally and constitutionally readable understanding of the situation. It must not be one suffering from the split between international and domestic public law. It must not mystify the Union as a completely original structure, intelligible only in its own terms. Such understanding should encompass not only the limits but also the logic of the situation; not only its mechanics but also its evolution. It should be intelligible for the public. It should allow for the multiple dualities of loyalty, of function, of legitimacy. It should allow for shared authority. Constitutional thought is well equipped to deal with actual duality and ambivalence. These characteristics of the Union are real and are here to stay.

‘The Law of Laws’ – Overcoming Pluralism

Editorials in this journal are meant not to comment on acts or events, even if these take the form of judicial rulings or legislative acts. They are meant to point at the events' potential for constitutional scholarship; to indicate and propose new lines of research. The Kadi judgments of the Court of Justice's two instances, discussed in this issue by Stefan Griller, offer such an occasion. They point at the problem of relationships between legal orders. Can these best be understood under the now familiar palliative terms of ‘dialogue’ and ‘accommodation’? There is both reason and reward in looking for a keener articulation of the relationships. That is the contention of this editorial.

Constitutional limits to the discretion of the legislature in forming the electoral system — Political equality — Equal suffrage — Equal opportunities for political parties — Free expression of popular will — Functionality of the parliament — Concrete normative standards for assessing the constitutionality of an electoral system — Conception of parliamentary democracy emphasising representation of political minorities and protection from ‘tyranny of the majority’

The European Union has been tightening its grip on the criminal laws of the member states. Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union introduced the framework decision as the appropriate instrument to harmonize criminal law. In this way, member states may be required to adopt minimum levels of criminal definitions and sanctions. This is a matter of ‘third pillar’ law. The case under scrutiny, however, is a perfect illustration of the delicate relationship between EU first pillar law and domestic criminal law.

Enforcement and conceptualisation of Article 2 TEU values – Rule of law – A non-regression principle for EU values faces significant pitfalls – Limits of the ‘backsliding’ paradigm informing doctrinal developments under Article 2 TEU – Inadequacy of a progress/regression trajectory as a lens for constitutional developments – Complexity of Article 2 values threatens to render regression assessments simplistic – Non-regression and the equality of member states – Potential conflicts between non-regression and minimum standards as tests for Article 2 compliance