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Reagan's Ambiguous Economic Legacy1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Robert Gilpin
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Abstract

The introductory piece attempts to set forth as objectively as possible the economic legacy of the Reagan Administration, with emphasis on its international aspects, and thereby to provide the background for the other articles. Gilpin charts the shift in the 1980s from a supply-side, laissez-faire style policy to one that acknowledges a need for cooperation between the United States and its economic partners. While this has been a responsible and productive change, it has also generated ambiguity as to what the U.S. stance on economic international activity should be.

Type
Articles
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 2 , March 1988 , pp. 1 - 16
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 1988

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Footnotes

1

This article is adapted from Robert Gilpin's most recent book, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

References

2 According to the report of the task force established by President Reagan to investigate the causes of the crash (Brady Report), it began as a response to the high trade deficit and political developments which, in turn, triggered the computer-driven programs of the large institutional investors. The New York Times, January 9, 1988, p. 1Google Scholar.

3 Although written before the stock market crash and therefore somewhat dated, the present author's analysis of many of these issues is contained in “American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era,”Daedalus (Summer 1987) pp. 33–67Google Scholar.

4 Cooper, Richard, “Economic Interdependence and Coordination of Economic Policies,” in Jones, Ronald W. and Kenen, Peter B., eds., Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

5 Branson, William H., “The Limits of Monetary Coordination as Exchange-Rate Policy” (unpublished) April 3–4, 1986Google Scholar.

6 McKinnon, Ronald I., “An International Standard for Monetary Stabilization,” in Policy Analysis in International Economics, No. 8 (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1984)Google Scholar.

7 Schmitt, Hans O., “Mercantilism: A Modern Argument,” The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 47:2 (1979) pp. 93–111CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Frenkel, Jacob, “Comment on William Branson, Causes of Appreciation and Volatility of the Dollar,” Working Paper No. 1777 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1985) p. 18Google Scholar.

9 For a good discussion of this subject, see Kraft, Joseph, The Mexican Rescue (New York: Group of 30, 1984)Google Scholar.

10 Kahler, Miles, “Politics and International Debt: Explaining the Debt Crisis,” International Organization 39:3 (1985) p. 369CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 The Paris Club is a set of procedures for negotiating debt payment deferrals and other arrangementsGoogle Scholar.

12 Kahler, , op. cit., p. 372Google Scholar.

13 Kuczynski, Pedro-Pablo, “At the Latin Debt Hospital,” The New York Times, December 16, 1985, p. A23Google Scholar.

14 The New York Times, October 3, 1985, p. D6Google Scholar.

15 Bogdanowicz-Bindert, Christine A., “World Debt: The U.S. Reconsiders,” Affairs (1985/86) pp. 259–73Google Scholar.

16 Branson, William H., “Trends in United States International Trade and Investment Since World War II,” in The American Economy in Transition, ed. Feldstein, Martin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) pp. 183–257Google Scholar.