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THE RIGHT SIDE OF HISTORY AND HIGHER-ORDER EVIDENCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 December 2018

Adam Green
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Abstract

Appeals to “being on the right side of history” or accusations of being on the wrong side of history are increasingly common on social media, in the media proper, and in the rhetoric of politics. One might well wonder, though, what the value is of invoking history in this manner. Is declaring who is on what side of history merely dramatic shorthand for one's being right and one's opponents wrong? Or is there something more to it than that? In this paper, I argue that an appeal to being on the right side of history is best construed as an invocation of higher-order evidence. I do not deny that there are purely rhetorical, non-evidential uses of the right and wrong side of history, but the phrase can be construed in a more substantive manner. I use work on virtual epistemic elections to model these appeals to history. Zeroing in on the kind of higher-order evidence invoked helps us clarify the criterion for better or worse, more or less convincing appeals to it.

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Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 1 - 15
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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