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The impact of collective use rights on share contracts: the case of the Extractive Artisanal Regime (RAE) in Chilean hake fisheries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2020

César Salazar Open the ORCID record for César Salazar [Opens in a new window]  and
Jorge Dresdner
César Salazar*
Affiliation:
Departmento de Gestión Empresarial, Grupo de investigación Análisis Económico Sectorial Aplicado, Grupo Agronegocios, and Centro de Estudios Ñuble, Universidad del Bio-Bio and Research Nucleus on Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (NENRE)-EfD Chile and Interdisciplinary Center for Aquaculture Research (INCAR), Chillan, Chile
Jorge Dresdner
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Research Nucleus on Environmental and Natural Resource Economics (NENRE)-EfD Chile, and Interdisciplinary Center for Aquaculture Research (INCAR), University of Concepción, Concepción, Chile
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Share contracts are the dominant remuneration system in artisanal fisheries. Introducing regulations based on collective use rights may affect the way profits are distributed. The literature on the effect of regulatory reform on factor income distribution, however, is scarce. In this paper, we look at differences in the implementation of the Extractive Artisanal Regime in Chilean hake artisanal fisheries to test its effect on share contracts. We estimated a switching regression model using census data to calculate the average treatment effect. Our results show that crewmembers in communities regulated by some form of collective use rights receive, on average, 6 per cent more of total net incomes compared to those regulated by a limited access with global quota regime. Differences in the relation between crew size and labor rewards, as well as in the negotiating power of crewmembers under different regimes, may explain the results.

Keywords

collective use rightsfisheriesshare contractsswitching regression model

JEL classification

Q22: Fishery • Aquaculture D86: Economics of Contract: Theory D13: Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 25 , Issue 4 , August 2020 , pp. 355 - 377
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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