In 1974, George Grant delivered the Josiah Wood lectures at Mount Allison University on the theme English-Speaking Justice. The lectures, first published in 1978, have been republished, and a volume of later essays on somewhat related themes has recently appeared. Grant's work offers an impressionistic but deep challenge to the conception of justice in modern moral thought and practice, a challenge paralleled, in interesting and important ways, by concerns about morality raised in the writings of such persons as Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, and, perhaps more surprisingly, J. L. Mackie. In this review, I want briefly to expound Grant's treatment of justice, to exhibit its relationships to other disquieting accounts, and to suggest some of the resources available to contractarian moral theory for lightening what for Grant is a terrifying darkness.

David Brink has recently argued for the “parity” of ethics and the sciences. While the parity claim alone might be metaphysically neutral, Brink favours a form of ethical naturalism on which moral properties “are” natural properties, just as non-moral macrophysical properties “are” the microphysical states that compose them. Brink supports this claim by showing that both types of properties share certain important features: specifically, that both may be (and typically are) constituted, supervening and synthetically necessitated. I shall argue that notwithstanding these common features, there remain significant modal differences in the way the two types of properties are assigned to the world. These differences represent an important respect in which moral properties are not on par with their scientific counterparts.

Human beings shape the landscapes of their individual, social, and political lives entangled in a web of language. Everything that human beings do, the way they act and think, is shaped by the use of language. Charles Taylor explores these anthropological dimensions of language. This article discusses three different aspects of Taylor’s language-oriented anthropology and confronts his considerations with three distinct questions concerning the relation between language and the lives of human beings. The first question is how Taylor’s constitutive view of language can be related to his criticism of the mediational view of language. Next, the relation between language and concepts is discussed. Finally, emotions are considered.

According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating the explanatory power of HOT theory.

The recent literature has seriously challenged, and in my view defeated, the traditional representationalist interpretation of Descartes. One contributor to it, John Yolton, has recently extended its arguments to argue that the traditional representationalist interpretation of Locke must be relinquished as well, that Locke, following the Cartesian path of Arnauld, held a semiotic theory of ideas which “de-ontologized” them and construed them as signs or cues in the direct perception of physical objects. The Cartesian support for this view, especially in La Dioptrique, has been questioned by R.F. McRae, who argues that “if Locke accepts Descartes' theory of vision, then Descartes' conception of sensations as signs provides no support for the direct realist interpretation of Locke.” My aim here is not to resolve the representationalism issue, but to show the irrelevance to it of the kinds of questions the Yolton-McRae exchange raises concerning sense perception. I shall try to show that there stems from Descartes a single account of those questions the essentials of which are embedded in theories falling on both sides of the representationalism issue. That single account involves a theory of judgment and vision, especially of distance, which in the case of Malebranche and Berkeley, even involves the same confusions.

One result of the protracted and inconclusive contemporarydebate over the merits of a materialist theory of mind is that philosophers have been prompted to explore new and credible alternative theories. Campbell's “new epiphenomenalism” is one of these, and Goldman's conception of mental and physical events as “simultaneous nomic equivalents” is another. After a brief introductory discussion of materialism, I shall examine and assess these views. My path leads back, tentatively, to materialism, via a critical look at the main reasons given by Campbell and Goldman for abandoning it.

Le texte freudien entretient avec l'ensemble de l'écriture un rapport d'intertextualité, il communique avec ceux qui parlent autour de lui, avec ceux aussi qui ont, avant lui, pris la parole et qui à son époque se laissaient déjà contenir sous le nom de « tradition ». Cette situation n'est pas le propre du texte freudien, elle est commune à tout texte qui s'énonce; cependant, chez Freud lui-même, ce rapport à la tradition, à l'écriture antérieure, trouve un lieu d'explication: Freud se situe explicitement à un point précis de cette tradition et pense celle-ci par rapport à lui; il lie, dans une lecture englobante, son texte à ceux de Copernic et de Darwin, il a conscience de lui-même comme appartenant à leur continuité; à ses propres yeux, « après Freud » advient quelque chose qui, après Copernic et après Darwin, était aussi de quelque façon advenu, quelque chose que le récit psychanalytique poursuit en le redisant.

Philosophers have traditionally decried vagueness as an unmitigated evil, and natural scientists have consistently agreed with them. Nevertheless, as I hope to show, the vagueness of scientific terms has some important advantages for the theories in which these terms figure. In so arguing I do not mean to put the best face on some unpleasant facts or to make a virtue out of a necessity. I shall begin, however, by arguing that on some contemporary accounts of scientific language the vagueness of many scientific terms is unavoidable; if it is unavoidable then lamenting it is futile, and justifying it is idle. I shall go on to argue that, independent of these accounts, the advantages of exactness attained can sometimes be substantially outweighed by the disadvantages of vagueness foregone.

The usual argument to show that Causal Determinism entails that our actions are determined by factors at no time under our control is defective. Though repairs suggest themselves, none are both plausible and obviously adequate. I substantiate these claims in turn.

The last half-century has witnessed a resurgence of interest in Aristotle's Topics and his theory of dialectic—culminating in J. D. G. Evan's book about Aristotle's concept of dialectic; the decision to devote the entire Third Symposium Aristotelicum to the Topics; and the appearance of a small but steady stream of articles, several of which are now conveniently bound together in the first volume of Articles on Aristotle, edited by Barnes, Schofield, and Sorabji. These studies provide two somewhat incompatible views of Aristotle's dialectic. On the one hand, it is argued that dialectic—as a method parallel but inferior to demonstration—was superseded by the discovery of the scientific method, or that dialectic—as a method of discussing first principles and of eliciting assent during debate—is at best a propadeutic to philosophic inquiry. These assessments are a consequence of the view that, what ever its strengths, dialectic can never transcend the level of opinion (endoxa) with which it begins, so as to achieve knowledge or certainty. At the other side of the spectrum are those who maintain that in addition t o having nonphilosophic uses, for Aristotle dialectical inquiry is often an integral part of philosophic investigation and, on occasion, its most important part. To some, dialectic's role in philosophic investigation is limited to the verification of definitions already discovered and to bringing an investigator to the threshold of discovering first principles, to others, dialectic's last stage (resolution, euporia) comprises part of the philosophic discovery itself.

This text views the case of Quebec nationalism from the vantage point of the debate between Habermas and Taylor on this question. This case highlights the problem of articulating the sphere of civic rights, whose claims are universalist, to that of culture and collective identity, whose essence is particularist. It seems that the multinational context of the Quebec-Canada confrontation needs to be approached in a manner that cannot be fulfilled by a strict proceduralism and a purely formal universalism. The Habermasian position will thus be criticized for these reasons, while Taylor's stance, which contemplates the integration of material considerations in a dialogue open to ideological alterity, will be taken into account so as to make up for the shortcomings of the former.

Would the occurrence of a miracle be evidence for or against the existence of God? Christine Overall and Robert Larmer have a longstanding debate over this question. In this paper, I argue that their respective positive accounts are not quite right and some important criticisms each levies against the other fail. I then move the debate forward by identifying and synthesizing what is correct in their respective accounts.

This article attempts to define the status of the political order in Pascal's thought by examining the coherence of the fragments on custom, imagination, force and justice in the Pensées. Situating this order between divine Justice and unjust human justice, Pascal offers a contribution to the Augustinian account of the relationship between moral and political existence by his description of the experience of temporal authority and of the spiritual skill which that experience requires.