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The Structural Evolution of Morality, Jason McKenzie Alexander. Cambridge University Press, 2007, ix + 300 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2009

Jonathan Grose
Jonathan Grose*
Affiliation:
University of Bristol and University of Gloucestershire
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Reviews
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 25 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 113 - 119
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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