Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-03T08:53:23.950Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Rawls's Lexical Orderings Are Good Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Robert D. Cooter
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley

Extract

Basic liberty, according to Rawls's first principle of justice, is not to be sacrificed for other values such as wealth. And, according to his second principle of justice, the material well-being of the worst-off members of society is not to be sacrificed to benefit better-off members of society. These trade-offs would be unjust, according to Rawls, no matter how small the sacrifice or how large the offsetting benefit. A decision-maker conforming to Rawls's theory, who is unwilling to sacrifice some values in favor of others, has lexical preferences. Lexical preferences, however, are not encountered in studies of consumer demand for market goods. Since goods trade off within the range of choices studied in demand theory, it seems to economists that political values ought to trade off as well.

Type
Essays
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Bergson, Abram. 1938. “A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 52:310–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooter, Robert, and Rappoport, Peter. 1984. “Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?Journal of Economic Literature 22:507–30.Google Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981a. “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10:185246.Google Scholar
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981b. “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10:283345.Google Scholar
Pigou, Arthur Cecil. 1950. The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rawls, John. 1985. “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14:223–51.Google Scholar
Sen, Amartya. 1979. “Equality of What?” Tanner Lecture, Stanford University.Google Scholar