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HAUSMAN AND MCPHERSON ON WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PREFERENCE SATISFACTION THEORIES OF WELFARE: A CRITICAL NOTE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 February 2015

Alexander F. Sarch
Alexander F. Sarch*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Southern California, 3709 Trousdale Parkway, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0451, USA. Email: [email protected]. URL: https://sites.google.com/site/alexsarch/
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Abstract:

Hausman and McPherson defend welfare economics by claiming that even if welfare does not consist in preference satisfaction, preferences still provide good, if fallible, evidence of welfare. I argue that this strategy does not yet fully solve the problems for welfare economics stemming from the preference satisfaction theory of welfare. More work is needed to show that our self-interested preferences are sufficiently reliable, or in some other sense our best, evidence of well-being. Thus, my aim is to identify the challenges that remain and clarify what additional work is needed before Hausman and McPherson's defence of welfare economics succeeds.

Keywords

WelfareWell-beingWelfare economicsPreferenceSelf-interest
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 141 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 

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