No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2012
The debate over nuclear proliferation has generated a large literature, but this literature does not adequately address the moral issues. A moral analysis of proliferation must go beyond concerns of international security. In this essay, Lee addresses the following questions: (1) Does nuclear proliferation make the world a more dangerous place; that is, does it increase security? (2) Is it morally permissible for a nonnuclear state to acquire nuclear weapons? (3) What are morally permissible actions for states trying to keep other states from acquiring nuclear weapons?
2 Some of the novel features of proliferation in this decade are discussed by Simpson, John, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Affairs 70 (January 1994), 17–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 By “nuclear state,” I mean a state with a nuclear weapons capability and by “nonnuclear state,” a state without such capability—a potential or would-be proliferator. A nonnuclear state may, of course, have a nuclear power capability.Google Scholar
4 Sagan, Scott, “The Perils of Proliferation,” International Security 18 (Spring 1994), 68–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 There have been recent reports of plutonium being smuggled out of the states of the former Soviet Union and put on the black market. See, for example, Broad, William, “A Smuggling Boom Brings Calls for Tighter Nuclear Safeguards,” New York Times, August 21, 1994, 5.Google Scholar; and Milhollin, Gary, “Plutonium Plunder,” Boston Globe, September 4, 1994, 65.Google Scholar
6 Jervis, Robert, “The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?” International Security 16 (Winter 1991–92), 63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 See, for example, Frankel, Benjamin, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” in Davis, Zachary and Frankel, , eds., The Proliferation Puzzle (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 37Google Scholar.
8 Simpson, , “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” 27Google Scholar.
9 This is, by the way, a propitious time to discuss proliferation, not only because it is the year of the renewal conference, and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the NPT, but also because it is the fiftieth anniversary of one of the first nonproliferation efforts, the attempt by the United States to keep the “secret of the bomb” for itself.Google Scholar
10 Despite being a signatory of the NPT, Sweden was recently reported to be preserving a capacity developed thirty years ago to produce nuclear weapons on short notice. Coll, Steve, “Sweden Preserving Key Elements of an Atom Bomb Project,” Boston Globe, November 25, 1994, 7.Google Scholar
11 Nye, Joseph, “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” in Quester, George, ed., Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 33Google Scholar.
12 According to Article IX of the NPT, “a nuclear-weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.”.Google Scholar
13 See Taylor, Theodore, “Nuclear Tests and Nuclear Weapons,” in Frankel, Benjamin, ed., Opaque Nuclear Proliferation (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 175–90Google Scholar.
14 Schelling, Thomas, Choice and Consequence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 291Google Scholar.
15 Cohen, Avner and Frankel, Benjamin, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” in Frankel, , Opaque Nuclear Proliferation, 14, 17, 30.Google Scholar; also Frankel at 1.
16 Mandelbaum, Michael, The Nuclear Future (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 93Google Scholar.
17 Waltz, Kenneth, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphia Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), 3–4.Google Scholar
18 Sagan, , “Perils of Proliferation,” 67Google Scholar.
19 Mearsheimer, John, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” International Security 18 (Spring 1994), 57Google Scholar.
20 Waltz, “Spread of Nuclear Weapons.”.Google Scholar
21 The stability of the nuclear relationship comes when the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage is mutual, so this argument works best when opponents both have nuclear weapons. This suggests that there is a risk of preventive nuclear war when only one of the opponents has the weapons, a point made by the critics of proliferation optimism.Google Scholar
22 Waltz, “Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 5, 17, 30.Google Scholar
23 Joseph Nye, “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” 32.Google Scholar
24 Dunn, Lewis, “What Difference Will It Make?” in Levine, Herbert and Carlton, David, eds., The Nuclear Arms Race Debated (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 330–31Google Scholar. On the general risks of accidental nuclear war, see Sagan, Scott, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)Google Scholar and Blair, Bruce, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993Google Scholar).
25 Weltman, John, “Nuclear Devolution and World Order,” World Politics 32 (January 1980), 189CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 Ibid.Google Scholar
27 Waltz, , “Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 11Google Scholar.
28 Sagan, “Perils of Proliferation,” 68, 71–72.Google Scholar
29 Ibid., 86Google Scholar. Miller, Steven, “The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993), 71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
30 Sagan, “Perils of Proliferation,” 96–97.Google Scholar
31 See, for example, Waltz, “Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 26; Lewis Dunn, “What Difference Will It Make?” 335.Google Scholar
32 Waltz, , “Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 4Google Scholar.
33 The notion of a pariah state is discussed by Quester, George, “Preventing Proliferation,” in Quester, , Nuclear Proliferation, 223.Google Scholar Writing in 1981, he suggests that this category includes, or has included, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, and perhaps Pakistan. See also in the same volume Robert Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation,” 135–63.
34 I owe some of the points in this paragraph to discussions with Avner Cohen.Google Scholar
35 See, for example, Kenny, Anthony, The Logic of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985Google Scholar).
36 Schelling, Choice and Consequence, 299–300, 315.Google Scholar
37 I owe some of the points in this paragraph to discussions with Avner Cohen.Google Scholar
38 The points in this paragraph are developed in much greater detail in my book, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993Google Scholar).
39 This argument is similar to Michael Walzer' s argument for the moral justifiability of nuclear deterrence from what he calls the condition of supreme emergency. Walzer, , Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 269–74Google Scholar. Walzer, however, sees the matter not as a moral dilemma but as a situation where concern over harmful consequences clearly outweighs concern over threatening innocents.
40 Quester, , “Preventing Proliferation,” 219Google Scholar.
41 Some argue that this assumption is false, that there is nothing other states can to do stop proliferation. For example, John Weltman argues, “Unless the system of states undergoes a revolutionary transformation, any suggestion that further proliferation can be stopped borders upon the absurd.” Weltman, “Nuclear Devolution,” 192. I will assume that the assumption is true, though I will later consider an argument that it is in fact false. But the moral issues arise in any case because states may mistakenly believe their efforts at nonproliferation can be effective. Futile action is in as much need of moral evaluation as potentially successful action.Google Scholar
42 Just war theory can be viewed as based on a domestic analogy as well. See, for example, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 58–63.Google Scholar
43 Not all deterrent purposes are defensive, nor is it possible to draw a sharp line between defensive and aggressive purposes, but I will not attend to these complications.Google Scholar
44 Miller, “Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” 75. Miller is speaking of the Ukraine in particular, but it seems clear he means this to be a general principle.Google Scholar
45 Nye, Joseph, “NPT: The Logic of Inequality,” Foreign Policy 59 (Summer 1985), 127Google Scholar.
46 Simpson, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” 25–26.Google Scholar
47 The analogy is not perfect, for a state that is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group does not usually refuse to sell what belongs to it, but rather interferes with a private corporation which seeks to sell its own technology to would-be proliferators in the global marketplace.Google Scholar
48 Belts, , “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation,” Foreign Policy 26 (Spring 1977), 157Google Scholar.
49 Frankel, , “Brooding Shadow,” 39Google Scholar.
50 Meyer, Stephen, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 165Google Scholar.
51 Kortunov, Sergie, “Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation: The Role of BMD,” Comparative Strategy 13 (1994), 138CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
52 This is revealed by the current situation in Iraq and the recent situation in Haiti.Google Scholar
53 See Kortunov, “Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation,” 138.Google Scholar
54 Cohen, Avner, “The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate,” in Reiss, Mitchell and Müller, Harald, eds., International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, Wilson Center Working Paper No. 99 (Washington: Wilson Center, forthcoming); manuscript, 88, 89.Google Scholar
55 Simpson, , “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” 38Google Scholar.
56 Belts, Richard, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs and Nonproliferation Revisited,” in , Davis and Frankel, , Proliferation Puzzle, 122.Google Scholar, and Cohen, “The Lessons of Osirak.”
57 Belts, , “Paranoids,” 157Google Scholar.
58 A recent example of this is the agreement reached between the United States and North Korea whereby North Korea agreed “to freeze and gradually dismantle its nuclear weapons development program.”“Clinton Approves a Plan to Give Aid to North Koreans,”New York Times, October 19, 1994, 1. See also Sigal, Leon, “Rethinking Nuclear Diplomacy. The Bold Premises of the North Korea Deal,” New York Times, November 8, 1994, 22.Google Scholar
59 Simpson, , “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” 19Google Scholar.
60 In the case of the deal with North Korea, it was, in part, energy aid.Google Scholar
61 Wheeler, Michael, “Positive and Negative Security Assurances,” PRAC Paper No. 9 (College Park: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 1994), 2.Google Scholar
62 Simpson, , “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” 32Google Scholar.
63 Nye, , “NPT,” 128Google Scholar.
64 Cohen, “The Lessons of Osirak,” ms., 89.Google Scholar
65 Waltz, , Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 28Google Scholar.
66 Belts, , “Paranoids,” 165Google Scholar.
67 Dunn, Lewis, “Some Reflections on the ‘Dove's Dilemma’,” in Quester, , Nuclear Proliferation, 181–92.Google Scholar
68 Belts, “Paranoids, Revisited,” 100. Also see Frankel, “Brooding Shadow.”.Google Scholar
69 Bull, Hedley, “The Role of the Nuclear Powers in the Management of Nuclear Proliferation,” in Levine, and Carlton, , Arms Race Debated, 368.Google Scholar
70 Paskins, Barrie, “Proliferation and the Nature of Deterrence,” in Blake, Nigel and Pole, Kay, eds., Dangers of Deterrence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 128Google Scholar.
71 Simpson, , “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” 36Google Scholar.
72 Roberts, Brad, “From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation,” International Security 18 (Summer 1993), 172CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
73 Nye, “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” 16. For an extended discussion of regimes, see the essays in Krasner, Stephen, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar.
74 Mandelbaum, , Nuclear Future, 92Google Scholar.
75 See Cohen and Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation,” 16, and Simpson, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” 36, 18. Some argue that there is no nonproliferation norm or regime and that the slow pace of proliferation represents simply a confluence of national interests.Google Scholar
76 Simpson, , “Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” 22Google Scholar.
77 Ibid., 36.Google Scholar
78 Subrahmanyam, K., “Regional Conflicts and Nuclear Fears,” in Levine, and Carlton, , The Nuclear Arms Race Debated, 348.Google Scholar
79 Nye, “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” 35, and “NPT,” 124–25. See Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971Google Scholar).
80 Nye, “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” 36. One might argue that there is a more straightforward argument from consent, namely, that states have actually consented to nuclear inequality in signing the NPT. But they may not have consented to the loose interpretation, instead having understood the treaty they signed under its strict interpretation.Google Scholar
81 Nye, , “NPT,” 128, “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” 36Google Scholar.
82 Frankel, “Brooding Shadow,” 61. See also Belts, “Paranoids.”.Google Scholar
83 Nye, , “Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime,” 16Google Scholar.
84 Ibid., 36.Google Scholar
85 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 260Google Scholar.
86 Wheeler, “Positive and Negative Security Assurances,” 2. Wheeler argues for a nonproliferation policy including universal negative security guarantees, which, if established, would move the world much further along toward a nonnuclear norm.Google Scholar
87 Cohen, “The Lessons of Osirak,” ms., 92.Google Scholar
88 I say “in most cases” to allow for the exception of pariah states, which may need nuclear weapons because of conventional rather than nuclear threats. But still the dilemma is resolved, because the conventional security guarantees needed to remove the threat to the survival of pariah states are, in general, morally permissible.Google Scholar