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GRADING IN GROUPS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2016

Michael Morreau
Michael Morreau*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Postboks 6050 Langnes, 9037 Tromsø, Norway. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

Juries, committees and experts panels commonly appraise things of one kind or another on the basis of grades awarded by several people. When everybody's grading thresholds are known to be the same, the results sometimes can be counted on to reflect the graders’ opinion. Otherwise, they often cannot. Under certain conditions, Arrow's ‘impossibility’ theorem entails that judgements reached by aggregating grades do not reliably track any collective sense of better and worse at all. These claims are made by adapting the Arrow–Sen framework for social choice to study grading in groups.

Keywords

GradingContextSocial ChoiceArrow's Theorem
Type
Symposium on Rational Choice and Philosophy
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 323 - 352
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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