In this article, I study Richard’s paradox, and I consider several of its solutions. I then restate the paradox using Kolmogorov’s theory of complexity. Taking as a starting point Chaitin’s demonstration that Kolmogorov’s understanding of «complexity» is only relative, I put forth a new solution to the paradox.

Epistemic contextualism was devised mainly to provide a solution to the problem of skepticism based on a thesis about the truth conditions of knowledge attributing sentences. In this paper, I’ll examine two possible semantic bases of epistemic contextualism i.e., (i) the epistemic standard is an unarticulated constituent, (ii) the epistemic standard is a hidden variable. After showing that the unarticulated constituent thesis is incompatible with epistemic contextualism, I’ll argue that the hidden variable account remains unconvincing. My aim in this paper is to show that questions remain that must be answered before epistemic contextualism can claim success in the project of resolving skepticism.

In this paper, I sketch a fictionalist interpretation of Whitehead’s metatheory of metaphysics from Process and Reality. I hold that he engages in a program of foundational research in philosophical cosmology and I interpret his metatheoretical remarks accordingly, in the framework of scientific structuralism.

Developing Thomas Nagel’s 1969 paper, Rockney Jacobsen argues that sexual desires are for activities that are taken to affect states of sexual arousal in certain ways. I argue that some sexual desires are for activities that are taken to affect states of phenomenal attraction (phenomenal states associated with sexual attraction). Unlike sexual arousal, phenomenal attraction cannot be assuaged; thus, there are no activities that can satisfy phenomenal attraction-based sexual desires. This explains why sexual activities are so varied and numerous, and possibly how so many activities are able to affect sexual arousal.

This paper is informed by two principles: the Partiality Principle and the Impartiality Principle. Relying upon a relatively-unknown argument in Kant, the latter principle is stated and defended. The former principle is shown to be connected to Annas’ claim, in her theory of virtue ethics, that no mature, responsible adult wants to be told what to do, as well as to her developmental account of teaching and learning of virtue. I argue that Annas’ theory of virtue ethics is susceptible, as Kant’s theory is not, either to the Circularity Objection or (inclusive) to the Relativism Objection.

The concept of modernity, according to Michel Foucault and Marcel Gauchet, is closely related to the idea of a new form of power. While Foucault analyzes power from within, Gauchet develops a theory of power based on a relation to externality. Both perceive the asylum as one of the most representative settings of this modern form of power. I show that Gauchet’s model preserves Foucault’s contribution, while giving it a new significance.

In the Science of Logic and Philosophical Encyclopaedia, Hegel reconstructs Kant’s Critical philosophy by developing: a transcendental logic in the Science of Logic and Philosophy of Nature (§2), a pragmatic account of the a priori (§3), and a crucial use of the verb “realisieren” in connection with concepts and principles (§4). These three points are central to Hegel’s specifically cognitive semantics, which Hegel developed from Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference into a systematic, pragmatic realism. Hegel’s re-analysis of Kant’s Critical philosophy is thus the first and still one of the most adequate forms of pragmatic realism.