Dans ce court article, je propose en m'appuyant sur l’œuvre de Paul Ricœur que la réalisation de la liberté dépend en partie de l'anonymat des institutions politiques. D'abord, j'explique que les institutions constituent la nécessaire médiation de la liberté. Ensuite, je distingue deux formes d'anonymat des institutions. Alors que la première exprime la perversion de certaines institutions, la seconde appartient à leur essence. Je conclus en suggérant que toute critique de l'anonymat des institutions devrait prendre en compte cette distinction.

I introduce the symposium on Anjan Chakravartty's Scientific Ontology by summarizing the book's main claims. In my commentary, I first challenge Chakravartty's claim that naturalized metaphysics cannot be indexed to science simpliciter. Second, I argue that there are objective truths regarding what conduces to particular epistemic aims, and that Chakravartty is therefore too permissive regarding epistemic stances and their resultant ontologies. Third, I argue that it is unclear what stops epistemic stances from having unlimited influence. Finally, I argue that Chakravartty's epistemic stance voluntarism is inadequately motivated and lacks empirical support for its psychological content.

Due to the rampant epistemic distrust present in echo chamber members towards outsiders, responding to echo chambers with civil debate is unlikely to lead to any agreement or compromise. Moreover, a civil response may contribute to the echo chamber's inflated sense of epistemic status, which is precisely what needs to be dismantled or diminished if agreement/compromise is to be made possible. When responding to particularly dangerous and resistant echo chambers, a moderately uncivil response may be warranted.

La thèse affirmant la dépendance mentale des entités institutionnelles est particulièrement débattue en ontologie sociale. L'une de ses implications est la position infaillibiliste selon laquelle l'existence des entités institutionnelles nécessite que certaines de leurs propriétés soient connues. Quelles sont ces propriétés ? Après avoir présenté la conception searlienne des entités institutionnelles et le type de dépendance mentale qu'elles manifestent, je circonscris le contenu de la position infaillibiliste. Je montre ensuite que ces propriétés sont les pouvoirs déontiques associés à ces entités et que l'attitude mentale vis-à-vis des pouvoirs déontiques doit prendre la forme d'un savoir pratique. Je montre enfin que cette interprétation est compatible avec l'existence d'au moins certaines entités institutionnelles naturalisées.

In this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. After a brief presentation of the project of stance-based ontology (Section 2), I move on to criticize Chakravartty's account of metaphysical inference (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I take issue with Chakravartty's view that fundamental debates in metaphysics inevitably lead to irresolvable disagreement, while in Section 5, the concept of epistemic stance is scrutinized, noting that there are problems in Chakravartty's account of the rationality of stance-choice. Finally, Section 6 is about the implications of stance-based ontology for the scientific realism debate.

In November 2020, the world received the good news that some vaccine candidates were highly effective at preventing COVID-19. Yet, the demand for COVID-19 vaccines within the global free market has led wealthy nations to procure most of the vaccine supply, leaving low- and middle-income countries in dire circumstances. This article considers the morality of our global procurement strategies and argues that, although what we are witnessing may be adhering to the parameters set out in global business and global politics, it nonetheless has moral deficiencies.

I raise questions about Chakravartty's voluntarism about stances: supposing that we recognize a hierarchy of stances, voluntarism might be at once true (in an ultimate sense) but misleading when it comes to the practical tenability of pursuing certain debates in the philosophy of science, such as the debate about scientific realism or how to ‘naturalize’ metaphysics.

This paper engages Rainer Forst's doctrine of noumenal power. At the centre of this doctrine is its signature claim that power is noumenal in nature. I reconstruct Forst's definition of power and distinguish three conceptions of noumenal power in his writings. I argue that, on each conception, we should reject that claim. It emerges that the professed noumenality of power is either a trivial feature of power, or else a feature only of some forms of power. Consequently, Forst's definition of power cannot be adequate and the claim that power is noumenal in nature is either trivial or false.

In this paper, I argue that John Dupré and Daniel Nicholson's ‘process manifesto’ is ironically more sympathetic to descriptive metaphysics than to revisionary metaphysics. Focusing on their argument that any process philosophy automatically slides into Whiteheadian obscurantism if it does not just rest content with revealing the problematic features of ordinary language, I argue that their position occludes a logical space, one in which revisionary metaphysics is articulated without any Whiteheadian obscurantism and involves no dereliction of critical/revisionary orientation. I argue that key features of the respective critical social ontologies of Judith Butler and Talia Mae Bettcher occupy such a logical space.

Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology contends that ontological commitments associated with scientific inquiry are infused with philosophical commitments. Interpretations of scientific ontology involve (what I call) metaphysical inferences, and furthermore, there are different ways of making these inferences, on the basis of different but nonetheless rational epistemic stances. If correct, this problematizes any neat distinction between naturalized and other metaphysics, and dissolves any presumption of there being a uniquely correct answer to ontological questions connected to the sciences. In this paper, I consider some weighty challenges to these contentions by Amanda Bryant, Stathis Psillos, and Matthew Slater.

This article highlights three epistemic practices, which, taken together, create conditions that worsen the problem of ‘bisexual erasure.’ Though bisexual people constitute a significant portion of the larger LGBTQ+ community, their identities and experiences and routinely erased — in queer communities and broader society alike. This article argues that we have both an epistemic and a moral obligation to attend to the epistemic conditions created for bisexual people, and to work to make those conditions more just. Specifically, I highlight the detrimental influence of testimonial injustice, testimonial smothering, and epistemic microaggressions on bisexual people's ability to challenge and resist their own erasure.

Philosophers and scientists generally assume that consciousness is characterized by a ‘first-person perspective.’ On one interpretation of this claim, experiences are defined, at least in part, by representations that encode a subject-centred ‘point of view.’ But claims about the defining features of consciousness must be sensitive to the possibility of dissociation: if a neurobiological structure or psychological function is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness, it cannot be a defining feature in any robust sense. I appeal to research on unconscious emotion, visually guided action, perceptual constancy, and psychiatric disorder to argue that first-personal representations dissociate from conscious experience.

Aux termes de l'article premier de la Déclaration du 26 août 1789, ne peut disposer des droits de l'homme que celui ou celle qui naît homme. La naissance, c'est-à-dire la manifestation d'un corps selon des lois naturelles dans un monde social, est la condition par laquelle un être advient à la personnalité. Si une longue tradition, étudiée ici, attribue l'identité humaine à ce qui possède à la naissance une « forme humaine », il reste à déterminer ce que désigne cette « forme », et à examiner si elle peut s’étendre aux êtres formés ou transformés par l'industrie humaine. La présente contribution examine les conditions nécessaires pour que soient reconnus ou accordés des droits tels que les droits de l'homme aux individus trans/posthumains.

Dans Fellow creatures, Christine Korsgaard soutient que les êtres humains auraient l'obligation morale de traiter les animaux sensibles comme des fins en soi. Cependant, cet article tente de démontrer que la méthode korsgaardienne dépasse ce que permet une théorie constructiviste conséquente et soutient que nous devrions opter pour une version humienne plutôt que kantienne du constructivisme. Selon moi, une telle conception permet tout à fait de soutenir des positions éthiques substantielles sur la question animale sans avoir à compromettre ses engagements ontologiques.

Conceptual engineers have made hay over the differences of their metaphilosophy from those of conceptual analysts. In this article, I argue that the differences are not as great as conceptual engineers have, perhaps rhetorically, made them seem. That is, conceptual analysts asking ‘What is X?’ questions can do much the same work that conceptual engineers can do with ‘What is X for?’ questions, at least if conceptual analysts self-understand their activity as a revisionary enterprise. I show this with a study of Russell's metaphilosophy, which was just such a revisionary conception of conceptual analysis.

There is no consensus regarding whether Gilles Deleuze offers a cogent theory of the Other. Deleuze develops the notion of the Other-structure, but given his scarce remarks on this concept, his treatment of this issue is debated. This article argues that to elucidate Deleuze's philosophy of the Other, his notion of the Other-structure must be analyzed in parallel to Edmund Husserl's intersubjective theory. This comparison, made possible by Natalie Depraz's reading of the Husserlian alterity, reveals nuanced phenomenological traces in Deleuze's Other-structure and its implicated structural moments while substantiating his affirmation of the Otherless world, as an impetus to surpass phenomenology.

In this article, I explore how we can expand the project of Buddhist feminism by drawing on Chinese Yogācāra philosophy. With a focus on the writings of Xuanzang (c. 602–664) and his disciple Kuiji (632–682), I investigate how the Yogācāra theory of consciousness can be read as a gendered account of non-duality. The term ‘Yogācāra dialectics’ is thus coined to describe this theory of non-duality that highlights fluidity and transformability. As I will argue, Chinese Yogācārins developed the dialectics of gender by means of which they were able to subtly erode sexism in premodern times.

Recently, in a series of papers, Joshua Spencer has introduced, defended, and developed a modified version of Neo-Russellianism (NR), namely Plenitudinous Russellianism (PR), according to which there are structurally identical but numerically distinct singular Russellian propositions (SRPs). PR claims to provide novel semantic solutions to all the major problems that NR faces with no radical revision in NR. In this paper, I introduce a semantic puzzle for PR: the view leads to the violation of the principle of substitutivity of co-referential proper names within simple (predicative) ‘that’-clauses (PS1). I consider different responses to my argument, and show that none of them is fully satisfactory for the Russellian. I conclude that PR needs to depart from NR more radically.

Taste, as a faculty of aesthetic appreciation, involves an individual, and yet assumes a community. In this article, a distinctly singular mode of being attuned to objects of taste is shown to be conditioned by the consent of others and by being-with others, thereby constituting what is named here an ‘aesthetic community.’ This idea of an aesthetic community is traced back to Kant's sensus communis and to Heidegger's notion of preservation: for both, it is the presence of a community that conditions aesthetic experience.