Does modernity still have a future? The news from the modern world suggests a negative answer. It is true, the project of modernity, in the fourth century after its inception, has still not been brought to its completion. Modern man has not yet succeeded in establishing himself as maître et possesseur de la nature. Nevertheless, he has elevated himself above his earthly existence by mastering the laws of space travel; the man in the moon, formerly a mythological figure, has now an American name. Modern man has not yet reached Utopia where the necessity of labor and the ease of leisure would be reconciled; in many regards, he is still bound to toil for his subsistence. But he has invented artificial intelligence and thus has found a humanoid substitute for an endless number of cumbersome tasks; work is transformed into computer games. Modern man has not yet become the Lord of his life, he continues to miss a complete control over infirmities, afflictions, and, finally, death. But he has fathomed the biochemical basis of life and acquired the skills to manipulate the forms of being; the breath of life is recorded as genetic code.

If a meteorite had not fallen on the earth sixty-five million years ago, we would not be where we are now; or more exactly we would not be here at all. If icebergs had not covered a third of the globe's surface three hundred million years ago, this collision some two hundred and thirty-five million years later would have been of no benefit to us. If drought had not swept over the Eurasian continent some ten million years ago, we would still be in the trees, and nothing would encourage us to come down from them.

What is the difference between the earthly paradise, the Golden Age and the ideal city? This question is most important for whoever is interested in the various ways human societies have had for imagining an ideal state of perfection or social harmony. If we are not to confuse such different systems of representation as mythical thought, millenarianism and Utopia, it is absolutely necessary that we do not reduce the descriptions of an earthly paradise and a Golden Age to simple precursors of the ideal city of the Utopians. It is especially important not to call “Utopian” every representation of the ideal society, Utopia being only one— and the most, recent—of its modalities. The Utopian dream Translated by Jeanne Ferguson takes up and at the same time alters the paradisiacal and millenarian imagination: it would be difficult to believe that the passage of primitive societies to great urban civilizations, then to modern society occurred without major repercussions on the vision of these societies, that the ideal state of social perfection did not vary from one to the other.

We must begin from the principle that all language is necessarily limited. The art of speaking is a common heritage, even if it is wasted. It has so lost its mystery (more precisely; we are so calm in its possession) that we consider it almost as a gift of nature. Nevertheless, it must be learned; it is, in fact, a product of education, even for those who might believe that they have never received any. Like all acquired disciplines, then, it is the fruit of a long process of restraint. Manuals exist which teach Latin without tears. Learning the first language seems to take place without recourse to handbooks and hickory sticks, but this is because a vast program is available, full time, along with dedicated teachers who do not keep an eye on the clock, and fresh intellects who never think their knowledge is sufficient. Instruction is difficult, in spite of all this, for the task is more challenging than adults imagine it to be.

“Given the fact that the consciousness of man is a linguistic consciousness, all models superimposed on consciousness, including art, can be understood as secondary modeling systems, “ wrote Yuri Lotman in Introduction à la structure du texte artistique.

The subject of values presents certain dangers. Why not the moral philosophy of Islam or even the ethics of Islam? The term “moral” seems traditional, if not antiquated: it connotes the ideas of good and evil, a long list of commandments and interdictions; it evokes a restraint of the individual, something limiting and narrow. The word “ethics” is more acceptable; it is closer to the idea of a system of values, a global vision of the moral life, but it may also express a normative process. Max Weber speaks of Islam and other religions as being ethical religions, that is. “a complex of commandments and bans whose transgression is sin,” and he imputes this particularity to prophecy that “produces a centralization of ethics.” The term “values” is often used today, and it corresponds better to modern sensitivity preoccupied with the search for dispersed or connected values on which to base its behavior and its image. We know that the “theory of values” began with Western moralist philosophers as a substitute for the old morality, experienced as submission, and to introduce the idea of a personal morality, the essential being to conform to freely-chosen values. However, we may also speak of collective values or even of values attached to a particular line of conduct that they establish, for example, “martial values.” “tribal values” or “fundamental values.” A value may be isolated, like a Platonic idea, put into a package or even a system. It remains none the less abstract, since it is itself the product of an abstraction and rarely a creation. To look for the values of a culture, a religion or a society is to devote oneself to an operation of extraction from a multitude of data. It is truly a quest, one that allows for personal interpretation in selection from the lime that one becomes sensitive to one line of values rather than to another. Thus is presented the problem of the divergence of values within a single ethical system, especially if it is as vast as that of Islam. My purpose here is not selective. It is to go in search of the values of Islam in their variety while trying to find a guideline and also locating them at various levels of comprehension.

It is strange, indeed, to have devoted one's life to an obscure topic and to sense it suddenly as a focus of political passion. It is also a unique opportunity: when a country like France, so long a victim of protectionism, makes ready to give it a new impetus, when another, the United States, hopefully cured, envisages it as the stock issue of an electoral campaign, it is fitting to search for motivations which preserve world-wide restrictive practices no longer defensible in theory. Thus, a comportment is discovered first found in international trade then invading the most variegated fields and explaining in large measure the rise of the day's great problems: unemployment, the financial crisis and the armament race.

The general theme of this reflection on laughing is that the place of laughter in everyday life has been reduced a great deal in Western societies since the beginning of the century and that this fact could have major consequences for the mental equilibrium of individuals and for the future of our civilizations. Moreover, philosophy and human sciences seem to have a certain responsibility for this disenchantment of our contemporaries with laughing.