Should social preferences conform to the principles of rationality we normally expect of individuals? Should they, for instance, conform to the consistency axioms of expected utility theory? This article considers one fragment of this question.

A recent paper by David Levy (1987) focuses on “utility enhancing consumption constraints.” Levy concludes by noting that his analysis stays within standard utility maximizing theory, in contrast to my analysis of rule-governed behavior (Heiner, 1983, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c) which allows imperfect decisions that don't always maximize utility. I wish to show how our two theories can be integrated, thereby representing complementary, rather than conflicting, explanations. In the process, I argue that imperfect decisions are an essential factor in the stability of any rule that constrains freedom of choice. I also briefly discuss certain intrinsic problems with achieving “self-stabilizing” rules applied to moral teachings.

The social discount rate – the rate at which future benefit flows from government investment are discounted to present value – has been a frequent subject of technical debate among professional economists. From a broader perspective, however, the selection of an appropriate rate enjoins consideration of questions that define the very contours of our public philosophy. It carries implicit assumptions about the nature of citizenship, the relation between public and private spheres, and, most singularly, the status of a political society as it is located in time. A key determinant of intertemporal economic allocation, the social discount rate provides a unique registry of a polity's historical consciousness and perceptions of its intergenerational obligations. Yet the highly technical nature of the debate over the discount rate has proven inhospitable to scholars otherwise inclined to investigate its ethical dimensions. Some, notably A. K. Sen, have begun to address these philosophical issues, though much territory remains to be explored.

Basic liberty, according to Rawls's first principle of justice, is not to be sacrificed for other values such as wealth. And, according to his second principle of justice, the material well-being of the worst-off members of society is not to be sacrificed to benefit better-off members of society. These trade-offs would be unjust, according to Rawls, no matter how small the sacrifice or how large the offsetting benefit. A decision-maker conforming to Rawls's theory, who is unwilling to sacrifice some values in favor of others, has lexical preferences. Lexical preferences, however, are not encountered in studies of consumer demand for market goods. Since goods trade off within the range of choices studied in demand theory, it seems to economists that political values ought to trade off as well.

The literature of comparative economics as well as economic history is replete with references to productivity differences as reflecting relative efficiency in production. In socialist economics, for example, the longevity of the relative-productivity/relative-efficiency theme is apparent from Abram Bergson's (1948) early survey where, commenting on a productivity debate that had already been going on for over twenty years, he identified “the only issue outstanding” as the question “which is more efficient, socialism or capitalism?” The issue has continued to be addressed vigorously since then, and it is still outstanding. Again, in European economic history, John Nye (1987) recently pointed out that relative efficiency as reflected in relative productivity has been part and parcel of the postwar debate on French industrialization: the view that less productive and, therefore, “inefficient” family firms led to French “backwardness” in production.