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DELIBERATION AND PREDICTION: IT'S COMPLICATED

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

Katia Vavova
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Abstract

Alan Hájek launches a formidable attack on the idea that deliberation crowds out prediction – that when we are deliberating about what to do, we cannot rationally accommodate evidence about what we are likely to do. Although Hájek rightly diagnoses the problems with some of the arguments for the view, his treatment falls short in crucial ways. In particular, he fails to consider the most plausible version of the view, the best argument for it, and why anyone would ever believe it in the first place. In doing so, he misses a deep puzzle about deliberation and prediction – a puzzle which all of us, as agents, face, and which we may be able to resolve by recognizing the complicated relationship between deliberation and prediction.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Special Issue 4: 2015 Episteme Conference , December 2016 , pp. 529 - 538
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

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