Following the ECJ's recent case law on EC freedom of establishment (the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases), regulatory competition for corporate law within the European Union takes place at an early stage of the incorporation of new companies. In contrast, as regards the ‘moving out’ of companies from the country of incorporation, the ECJ once considered a tax law restriction against the transfer abroad of a company's administrative seat as compatible with EC freedom of establishment (the Daily Mail case). For years, this decision has been regarded as applicable to all restrictions imposed by countries of incorporation, even the forced liquidation of the ‘emigrating’ company. This paper addresses the question whether EC freedom of establishment really allows Member States to place any limit on the ‘emigration’ of nationally registered companies. It argues that EC freedom of establishment covers the transfer of the administrative seat as well as the transfer of the registered office and, therefore, that the country of incorporation cannot liquidate ‘emigrating’ companies. In addition, it addresses the question whether a new Directive is needed to allow the transfer of a company's registered office and identity-preserving company law changes. It argues that such a Directive is necessary to avoid legal uncertainty and to protect the interests of employees, creditors and minority shareholders, among others, who could be detrimentally affected by the ‘emigration’ of national companies.

In January 2008, the Ronald Coase Institute conducted the First Asia Workshop on Institutional Analysis, in partnership with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and the Asia Competitiveness Institute of the National University of Singapore. This report highlights the general theme of the workshop: that well-functioning institutions are fundamental to development. This is shown by summarising two studies presented at the workshop and by contrasting two countries from Southeast Asia, i.e., the Philippines and Singapore.

The Regulation and the Directive on the Statute for a European company introduce a new corporate structure under French law justifying the inclusion of new chapters in both the Commercial Code and Labour Code of France. In order to assess the merits of this new alternative, the benefits offered by the SE structure and regime need to be examined in comparison with existing corporate structures under French law, in particular the SA, which is the structure that the SE most resembles. This article reviews the main features of the SE as a legal entity under French law facilitating the formation of European groups. It also looks at reasons for choosing the French SE regime from the point of view of corporate and employment law. The SE is clearly most valuable in cases where the scope of business is European, in which context it can facilitate transnational mergers and joint operations, make the transfer of registered offices possible and serve as a model for streamlining the corporate governance of European groups. If, on the whole, the French legislator has proved conservative with regard to the SE, even in implementing the Directive on labour side, he has nevertheless granted the ‘French’ SE plenty of freedom in the statutes regarding the definition of relationships among shareholders.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance in Microsoft represents a major success for the European Commission in its fight against abuses of a dominant position. The Court upholds the Commission's findings that Microsoft abused its dominant position by refusing to supply interoperability information that is indispensable for competitors to be able to viably compete in the work group server operating system market. Moreover, the Court upholds the record fine of approximately EUR 497 million. According to the Court, the judgment does not contain any legal novelty, as it simply applies earlier Magill/IMS Health case law. However, it may be argued that the judgment does contain a legal novelty as to the scope of the so-called new product condition. Specifically, it may be argued that the judgment considerably diminishes the scope for a dominant firm to rely on intellectual property rights as a defence in antitrust proceedings concerning the abuse of a dominant position.