Is a policy of economic growth compatible with the neutrality of the State? Some liberals (Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman, Larmore, Kymlicka) think so. I do not. I begin by explaining and discussing the different meanings of the neutrality thesis, then I show that, whatever meaning we give to the idea of neutrality, it is very difficult to argue convincingly that a policy of economic growth does not favour some conceptions of the good.

In this article I consider the Kantian preference for natural beauty from a socio-political point of view. Instead of only regarding the “intellectual” significance of beauty in nature as a symbol of morality, I show that the aesthetic appreciation of natural beauty must also be understood in its dialectical relation to society as “the place of antagonism.” By highlighting this dialectical understanding, I point out the socio-political contribution of aesthetic experience for the cultural progress of humanity. The fragility of beauty in the context of culture can be further interpreted as a symbol of the temporality of the project of perpetual peace in politics.

This, the latest volume in The Douglas Walton Encyclopedia of Argumentation—well, it's starting to look like that, anyway—is primarily concerned with four purported fallacies that involve an appeal to emotion: ad populum, ad misericordiam, ad baculum, and ad hominem. In very rough outline, the layout of the book is this. After some preliminary remarks about the four fallacies in the first chapter, and some remarks about the theoretical framework he will be working with in the second, Walton devotes a chapter apiece to each of the four in the order indicated above. A seventh chapter focuses on “borderline cases,” in which more than one of the so-called fallacies is involved, and an eighth summarizes and refines the findings of earlier chapters. As is obvious, The Place of Emotion is well organized; and, as would be a safe inference for anyone acquainted with any of Walton's work, it is written in a readily accessible and unpretentious style: a plain style, in the best sense of the term. Walton has something to say, and it's virtually impossible to miss it—and that independently of the fact that this book, like a number of his others, is somewhat repetitive. The Place of Emotion is one of those rare books that a specialist in a field would find of interest, but that could also be taught in an undergraduate course.

The Rational and the Moral Order, a work of sweeping scope and depth, opens with three problems: the Rationality Problem, briefly, is that the following set is inconsistent, although each of its elements seems true: our conduct cannot be rationally justified unless it promotes our own good; moral conduct is rationally justified; but morality often requires that we do things that do not promote our own good. The Motivation Problem distills to this: can something be a reason for someone to do something without its actually motivating him to do so (the so-called “externalist” position), or is being a motivator a necessary condition of being a reason for that person (the “internalist position”)? Finally, the Sanction Problem notes that, although it seems plausible and generally accepted that immorality should be sanctioned, it seems neither plausible, nor is it generally accepted, that irrationality should be. Why this asymmetry? I restrict my attention, in what follows, to aspects of Baier's fascinating discussion on the Rationality Problem and the Motivation Problem.

Do Wittgenstein's late philosophical writings represent a religious point of view? There is a good deal of evidence—including a number of Wittgenstein's own avowals—for an affirmative answer. Against this, there is the stark fact that Wittgenstein's late philosophical writings never directly discuss questions of God and religion. So, if they do represent a religious viewpoint, a correct account of it would, it seems, need to address subtleties and hidden tendencies. While a number of philosophical authors have offered such accounts, nothing resembling a consensus has so far emerged.