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A Genealogy of Trust

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Paul Faulkner
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Abstract

In trusting a speaker we adopt a credulous attitude, and this attitude is basic: it cannot be reduced to the belief that the speaker is trustworthy or reliable. However, like this belief, the attitude of trust provides a reason for accepting what a speaker says. Similarly, this reason can be good or bad; it is likewise epistemically evaluable. This paper aims to present these claims and offer a genealogical justification of them.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , October 2007 , pp. 305 - 321
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

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