A recently developed small area estimation technique is used to geographically derive detailed estimates of consumption-based poverty and inequality in rural Shaanxi, China. These estimates may be helpful for targeting since there is wide variability in poverty rates within Shaanxi but low levels of inequality within most counties and townships. We also investigate whether including environmental variables in the equation used to predict consumption and poverty improves upon typical approaches that only use household survey and census data. Ignoring environmental variables appears likely to produce targeting errors.

We develop a forward-looking version of the recursive dynamic MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, and apply it to examine the economic implications of proposals in the US Congress to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We find that shocks in the consumption path are smoothed out in the forward-looking model and that the lifetime welfare cost of GHG policy is lower than in the recursive model, since the forward-looking model can fully optimize over time. The forward-looking model allows us to explore issues for which it is uniquely well suited, including revenue-recycling and early action crediting. We find capital tax recycling to be more welfare-cost reducing than labor tax recycling because of its long-term effect on economic growth. Also, there are substantial incentives for early action credits; however, when spread over the full horizon of the policy they do not have a substantial effect on lifetime welfare costs.

Extreme weather events such as droughts and floods have potentially damaging implications for developing countries. Previous studies have estimated economic losses during hypothetical or single historical events, and have relied on historical production data rather than explicitly modeling climate. However, effective mitigation strategies require knowledge of the full distribution of weather events and their isolated effects on economic outcomes. We combine stochastic hydrometeorological crop-loss models with a regionalized computable general equilibrium model to estimate losses for the full distribution of possible weather events in Malawi. Results indicate that, based on repeated sampling from historical events, at least 1.7 per cent of Malawi's gross domestic product (GDP) is lost each year due to the combined effects of droughts and floods. Smaller-scale farmers in the southern region of the country are worst affected. However, poverty among urban and nonfarm households also increases due to national food shortages and higher domestic prices.

Environmental regulation in the developing countries is undermined by weak enforcement. Lack of information and public awareness are fundamental factors that render informal regulation by civil society ineffective. In India, a number of environmental problems have been addressed using the institution of public interest litigation (PIL) by ‘public-spirited’ citizens. This paper examines the economic advantage of PIL over other conventional legal forms. An important outcome of judicial interventions of this kind in environmental cases in India is a spillover effect, which generates public information via media coverage. Using a case study, we test whether the judicial directives that followed a PIL filed and the subsequent spillover effect of media publicity were effective in getting the state to enforce the standards. This is done using autoregressive distributed lag models and univariate structural break analysis. The results show that judicial intervention and public information were effective in controlling pollution.

We investigate the relative efficiency of an agreement based on a uniform standard without transfers and one based on differentiated standards with transfers when strictly identical countries deal with transboundary pollution. We especially ask what role fixed cost plays. Two approaches are examined: the Nash bargaining solution, involving two countries, and the coalition formation framework, involving numerous countries and emphasizing self-enforcing agreements. In the former, in terms of welfare, strictly identical countries may wish to reduce their emissions in a non-uniform way under the differentiated agreement. For this result to hold, the fixed cost of investment in abatement technology must be sufficiently high. The nature of the threat point of negotiations, however, also plays a crucial role. As concerns global abatement, the two countries abate more under the uniform agreement than under the differentiated one. In terms of coalition formation when numerous countries are involved, a grand coalition could emerge under a differentiated agreement.