This paper offers a theory of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) based on the scarcity of capital relative to environmental quality. In a unified treatment of both market and transition economies of the former Soviet Bloc, we characterize a dynamic economy subject to two sources of market failure: a pollution externality and a pure public good ‘environmental quality’. We derive a policy rule to implement the social optimum in market and transition economies and show how, in general, a pollution tax or tradable permits can only implement the social optimum if accompanied by other taxes on consumption or profits.

This paper examines the double dividend hypothesis in the presence of labour income uncertainty. Empirical evidence shows that uncertainty over labour income is particularly significant in developing, while not negligible in developed countries. Under uncertainty, and assuming incomplete capital markets, the tax system plays a role in providing social insurance, and a green tax reform influences its effectiveness. We show that the increase in environmental tax reduces consumption risk, while the balanced budget decrease in labour income tax increases income risk. We find that the total welfare effect of a green tax reform differs substantially from the case of certainty. The critical parameters determining the existence of a second dividend are the lump-sum transfers, the relative substitutability of the two goods for leisure, and the initial tax rates relative to their optimal that determine also the response of labour supply to a change in the tax mix.

The mopane worm, which is the caterpillar form of the Saturnid moth Imbrasia belina Westwood, is – like other edible insects and caterpillars – a vital source of protein in southern African countries. The worms live and graze on mopane trees, which have alternative uses. With increasing commercialization of the worm, its management, which was hitherto organized as a common property resource, has been degraded to almost open access. This paper uses a bioeconomic modelling approach to show that for some optimal allocation of the mopane forest stock, the restrictive harvest period policy advocated by community leaders may not lead to sustainable harvesting of the worm.

This paper investigates the links between growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and sulfur dioxide emissions by disaggregating income growth into long-term growth (the trend of GDP over time) and short-term growth (income fluctuations around the trend). Results indicate a substantial fixed component of sulfur dioxide emissions. Once income fluctuations are controlled for, the effect of changes in the scale of the economy over time can be distinguished from the effects of the changing composition of output and the state of technological development. Results indicate that at low levels of income, the composition and technology effects are associated with an increase in emissions; for high levels of income, the composition and technology effects are associated with a leveling off of emissions.

Solid fuel burning in households is a leading health risk for people in developing countries. Several studies of indoor air pollution from solid fuels have analyzed the problem at the village and household level, but to design effective policies it is important to understand the large-scale socioeconomic drivers of household air pollution (HAP). Using county-level data covering all of China, we examine relationships between socioeconomic variables and ambient concentrations of PM and SO2 resulting from household energy use. Applying both non-parametric and parametric techniques, we find that income and education are robust determinants of HAP; structural characteristics affect the HAP turning points; and the poorest counties bear a disproportionate amount of total pollution, especially urban counties and counties located in the coastal provinces.

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.